Haha - not a true believer, huh?

In that article I was imagining what happens to things other than the F-35.

They come in to land, and increase their radar signature in the process. They refuel and rearm while China launches an attack. The plane takes off… leaving fuel and munitions and Marines on the deck. Remember that incoming attack? Do they sprint to the woods? Do they exfil somehow?

If detectability is a huge concern - can they even get Ospreys and 53's to do the staging and retrograde

If the EAOB is a strip of road on an island… what about locals?

I can barely see how we could slip in and hide area denial units with anti-air and anti-ship weapons inside China's AO using small landing craft. Using EAOBs for F-35s sounds like someone finally realized that carriers won't be able to get close enough to the fight any longer and they're looking for a way to stay relevant (I.e. Lilly pads that give them a chance to hop close enough to participate in the fight).

It's the F35B's that have the issue with range, the Navy's F35C's won't have an issue.

I think it's a traditional Cavalry scout type roles, where they will infiltrate and assume a strike position, execute the strike then exfill or occupy an island to protect the flank of a larger force conducting a strike elsewhere. Then pull out once that strike is over.

Anti-ship missiles have increased range far beyond the operational ranges for any modern fighter. An extra 20% range is nice, but still demands aerial refueling if the carrier is going to maintain stand-off.

Carriers in 2023 are like battleships in 1953. Sure, they can be super useful, but against a peer/near-peer adversary the threats will likely push them so far back as to neutralize much of their ability to project force.

Unwise divestments are crippling US Marine Corps aviation (marinecorpstimes.com)

Interesting article about the changes being made to aviation. Op Ed by former CMC, ACMC and CG of MCCDC.

Van Riper and Zinni laid it bare in this debate.

Interesting conversation - I've also wondered about how EAOBs don't become death traps when counter-battery IDs the rock your launcher is on. Shoot & Scoot options may be a bit limited on remote tropical islands.

Part of me wonders if that's the unspoken logic to fielding so many launchers: have enough that launcher and crew can be sacrificed without strategic impact.

As a former Marine here the Corps is abandoning the principles of maneuver warfare in this Force Design 2030. Maneuver Warfare is what has always what made Marines good at what we do. To get rid of that core trait is a huge blow.

Article on USMC Maneuver Warfare Doctrine

chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/Marine-Corps-Maneuver-Warfare-1.pdf

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/navy-wants-to-sell-off-six-nearly-new-littoral-combat-ships

Navy looking to decommission 6, maybe more, littoral combat ships. This has to be a backwards step in our goal to force project Marines quickly in and out of places I would think? Some of these ships are less than 5 years old. I see we have a few LHA/LPDs commissioning over the next few years but still the number of hulls we have with this capability looks to stay stagnant over the next few years instead of increasing.

I know the LCS class has seen a large number of complaints but this seems like a pretty drastic step overall. Anyone with further insight to this? Just curious on my end.

The admirals slighting the Corps as an inconvenient collateral duty and half-assing their support?! Never!!!

My understanding is the LCS doesn't have the ability to sustain itself anywhere for very long and can't get it self anywhere on it's own, add to that issues with hull, engine, and low crew numbers and you have a ship that's probably better suited for the coast guard than a blue water navy.

A conflict with China will be a blue water fight. Yes the south china sea is small and shallow but you have to get there and stay there and dominate the ocean around it if you want to win the fight.

The new frigates will replace the LCS in the force structure. You can sail a frigate from San Diego to the South China sea you have to put an LCS on a transport ship just to get it to the theater.

Eliminatus said:

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https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/navy-wants-to-sell-off-six-nearly-new-littoral-combat-ships

Navy looking to decommission 6, maybe more, littoral combat ships. This has to be a backwards step in our goal to force project Marines quickly in and out of places I would think? Some of these ships are less than 5 years old. I see we have a few LHA/LPDs commissioning over the next few years but still the number of hulls we have with this capability looks to stay stagnant over the next few years instead of increasing.

I know the LCS class has seen a large number of complaints but this seems like a pretty drastic step overall. Anyone with further insight to this? Just curious on my end.

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The LCS as a concept is a contradiction. It was to operate in greenwater which means within range of shore launched cruise missile but they had neither the ability to defeat a substantial number of enemy missiles nor the ability to sustain a hit and keep fighting. They carried a lot of firepower to support a landing force but, can't actually deliver a landing force except for a small force launching on helps withoutground vehiclesor heavy weapons.

The LCS's were bought from different vendors as essentially COTS products and had almost no interchangeable parts between the ships from different vendors. The LCS wasn't able to logistically support a landing force or carry many aircraft. It was a formidable threat to enemy vessels in the littoral region but it's not much in terms of being an enablers for the landing force.

https://americanmilitarynews.com/2023/05/congress-must-save-the-marine-corps/

Makes me think of Wake Island.

Me too.

Ulysses90 said:

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Van Riper and Zinni laid it bare in this debate.

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I love me some General Zinni. That guy is incredibly sharp for anyone, but especially someone his age. I'm glad I got his perspective on this. I also thought it was telling how Zinni wondered why Berger got retired O-5/6 input and didn't ask for any from the retired flag officers. Who was giving the pro 2030? A retired colonel.

Dale Alford has been in combat at every rank from 2ndLt to Major General. This is the type of guy whose views on FD 2030 should be listened to very carefully. In this interview he's not talking about FD 2030 but rather the breadth of missions that the Marine Corps was called to do over 37 years when he was in uniform and the preparation needed to execute the full spectrum of conflict.

https://player.fm/series/controversy-clarity/ep-2-dale-alford

The incoming commandant is all in on continuing the Corp's transformation.

SMITH

A young commander discusses the pros and cons.

2030

A review of both sides of the debate.

CHANGE

And some may not know, Smith is a BQ '87.

As it should be !

We all don't self advertise.

Eliminatus said:

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https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/navy-wants-to-sell-off-six-nearly-new-littoral-combat-ships

Navy looking to decommission 6, maybe more, littoral combat ships. This has to be a backwards step in our goal to force project Marines quickly in and out of places I would think? Some of these ships are less than 5 years old. I see we have a few LHA/LPDs commissioning over the next few years but still the number of hulls we have with this capability looks to stay stagnant over the next few years instead of increasing.

I know the LCS class has seen a large number of complaints but this seems like a pretty drastic step overall. Anyone with further insight to this? Just curious on my end.

---

Confusing comment. The LCS is a small warship which was not designed "to force project Marines in and out of places." But, like other warships, it can be tasked as an escort. Unlike the Freedom class LCS, the Independence class LCS ships are not programmed for early retirement and the Navy has assigned all of them to operate in the Pacific littorals, primarily in the naval mine clearing mission.

Here's the essence of the current USMC-USN disagreement over amphibs: LIFT

Corps continuing to exercise and experiment with the Marine Littoral Regiment as it refines its composition. Presently, it includes three primary elements: Combat Team (Battalion), Anti-Air Battalion and the Logistics Battalion. Here's an update on the Combat Team: INFANTRY

The Army is assuming responsibility for an amphibious transport capability in the first island chain for which the Marine Corps will not have a comparable capability anywhere in the PACOM AO.

https://www.stripes.com/branches/army/2023-07-03/army-watercraft-unit-japan-flynn-10625126.html

The movement of troops and supplies in LCUs isn't sexy but in the spectrum of conflict below a direct hostile exchange of fire between the US and China, the 13 vessel Army fleet will be of far more relevance in the region of the Philippines, Japan, and Taiwan than any of the EABO outposts and vessels that the Marine Corps is investing (or not investing) in Guam.

There is a vast amount of transport of troops and supplies in that region that is necessary to contest Chinese expansion that happens before armed conflict begins. If it is done successfully, those operations to reinforce JDF, Philippines, and Taiwan can deter and delay Chinese expansion. USARPAC is taking the lead in these activities while the FD2030 vision of the anointed is focused on a high intensity fight to retake lost ground in the first island chain with forces that are supplied and transported long distances from the second island chain. That does not make sense to me.

Ulysses90 said:

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The Army is assuming responsibility for an amphibious transport capability in the first island chain for which the Marine Corps will not have a comparable capability anywhere in the PACOM AO.

https://www.stripes.com/branches/army/2023-07-03/army-watercraft-unit-japan-flynn-10625126.html

The movement of troops and supplies in LCUs isn't sexy but in the spectrum of conflict below a direct hostile exchange of fire between the US and China, the 13 vessel Army fleet will be of far more relevance in the region of the Philippines, Japan, and Taiwan than any of the EABO outposts and vessels that the Marine Corps is investing (or not investing) in Guam.

There is a vast amount of transport of troops and supplies in that region that is necessary to contest Chinese expansion that happens before armed conflict begins. If it is done successfully, those operations to reinforce JDF, Philippines, and Taiwan can deter and delay Chinese expansion. USARPAC is taking the lead in these activities while the FD2030 vision of the anointed is focused on a high intensity fight to retake lost ground in the first island chain with forces that are supplied and transported long distances from the second island chain. That does not make sense to me.

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It doesn't make sense to the Marines either, which is why they're not planning to do that. Nothing in FD2030 talks about going toe-to-toe with the Chinese in a high intensity fight. More importantly, the operational guidance that FD2030 is trying to implement--Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO)--doesn't say that either. The plethora of readings linked here, particularly in the first few pages, spells out EABO/FD2030's sea control focus in support of a naval campaign, rather than land battles to retake islands from the Chinese.

Berger: "Such heavy capabilities are found in abundance elsewhere in the joint force inventory, and I am confident that we can rely on them to be there to support Marines in any high-end ground combat scenario into which we may find ourselves drawn. Even Marine infantry battalions, the capability perhaps most central to my Service's historical record and self-image, will become fewer and perhaps smaller, a move that is fully justifiable in a force that will no longer be sized for large-scale sustained ground combat. Changes in these key units will be informed by the recent experiences of highly distributable ground units operating within adversary weapons engagements zones, including those of our own special operations forces. On the other hand, existing capabilities that promise to make us more competitive under the realities of the precision strike regime will increase. Long-range rocket artillery and high- endurance unmanned aerial vehicles, for example, are obvious contributors in this space and will be making their appearance in greater numbers enhancing the ability of future naval forces to win the reconnaissance versus counter reconnaissance competition and "fire effectively first."

Anyway, it's titled FD2030 for a reason, because there's still years of experimentation to come to find the right balance of structure and capability for the Corps to better support the Navy rather than trying to be a mini-Army.

nm

While the senior leadership of the Corps is figuring out the 'right balance' for EABO, they are failing to maintain a continuous forward deployed ready force.

https://breakingdefense.com/2023/07/4-of-5-last-marines-arg-meu-deployments-were-delayed-official/

As MEU deployments are gapped, contingencies happen while there's no ready force on station. Irrespective of whether one believes that the GCE close combat foeces can shrink because of standoff weapons, the inability to conduct NEOs and TRAP is a serious problem created by the tradeoffs made to fund FD2030. This wasn't advertised to anyone as an accepted risk for divested structure.

What does the inability of the Navy to provide sufficient amphibious ships ready for deployment have to do with the Corps re-organizing itself? Any gapping that has occurred is not due to a lack of Marines, but to the unavailability of Navy supplied amphibious lift for them to first train on and then transport them to a mission area.

Ithas to do with FD 2030 because the Commandant traded away the agreement in place since 2009 that the Navy would maintain 38 amphibious class ships and drop to 31. As explained in the article above, 31 means only 24 in a mission ready state.

https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/opinion/commentary/2023/05/06/marines-slam-a-shrinking-amphibious-fleet-but-the-navy-isnt-to-blame/

That's a shipbuilding disagreement between the Navy and the Marine Corps, with the Navy happily not building large amphibious ships, but failing to move out building the replacement medium amphibs the Marines asked for.

Again, that doesn't invalidate the Corps re-organization, nor support your assertion that there aren't sufficient Marines available because of FD2030, it simply indicts the contentious USN-USMC shipbuilding justification process which has almost always produced ships late to need.

https://breakingdefense.com/2023/06/to-cool-the-war-over-amphibs-the-navy-and-marines-need-a-clearer-justification/

….and, btw, what does any of this have to do with the misrepresentation of FD2030 as "focused on a high intensity fight to retake lost ground in the first island chain", which is what I originally responded to?

FD 2030 is singularly focused on the Chinese Navy as the pacing threat for the Marine Corps. Why is it focused on the second island chain rather than the first? If missile defenses can protect a base on Guam and far smaller islands farther out in the Pacific, why not Palawan? What is it that EABO can provide in terms defending farther back that cannot be done from closer?

One of the FD 2030 investments is another C-130J squadron but it's based in Hawaii. When the Marine Corps is doing EABO on small islands thousands of miles to the east, what is happening, or envisioned to have already happened to US bases at Iwakuni, Atsugi, Kadenw, and Camp Hansen? How is anything in the FD 2030 portfolio going to be able to reinforce, resupply, or evacuate those forces that aren't moving west? What good are C-130Js based in Hawaii going to do to shape the fight of forces on the other side of the date line?

How much petroleum does the stand-in force consume once hostilities begin and sea lanes are contested? How much do they carry with them and are there expeditionary advanced base fuel farms? What vessel refills the fuel tanks? Will these fuel farms be any more invisible to the Chinese that the fuel farms in the Donbas are to the Ukrainians? We still haven't seen whatever it is that constitutes the "low observable" technology on which the survivability of these small outposts depend.

Where is the medical treatment for the wounded on these EABs and ho far are the wounded transportes during the golden hour?

The USMC leadership hasn't answered any of these questions or identified the funded manpower structure and >TRL6 technology.