Gordo14 said:
I would say it's really dumb to say sanctions aren't working. Russian quality of life is in steep decline by every metric. There are lots of ways to patch over weaknesses in the economy that are temporary - not permenant solutions. For example, using foreign currency reserves to prop up the value of your currency. That works for a time, but it didn't work forever for countries like Venezuela or Sri Lanka and the situation absolutely can deteriorate very quickly.
That's a lot of unsupported assertions to back up your conclusion. The NYT piece seems to provide metrics for their 'dumb' analyses:
Quote:
"A surge in trade by Russia's neighbors and allies hints at one reason its economy remains so resilient after sweeping sanctions."
The NYT story said, "Russian trade appears to have largely bounced back to where it was before the invasion of Ukraine last February. Analysts estimate that Russia's imports may have already recovered to prewar levels, or will soon do so, depending on their models.
"In part, that could be because many nations have found Russia hard to quit. Recent research showed that fewer than 9% of companies based in the European Union and Group of 7 nations had divested one of their Russian subsidiaries. And maritime tracking firms have seen a surge in activity by shipping fleets that may be helping Russia to export its energy, apparently bypassing Western restrictions on those sales."
NYT reported, "Some parts of the Russian economy are struggling, Sergey Aleksashenko, former deputy minister of finance of the Russian Federation, said, pointing to car factories that shut down after being unable to secure parts from Germany, France, Japan and South Korea. But military expenditures and higher energy prices helped prop it up last year."
The euro was worth 90 rubles when sanctions began. Now the euro is worth 77.
I said at the time economic sanctions do not work. Let us review:
- 40 years of economic sanctions have not stopped Iran.
- 60 years of economic sanctions have not stopped Cuba.
- 70 years of economic sanctions have not stopped North Korea.
This time it will be different, right? Last June 15, Business Insider a Democrat tool spun it as, "Biden officials worry their Russia sanctions were so powerful they also brought economic suffering to the U.S., report says."
The IMF said last week the
Russian economy is expanding this year: Quote:
The IMF has said Russian output will expand 0.3 per cent in this year and 2.1 per cent next year, defying earlier predictions. Russia has been tipped as an emerging economy as it continues to trade with other countries and there predicted downtown has not been as severe as they feared. A spokesman from the fund said: "At the current oil price cap level of the G7, Russian crude oil export volumes are not expected to be significantly affected, with Russian trade continuing to be redirected from sanctioning to non-sanctioning countries."
I do think they have cut down on Russian GDP growth/hit their finances some, just to be clear. But that doesn't mean they are working, toward a real objective. And we're
not willing to punish others of consequence for doing more business with Russia, obviously.
I guess my question would be; when did sanctions cause a war to stop/end prematurely/the invading country to retreat? When are sanctions on Russia expected by one who disagrees with this, to have what impact that can be measured?
There is a possibility of
further pushback due to the sanctions impact on 'the west':
Quote:
The US' "Lead From Behind" subordinate for "managing" European affairs as part of its new so-called "burden-sharing" strategy, Germany, has more than enough levers of economic, institutional, and political influence to several punish any of those lower-tier American vassals who get out of place. It's therefore unrealistic to expect any single EU member to unilaterally defy the bloc's anti-Russian sanctions that their own government previously agreed to.
Considering this reality, those leaders who want to remain in power or at least not risk the US' German-driven Hybrid War wrath against their economies are loath restore a semblance of their largely lost sovereignty in such a dramatic manner. Instead, their most pragmatic course of action is to not participate in the military aspect of this proxy war by refusing to dispatch arms to Kiev exactly as the emerging Central European pragmatic bloc of Austria, Croatia, and Hungary have done.
The population of those countries are thus unlikely to protest against the sanctions even after being made aware of the facts contained in the NYT's latest piece and naturally coming to the conclusion that the anti-Russian sanctions have only harmed their own economies and not that targeted Great Power's. Folks in France, Germany, and Italy, however, could very well react differently, especially considering their tradition of organizing massive protests.