Here's another stupid question: What happens to all those officers and NCOs who are leading the soon to be dissolved armor units? Do most of them just get the boot or do they get sent to learn a new MOS?
MASSIVE changes coming to USMC
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Last: 10 mo ago by Get Off My Lawn
This is a 10 year plan, aimed at 2030. Most will have separated, retired or been re-trained by the time this thing comes to full fruition.
The career force Marines will probably be given an opportunity to lat-move into a short MOS. That's going to eb a difficult pill to swallow for Tankers because none of the combat arms MOS's are short and there is also going to be a surplus of infantry and artillery Marines as those units draw down numbers as well. I have a friend who commanded 1st Tanks about 16 years ago and he's not at all happy about the demise of Marine Corps Tanks. He vented quite a bit on Facebook. Here's one of his more creative posts.
74OA said:
........and as the Commandant says, there are still many unanswered questions remaining and the time between now and 2030 will be spent in intensive experimentation and analysis to drill down to the answers. Stand by.
This. I wonder if the Marines, if indeed their mission is going to be more in the island taking mode have considered the need for armor is gone? The PLA Ground Forces have their Type 15 "light tank" equipped with a 1000 hp engine and 105 mm MTG. It is 33-36 tons depending on armor package and designed for use in less than ideal terrain for tanks. I don't think any military force, no matter how high tech, should rule out the possibility that combat won't devolve into an infantry/armor slugging match at some point.
“If you’re going to have crime it should at least be organized crime”
-Havelock Vetinari
-Havelock Vetinari
Because the Marines have no intention of going toe to toe with the Chinese army.
Here's the concept: LOCE
Here's the concept: LOCE
74OA said:
Because the Marines have no intention of going toe to toe with the Chinese army.
Here's the concept: LOCE
That may be the present thinking, but Marines have historically picked up additional missions because the Army takes time to get there. Marines have been on land in WW1 fighting as regular infantry, in WW 2 as amphibious assault, in Korea as regular infantry and amphibious assault and in the latter two instances have needed armor. I would not sacrifice all arms capability if I was the CMC.
“If you’re going to have crime it should at least be organized crime”
-Havelock Vetinari
-Havelock Vetinari
I believe the force designers in the Corps worry a lot about the problems described in Michael Yon's essay The Amber of War.
https://www.michaelyon-online.com/amber-of-war.htm
https://www.michaelyon-online.com/amber-of-war.htm
I got through about a page and half before my eyes started hurting and had to stop. Can't believe someone writing a professional article would choose those colors for background and font. I may just copy and paste later to make it through.Ulysses90 said:
I believe the force designers in the Corps worry a lot about the problems described in Michael Yon's essay The Amber of War.
https://www.michaelyon-online.com/amber-of-war.htm
ETA: Alright made it through. Yup, mud sucks. Yup, we are not prepared for it. Shocking reality hit me personally my second week in Iraq as a fresh boot. Looking for a suspected weapons cache in a farmers field. Received some pot shots at us. Mud sucked my boot right off. My well tied boot I might add. Blew my mind. Harsh awakening for sure. Turned our normal combat shuffle (from our heavy ass gear) to a combat crawl and slither. About 100% not fun. Lost a hand held Surefire once too when I tripped and fell in some deep mud. Like, that thing disappeared. Never did find it. Double sucked because it was serialized. And definitely seen my fair share of stuck vehicles. Completely stops a mission dead in its tracks.
I don't even know if there is a true solution possible, but I hope attention is being paid to it.
UTExan said:74OA said:
Because the Marines have no intention of going toe to toe with the Chinese army.
Here's the concept: LOCE
That may be the present thinking, but Marines have historically picked up additional missions because the Army takes time to get there. Marines have been on land in WW1 fighting as regular infantry, in WW 2 as amphibious assault, in Korea as regular infantry and amphibious assault and in the latter two instances have needed armor. I would not sacrifice all arms capability if I was the CMC.
If you were the CMC, you would have to make choices.. ..not an option to avoid making hard force development choices in this environment (resource constrained - eroding capabilities vs China - aging equipment). So, you can't have new long range fires, new rotary wing, new jets, new amphibious vehicles, and new tanks. Where would you make those hard choices? Obviously not a Marine so I'm curious what some of you would do.
I am an Army guy, too, but the hard choice to me would be preparing my forces to counter every threat. I cannot help but recall the Japanese campaign in the Malay peninsula during the early days of WW2: Resourceful Japanese infantry and light armor skipped down the peninsula to Singapore, while the British could neither turn their seaward facing cannon inland nor have any armor at all to counter the minimalist armor of the Japanese. I WOULD plan to go toe to toe with the PLA with Marines if that's what I had during a multi-theater struggle. I know there has been some thinking going into lighter armor and it probably has a place in the Pacific. This would not be for the purpose of creating a smaller army, but rather a flexible all-arms striking force intended for island/coastal operations.Fly Army 97 said:UTExan said:74OA said:
Because the Marines have no intention of going toe to toe with the Chinese army.
Here's the concept: LOCE
That may be the present thinking, but Marines have historically picked up additional missions because the Army takes time to get there. Marines have been on land in WW1 fighting as regular infantry, in WW 2 as amphibious assault, in Korea as regular infantry and amphibious assault and in the latter two instances have needed armor. I would not sacrifice all arms capability if I was the CMC.
If you were the CMC, you would have to make choices.. ..not an option to avoid making hard force development choices in this environment (resource constrained - eroding capabilities vs China - aging equipment). So, you can't have new long range fires, new rotary wing, new jets, new amphibious vehicles, and new tanks. Where would you make those hard choices? Obviously not a Marine so I'm curious what some of you would do.
Edit to say that the Japanese inflicted what Churchill called the "worst" defeat in British military history, netting 130,000 Brit, Aussie and Indian POWs. We cannot assume eternal air/fires superiority so I would want some firepower on the ground right there at the scene, like the 105mm MTG of an armored vehicle at minimum.
“If you’re going to have crime it should at least be organized crime”
-Havelock Vetinari
-Havelock Vetinari
Some here are trying to prepare the Corps to fight the last war. The Commandant is thinking about the next war and what the Marine's primary role in it will be. Sea control in direct support of the Navy seems to be the answer that both Services have agreed upon. It is a return to the Corps' maritime roots.
The Corps' thought process and supporting field experiments to figure out how to do sea control will last thru 2030. There will be lots of adjustments in between as successful concepts and equipment are refined and the failures are discarded.
But if you don't invest the time to read up on the Corps' thinking it's going to be difficult to comment intelligently on the tradeoffs it makes going forward. There are a bunch of links in this thread which, if read thru, are a start.
The Corps' thought process and supporting field experiments to figure out how to do sea control will last thru 2030. There will be lots of adjustments in between as successful concepts and equipment are refined and the failures are discarded.
But if you don't invest the time to read up on the Corps' thinking it's going to be difficult to comment intelligently on the tradeoffs it makes going forward. There are a bunch of links in this thread which, if read thru, are a start.
74 - We are in agreement...I think. The Joint Force is preparing to fight and win in 2030, and that is right around the corner in terms of concept development, acquisition, and force development. The USMC is not a separate force that can fight without the joint force behind, with, and embedded with USMC employment.
The Joint Warfigting Concept (under development) will surely influence the Navy and USMC execution of their own concepts and force development...but those developments resultant resourcing decisions take place in the here and now. Future Year Defense Plan FY21-25 is already past most reviews...that's accounting for half the decade. This next year is crucial to get this right for the USMC. Just my two cents.
The Joint Warfigting Concept (under development) will surely influence the Navy and USMC execution of their own concepts and force development...but those developments resultant resourcing decisions take place in the here and now. Future Year Defense Plan FY21-25 is already past most reviews...that's accounting for half the decade. This next year is crucial to get this right for the USMC. Just my two cents.
No, there's no disagreement on that. We will definitely fight as a joint force.
I was commenting on some people repeatedly insisting that aspects of the Marines transformation (shedding armor, for example) is a mistake without taking the time to read why the Corps believes doing so is necessary.
None of this is being done willy-nilly, as a quick read of the Commandant's "Corps 2030" document posted earlier attests.
I was commenting on some people repeatedly insisting that aspects of the Marines transformation (shedding armor, for example) is a mistake without taking the time to read why the Corps believes doing so is necessary.
None of this is being done willy-nilly, as a quick read of the Commandant's "Corps 2030" document posted earlier attests.
Related news: Mini-amphibs
I am pleased to see that article on the initiative to acquire the stern loading landing craft. I believe that this is an admission that the long sought after high water speed and long range (over the horizon) swim capability for the ACV is not technically feasible or affordable. It only took ~2 decades fort he Corps to reach the realization that launching combat vehicles from over the horizon to swim ~12-24 nautical miles to the beach is a concept that is only lacking the discovery of dilithium crystals to be workable.
The senior leadership of the Corps was buying into the planing vechicle load of crap since 2000. You just can cram enough kilojoules of petroleum energy into an armored amphibious combat vehicle to move it from blue water to the beach quickly. That finally seems to have dawned on the Amtrac mafia. They need these shipt ot shore connectors.
The senior leadership of the Corps was buying into the planing vechicle load of crap since 2000. You just can cram enough kilojoules of petroleum energy into an armored amphibious combat vehicle to move it from blue water to the beach quickly. That finally seems to have dawned on the Amtrac mafia. They need these shipt ot shore connectors.
I noted that these ships are rated for sea state 5 (I think the concept is quite interesting, BTW). Is that the rating for the current amphibious vessels and how might that inhibit movement of assets to critical areas?74OA said:
Related news: Mini-amphibs
And another consideration:
Quote:
Berger's vision of dispersed, small-unit operations closely resembles how special operations forces operate today. As the new guidance is implemented, the Marine Corps and U.S. Special Operations Command should increasingly work together to develop new operational concepts and capabilities including weapons, communications gear, intelligence systems, and insertion platforms. But Berger also needs to learn an important lesson from special operations forces about what distributed operations require. Special operators routinely conduct highly independent missions characterized by high risk, great agility, and little oversight. In order to do so effectively, they are nearly always older than conventional troops, trained for much longer periods, and carefully screened for maturity and psychological toughness. But today, the Marine Corps (and the Army) typically puts its youngest and least-experienced people at the cutting edge of the battlefield. Berger's vision may require the Corps to rethink its model of fighting primarily with 18-year-old marines which would be another culture-shattering challenge for the 21st-century Marine Corps.
https://warontherocks.com/2019/10/a-striking-new-vision-for-the-marines-and-a-wakeup-call-for-the-other-services/
“If you’re going to have crime it should at least be organized crime”
-Havelock Vetinari
-Havelock Vetinari
.........again, these are good examples of why it's called, "Force Structure 2030". The Corps will use the next ten years to experiment and find out what works and what doesn't.
The Commandant's own "2030" update document linked above is full of such open questions. I find the Marine's search for out-of-the-box answers to those questions great reading.
The Commandant's own "2030" update document linked above is full of such open questions. I find the Marine's search for out-of-the-box answers to those questions great reading.
74OA said:
.........again, these are good examples of why it's called, "Force Structure 2030". The Corps will use the next ten years to experiment and find out what works and what doesn't.
The Commandant's own "2030" update document linked above is full of such open questions. I find the Marine's search for out-of-the-box answers to those questions great reading.
And no doubt new technologies and weapons will emerge, which will lead to more questions rather than answers. I like Berger's ideas on more independence down to various unit levels and hope he generates a vigorous debate within all armed forces. But I don't see armored forces going away anytime soon as long as the plains in Europe, Asia or anywhere else exist.
“If you’re going to have crime it should at least be organized crime”
-Havelock Vetinari
-Havelock Vetinari
Quote:
Berger's vision may require the Corps to rethink its model of fighting primarily with 18-year-old marines which would be another culture-shattering challenge for the 21st-century Marine C
If this is truly what Gen Berger believes then he should just be upfront about the Marine Corps being an incubator for Marines, doctrine, and equipment that will be transfered to MARSOC under SOCOM. Gen Berger served a tour as an officer selection officer but he never served in an assignment on the enlisted recruiting or manpower planning.
There's a phenomenon that I have heard friends who are Army officers remark on which is that there seem to be a highly disproportionate number of cars all across the US with Marine Corps decals on them. The Marine Corps active component has never been even 50% the size of the active duty Army since the beginning of the all volunteer force and yet there seem to be as many or more Marine Corps decals. You could chalk some of it up to the Marine Corps' indoctrination (brainwashing) but there are still too many damn USMC Emblems, Semper Fi, and Oorah bumber stickers for that to be the sole factor.
The actual explanation for the phenomenon is that the Marine Corps' age demographic is as extremely skewed to the 18-22 year old age demographic as USASOC is to the 28-35 year old demographic. The Army, Navy, and the Air Force all have 18-22 year olds comprising between 18-19% of their total force. The Marine Corps has roughly double that percentage at 36%. On a per-recruit basis, the Marine Corps makes twice as many former Marines after the first term of enlistment as the Army does even before considering the slightly higher first term non-EAS attrition in the Marine Corps.
If Gen Berger wants older and saltier Marines to fill out the T/Os then it's going to require some cultural changes in the Corps that I don't believe anyone has contemplated. They will have to reshape the Corps' promotion and retension policies to something that will be alien to everyone in uniform except for recruits who have no experience with which to compare it. "Up or out" will become "up or maybe out but not just yet and we may decide to keep you around for a while."
I'm not sure this is what the CMC is saying. That article makes a lot of points, but let's not couch all special operations in the 12-man A Team Green. Rangers are still a young, highly trained, infantry force with highly skilled enablers to make it all happen - and the enlisted can come straight off the streets.
Disbursed operations does not equate to 10 man teams on an island. The evolving Navy and USMC-nested doctrine is what I am most interested to see.
Disbursed operations does not equate to 10 man teams on an island. The evolving Navy and USMC-nested doctrine is what I am most interested to see.
Agree. LOCE does not require upgrading the entire USMC into Tier 1 operators. The Marines are contemplating discreet, fast-moving roughly company-sized missions to conduct sea-denial ops. EABOFly Army 97 said:
I'm not sure this is what the CMC is saying. That article makes a lot of points, but let's not couch all special operations in the 12-man A Team Green. Rangers are still a young, highly trained, infantry force with highly skilled enablers to make it all happen - and the enlisted can come straight off the streets.
Disbursed operations does not equate to 10 man teams on an island. The evolving Navy and USMC-nested doctrine is what I am most interested to see.
"All told, EABO paints an interesting picture of what a possible conflict in a place like the South China Sea could look like. Rather than send high-value assets like an aircraft carrier or amphibious assault ship into a crowded and vulnerable location, long-range aircraft like the MV-22 Osprey would allow Marines to take up ground positions in a friendly nation like the Philippines, where they'd bring with them anti-ship and anti-air weapons and move around as needed to hit targets and to stay hidden from the enemy. These land-based units, then, help create a safer situation for high-value assets not just carriers and amphibs, but also logistics ships to come in when needed and then depart again."
" Such heavy capabilities are found in abundance elsewhere in the joint force inventory, and I am confident that we can rely on them to be there to support Marines in any high-end ground combat scenario into which we may find ourselves drawn. Even Marine infantry battalions, the capability perhaps most central to my Service's historical record and self-image, will become fewer and perhaps smaller, a move that is fully justifiable in a force that will no longer be sized for large-scale sustained ground combat. Changes in these key units will be informed by the recent experiences of highly distributable ground units operating within adversary weapons engagements zones, including those of our own special operations forces. On the other hand, existing capabilities that promise to make us more competitive under the realities of the precision strike regime will increase. Long-range rocket artillery and high- endurance unmanned aerial vehicles, for example, are obvious contributors in this space and will be making their appearance in greater numbers enhancing the ability of future naval forces to win the reconnaissance versus counter reconnaissance competition and "fire effectively first."
The Case for Change - Written by CMC
The Case for Change - Written by CMC
Pages 2-4 here summarize that excellent paper. It's the basis for the Corps' transformation.
Changes certainly make sense if the USMC is focused on becoming a regional force. The Commandant appears to be doing his best to meet the threats in the National Defense Strategy with a balance of cost and future budget considerations. Eliminating armor and reducing artillery will make them less agile for conflicts in Korea or Middle East. Hoping the planning assumptions being used are valid.
Good point on the NDS...if he kept everything, CMC would be accused of preparing for the last war. The NDS is clear on the pacing threat...and it's a Joint Force we are building, not a stand alone force that can do everything on it's own.stallion6 said:
Changes certainly make sense if the USMC is focused on becoming a regional force. The Commandant appears to be doing his best to meet the threats in the National Defense Strategy with a balance of cost and future budget considerations. Eliminating armor and reducing artillery will make them a less agile for conflicts in Korea or Middle East. Hoping the planning assumptions being used are valid.
I wonder if planners are always going to assume American air superiority for support/logistics/airspace denial? I would not do so. Even if I had to place some armored vehicle assets in reserve, I would do so. I just don't see some form of light armored vehicle losing its importance in ground warfare for the time being. The Russians and Chinese, who definitely plan Pacific expansion, don't think so:Fly Army 97 said:Good point on the NDS...if he kept everything, CMC would be accused of preparing for the last war. The NDS is clear on the pacing threat...and it's a Joint Force we are building, not a stand alone force that can do everything on it's own.stallion6 said:
Changes certainly make sense if the USMC is focused on becoming a regional force. The Commandant appears to be doing his best to meet the threats in the National Defense Strategy with a balance of cost and future budget considerations. Eliminating armor and reducing artillery will make them a less agile for conflicts in Korea or Middle East. Hoping the planning assumptions being used are valid.
Russian Airborne Armored Vehicles
“If you’re going to have crime it should at least be organized crime”
-Havelock Vetinari
-Havelock Vetinari
UT - I don't think those terms in isolation are as useful these days. Yes, every planner and concept developer understands the Anti Access / Area Denial and Integrated Air Defense Systems are key to address between Russia and China. The Army does a good job of describing their Multi-Domain Operations in terms how how they will penetrate the A2/AD IADS and work with the Joint Force to 'dis-integrate' the A2/AD IADS and maneuver forces. I don't think that implies total air-superiority.
I don't think anyone is arguing that potential adversaries are modernizing multiple aspect of their joint force, but many would argue that we can't penetrate that A2/AD IADS, and that is our biggest gap to address.
I don't think anyone is arguing that potential adversaries are modernizing multiple aspect of their joint force, but many would argue that we can't penetrate that A2/AD IADS, and that is our biggest gap to address.
The Corps is still going to have a lot of armored vehicles. It is currently bringing on the new ACV with a 30mm gun, looking for a LAV replacement and I bet it also buys whatever MPF light tank the Army eventually selects.
Again, the Commandant has repeatedly said the Corps is not abandoning its ability to participate in ROMO, but that those other tasks are not going to be allowed to detract from what he sees as its primary maritime contribution to the joint fight.
"While our force will be purpose-built in accordance with the three major realities noted above, the resultant force will be more capable of competing against and, when necessary, defeating the forces of revisionist powers and rogue states within the context of a naval or joint campaign. It will also retain broad capabilities for forward deployment afloat in support of the range of crisis and contingency operations that have historically been the "bread and butter" of the Marine Corps in the intervals between major wars. Our historical and legislatively-mandated role as the Nation's force-in-readiness, "most ready when the Nation is least ready," remains a central requirement in the design of our future force, and one which I will keep unflinchingly in mind as I oversee the next stage of wargaming, experimentation, and analysis that will work out many of the specific details."
Littoral Regiments
Again, the Commandant has repeatedly said the Corps is not abandoning its ability to participate in ROMO, but that those other tasks are not going to be allowed to detract from what he sees as its primary maritime contribution to the joint fight.
"While our force will be purpose-built in accordance with the three major realities noted above, the resultant force will be more capable of competing against and, when necessary, defeating the forces of revisionist powers and rogue states within the context of a naval or joint campaign. It will also retain broad capabilities for forward deployment afloat in support of the range of crisis and contingency operations that have historically been the "bread and butter" of the Marine Corps in the intervals between major wars. Our historical and legislatively-mandated role as the Nation's force-in-readiness, "most ready when the Nation is least ready," remains a central requirement in the design of our future force, and one which I will keep unflinchingly in mind as I oversee the next stage of wargaming, experimentation, and analysis that will work out many of the specific details."
Littoral Regiments
Asking from a "I did not serve" position, and mind you I haven't read the links, so maybe we are supposing whatever upcoming battle(s) that occur will be fought there and not here. And yet we are cutting back our capabilities? With China's population base at 1.75 billion and ours at 325 million (lot more fighting bodies there) I hope to hell we hit very fast and very hard or we might have some serious issues the deeper we get into this confrontation. And really, I do think there will be a confrontation in the future; don't want it but will happen.
monarch said:
Asking from a "I did not serve" position, and mind you I haven't read the links, so maybe we are supposing whatever upcoming battle(s) that occur will be fought there and not here. And yet we are cutting back our capabilities? With China's population base at 1.75 billion and ours at 325 million (lot more fighting bodies there) I hope to hell we hit very fast and very hard or we might have some serious issues the deeper we get into this confrontation. And really, I do think there will be a confrontation in the future; don't want it but will happen.
You should read the articles. The Marines are not intended to be a miniature Army but that is how they have been used for the past 17 years. Armor and artillery are not rapidly deployable. They are not flexible. The Marines are looking to become more specialized; less capable on their own but more useful as part of the team.
74OA said:
The Corps is still going to have a lot of armored vehicles. It is currently bringing on the new ACV with a 30mm gun, looking for a LAV replacement and I bet it also buys whatever MPF light tank the Army eventually selects.
Again, the Commandant has repeatedly said the Corps is not abandoning its ability to participate in ROMO, but that those other tasks are not going to be allowed to detract from what he sees as its primary maritime contribution to the joint fight.
"While our force will be purpose-built in accordance with the three major realities noted above, the resultant force will be more capable of competing against and, when necessary, defeating the forces of revisionist powers and rogue states within the context of a naval or joint campaign. It will also retain broad capabilities for forward deployment afloat in support of the range of crisis and contingency operations that have historically been the "bread and butter" of the Marine Corps in the intervals between major wars. Our historical and legislatively-mandated role as the Nation's force-in-readiness, "most ready when the Nation is least ready," remains a central requirement in the design of our future force, and one which I will keep unflinchingly in mind as I oversee the next stage of wargaming, experimentation, and analysis that will work out many of the specific details."
Littoral Regiments
It will be interesting to follow as they war game to discover the weaknesses in force structure. I will feel better about the Corps' combat capabilities if they at least have a 105 mm MTG with their forces. I just recall how unexpected armor and close support artillery have influenced combat effectiveness in the Pacific, whether the Japanese Type 92 battalion gun on Guadalcanal or the light tanks on the Malay peninsula..
“If you’re going to have crime it should at least be organized crime”
-Havelock Vetinari
-Havelock Vetinari
I'm not sure the threat of light armor is significant. We have capabilities on hand now like the Javelin and TOW2 that will deal with all current and near future armor threats. That's all internal man portable and easily operated at the company level.
I actually feel that the main battle tank as gone the way of the battleship. Expensive, resource intensive to maintain and able to be killed from long range with multiple platforms. The continued development of drones as weapons platforms that could be deployed at the battalion level and allow for long range engagement of armor by an infantry battalion only continues to push the engagement range further out.
At the opening of the Iraq invasion a special forces team engaged and destroyed an entire company of Republican Guard T-72's including engagements beyond the published max ranges of the javelin. A unique set of circumstances but I think the parallels to the Battle of Taranto are there.
I actually feel that the main battle tank as gone the way of the battleship. Expensive, resource intensive to maintain and able to be killed from long range with multiple platforms. The continued development of drones as weapons platforms that could be deployed at the battalion level and allow for long range engagement of armor by an infantry battalion only continues to push the engagement range further out.
At the opening of the Iraq invasion a special forces team engaged and destroyed an entire company of Republican Guard T-72's including engagements beyond the published max ranges of the javelin. A unique set of circumstances but I think the parallels to the Battle of Taranto are there.
I would not dismiss the importance of armor in a high intensity conflict and Iraqi T72s are nothing like an Abrams SEPV3. My assumption is the Commandant is shaping the focus of the Corps to the Pacific region. That makes since as China is our biggest threat but the US Army will need tanks in Europe, Korea, and Middle East. Down playing the role of tanks, to justify the USMC divesting their armor, is not a good justification. The Commandant apparently is making tough calls on how to resource his force. Look at how the US Army has reshaped its force in Europe to counter Russia. The US Army removed all their tanks and now are rushing quickly to place them back because their is a need for tanks to counter the emerging Russian threat.
All the same arguments the battleship admirals made, unique circumstances, out of date ships and poorly trained crews that were tied up in port and not able to maneuver. Until the Japanese sank a top of the line British battleship and battle cruiser with aircraft while they were at sea and prepared.stallion6 said:
I would not dismiss the importance of armor in a high intensity conflict and Iraqi T72s are nothing like an Abrams SEPV3. My assumption is the Commandant is shaping the focus of the Corps to the Pacific region. That makes since as China is our biggest threat but the US Army will need tanks in Europe, Korea, and Middle East. Down playing the role of tanks, to justify the USMC divesting their armor, is not a good justification. The Commandant apparently is making tough calls on how to resource his force. Look at how the US Army has reshaped its force in Europe to counter Russia. The US Army removed all their tanks and now are rushing quickly to place them back because their is a need for tanks to counter the emerging Russian threat.
Right now the Russians are getting T-90's killed by TOW2's in Syria. Same arguments can be made, They were being implemented improperly without infantry support and by poorly trained crews. Regardless, how many T-90's did Russia build? How many can they withstand losing? How many M1A2C's are we going to upgrade? How many can we withstand losing?
Now imagine in a not to distant future a scout element with a drone designating armor targets for an independent firing vehicle launching javelin like missiles at tanks 3-5 Km away. All technologies that exist today and are in development. That's not even considering traditional air assets and the toll they will take.
I'm not saying main battle tanks are going away right now, but similar to the battleship they will change in role and the days of large armored formations likely hit their zenith in the Iraqi desert in 1991.
Tanks are definitely not going away anytime soon CT. US Army has them in their inventory until at least 2040. There are weapon systems that can kill tanks. Everyone knows that. Your other points have nothing to do with the fact that the USMC will be less relevant in the near future, for high intensity conflicts without tanks. However don't make the Commandant out to be a singular transformational leader. He is just reorganizing based upon threat. By the way, laser weapon systems are coming in the future. But news alert; they are not ready yet.
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