From my experience in Internal Audit, I think you are missing very grave points in the results (U) section.drcrinum said:
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2019/a20009.pdf#page=2
Here's a link to the OIG report on validating confidential human sources.
I've scanned it. There are no citations or specific incidents/procedures/applications that identify any individual persons or FBI sections involved...all generalities...so there is no way to directly assess anything with respect to SpyGate or its associated actors IMO.
This was a process audit, about key people following / implementing a key process. Any of you who have heard the term "Material Weakness", should be able to translate that impact to "significant weakness" in this report. Material Weaknesses will often end up as sanctions from the SEC...
This process audit opens Manager / Director types to varying levels of organizational punishments, from slaps on the wrists all the way up to termination. These are not civil or criminal findings, but governance transgressions. Horowitz knows who is in each position, though, which will enable enforcement of penalties or punishments on the individual.
It will be up to Barr as the top of the organizational pyramid in DoJ to determine what actions can/need to be taken.
Again, while this report does not yield a list of names and civil/criminal actions to punish, it does reveal how pitifully this FBI CHS program has been operated, especially the part about re-assigning people during sequestration . If this were a large corporation, there would be h_ll to pay, IMO.