Rossticus said:
Thread Rollup:
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1699084153596379373.html
Gordo14 said:
Really good thread
Bret Devereaux @BretDevereaux
Ancient & military historian specializing in the Roman economy and military. PhD @UNChistory
Notice how any time Ukraine is experiencing anything less than full success, the 'realist' takes come out about how western support is cracking and we really all oughta just pack it up and give Putin what he wants? I don't think the analysis has really changed, though. 1/
It's still better for NATO interests if Russia's armed forces are bogged down in Ukraine than available for deployment elsewhere. It's still cheaper to supply Ukraine with the weapons they need than to divert resources to deal with an unencumbered Russia. 2/
It's still in the interests of the USA to signal determination through action here; there are arguments about if credibility travels or not, but I will note the Taiwanese certainly think it does (
https://nytimes.com/2023/05/30/us/politics/taiwan-ambassador-ukraine-china.html) and I am inclined to believe them. 3/
It would still be very bad for our interests if Russia was allowed to revise the status quo which says that international borders may not be redrawn by force. And the cost of supporting Ukraine is still small compared to the overall cost of our security infrastructure. 4/
And of course it is still the case that global American preeminence is substantially dependent on the United States' self-presentation as the defender of democracy and of liberal democracies, so it would be a blow to American soft power not to do that here. 5/
None of that calculus has changed. And meanwhile the Ukrainian people and their elected leaders retain the will and determination to continue to resist Russian aggression. If that changes, we can have a discussion, but right now they want victory as much as peace. 6/
Does that mean we shouldn't be looking at de-escalation and war-termination scenarios? Of course not. War is bad. But because of our interest calculus, the bar for acceptable war termination scenarios right now is pretty damn high. As it should be! 7/
A lot of these "I was for it, but only so long as it was easy" takes seem to have fundamentally misunderstood what kind of war this was always going to be. Back in Feb. of 2022 the consensus I saw was that outcomes ranged from "long insurgency" to "long conventional war." 8/
That was what I put in writing as my best assessment of the western consensus here (
https://acoup.blog/2022/02/25/miscellanea-understanding-the-war-in-ukraine/) on Feb 25th. And on that assessment, we are basically on the leading edge of "best case outcomes for Ukraine" right now. 9/
In short, there is not a lot of actual realism in these 'realist' takes. To be blunt, I think a proper realist analysis, one focused on interests, would conclude that it is in NATO's interest to twist the knife in Putin's self-inflicted wound as sharply as possible. 10/
Instead, what I think we're seeing is efforts by folks to smuggle back into the discussion priors which were fatally undermined by the course of the war to date under the label of 'realism.'
And that's not realism - that's an ideological commitment masquerading as realism. /end.
I should add one thing, which is the argument that the other economic costs (mostly energy costs) to the West are too high. Those costs are baked in. Russian gas isn't coming back to Europe. That cost is as sunk as the Moskva and so doesn't figure in peace analysis.