There are those and hundreds more open questions big and small that the Corps is working through as it exercises and experiments with FD2030. Many are discussed in the Commandant's published annual updates to FD2030. None of them invalidate it as a strategy but do reinforce how difficult the fight will be.

So, I'm not a line officer, let alone have I gone to any war college or anything. Though I like to pretend I understand some of what they talk about sometimes. One thing I do know, that I'm pretty sure everyone agrees on, is that we have always been really good at preparing for the last war we fought.

The probability of executing a large scale beach landing in the traditional form with a peer adversary is going to be impossible, or at the very least very risky. When was the last time we attempted a beach landing with an adversary that had anti-ship missiles? Not to mention potentially hypersonic anti-ship missiles?

If we do end being in a position to launch a large scale beach landing, it'll be after softening up the shoreline and making it safer for our Navy to get closer, and launch/escort landing craft. I believe the current thinking is that if you focus the Marine corps mission, and work more closely with other services, you can eliminate redundancy between services, and each becomes more focused on being better at fewer roles, rather than a jack of all trades.

I know the FMF likes the MAGTF concept, and being in control of every aspect of their missions, and increased reliance on other services can add another level of complexity to war fighting, but we also haven't fought a peer/near peer adversary in a very long time. I don't think anyone has a good playbook on how it'll go with or without conventional tactics.

https://www.energy.senate.gov/hearings/2023/7/hearing-to-receive-testimony-regarding-the-compact-of-free-association-amendments-act-of-2023

WTF is an FAS and why does it matter?

Did the wargames that validated the FD2030 structure incmude the assumption that the "Freely Associated State" (FAS) of Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands would renew the Compact of Free Association (COFAs) that allow US forces freedom of access within the FAS? If the renewal of COFA and the establishment of EABs inside the three FAS was assumed to be accomplished by Congress and the State Department, that may be flawed.

As Cleo Paskel (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cleo_Paskal) explains in the following post on LinkedIn, something is seriously off-track with the US relations with the Marshall Islands. It appears likely that China has persuaded the MI to align with the PRC and distance itself from the US.

https://www.linkedin.com/posts/cleopaskal_there-is-a-problem-with-marshall-islands-activity-7085850994537811968-VCSG?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_android

Chinese presence in the MI would present a huge problem for the basing of US forces on Guam because the Chinese would be in a position that divides the basing of III MEF forces. The SLOCs would be heavily contested over a much greater distance. A treaty between China and the MI could achieve through diplomacy what the Chinese might not be able to do with an additional $1T in military spending i.e. put Chinese land and navy bases between Honolulu and Hagtña.

The Marine Corps will not release, even to gray beard Generals who should be fully eligible for clearance, the initial Commander's Guidance and assumtions about the wargames that the Commandant has assured Congress and the public validated FD2030 and EABO as the correct doctrine. Consequently, only the Marine Corps senior leadership knows if a failure to renew to COFA with all three FAS invalidates a fundamental assumption or if it is merely a COA for which plans are already developed and forces are already identified. From the outside it appears very much that the force structure and equipment of an MLR is not designed for forced entry and seizure of the Marshall Islands from Chinese control.

This is Kiribati. The locals waving Chinese flags are celebrating the visit of the Chinese Navy hospital ship called the Peace Ark on its tour of Pacific islands
titled Harmonious Voyage 2023.



Also Kiribati.



The Chinese are generating a lot of goodwill in Oceania by well orchestrated spreading of money and gifts. In 2919, Kiribati switched from recognizing Taipei to Beijing. I have no idea when or what "partner building" activities the US DoD has invested in Kiribati over the past decade but it seems that it is becoming a friendly basing option for China that is due south of Hawaii and 2000 west of Guam.

FD2030 divested of Civil Affairs Group's because they were deemed unnecessary and unaffordable by the wargames. The State Department should probably be taking the lead diplomatically to engender positive support for the US among the population but they appear to have ceded Kiribati to Chinese influence operations.

How does FD2030 provide force structure and prepare for war with China in a situation where the Chinese have friendly basing at Kiribati on the southern flank of the the Hawaii-Guam SLOCs

As with the Marahall Islands, Marine Corps leadership knows the wargaming assumptions about Kiribati's relations with China and the United States. The public doesn't but Kiribatians waving CCP flags is alarming to me.

Yeah, unfortunately a lot of people in this country can't look strategically ahead. If something doesn't look like it'll produce tangible results in our interest a within a few years (or less), they want to cut it in favor of something they can hold up as an example of their successful ideas.

We could invest billions in a lot of these islands in the Pacific, and in other countries in Africa, and never see a tangible return on investment. They're unlikely to ever have a large economy to buy American goods and keep Americans employed. Nor are they rich with resources we want. But maybe a few billion dollars invested over a decade can help slow Chinese expansionism and prevent war. Or if war is inevitable, make their footprint easier to contain.

I think I was rooming with a Korean dentist at Camp Bullis, and we were talking about China. He said that in the US, we think in terms of fiscal quarters and fiscal years. The Chinese think in terms of fiscal centuries.

74OA said:

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The Corps is still going to have a lot of armored vehicles. It is currently bringing on the new ACV with a 30mm gun, looking for a LAV replacement and I bet it also buys whatever MPF light tank the Army eventually selects.

---

Anyone have an update on this part specifically? I'm specifically interested now that we're seeing the Russian paratroopers essentially being thrown to the wolves without the support they thought they would be getting.

Is the new Booker going to be part of this or still no armour?

Fly Army 97 said:

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Upgrading tanks a 100 a year is not transformational change, and maybe that's fine....but to CT's point (I think), attrition warfare is over. We will not build tank for tank like we did in the 80s.

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Ukraine must be really making people question what they thought they knew.

AgLA06 said:

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Fly Army 97 said:

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Upgrading tanks a 100 a year is not transformational change, and maybe that's fine....but to CT's point (I think), attrition warfare is over. We will not build tank for tank like we did in the 80s.

---

Ukraine must be really making people question what they thought they knew.

---

In some ways, yes, in others, no.

The toys may change, but some principles (such as maneuver and relative speed) remain pretty entrenched (irony intended).

And that's the big problem with EAOB: if your dinky island has a causing problems for China - it may well just disappear. In a vast ocean with sparse islands, HIMARS launchers with anti-ship ammo will have few operationally useful options and very few of those will afford meaningful mobility.

AgLA06 said:

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74OA said:

---

The Corps is still going to have a lot of armored vehicles. It is currently bringing on the new ACV with a 30mm gun, looking for a LAV replacement and I bet it also buys whatever MPF light tank the Army eventually selects.

---

Anyone have an update on this part specifically? I'm specifically interested now that we're seeing the Russian paratroopers essentially being thrown to the wolves without the support they thought they would be getting.

Is the new Booker going to be part of this or still no armour?

---

No USMC rumbles about Booker so far. The Corps is transitioning to a lighter and easier to maintain wheeled vehicle fleet, so at this point it would be surprising if it suddenly reverted to a tracked vehicle even if it does decide it needs an armored assault gun like Booker.

Get Off My Lawn said:

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AgLA06 said:

---

Fly Army 97 said:

---

Upgrading tanks a 100 a year is not transformational change, and maybe that's fine....but to CT's point (I think), attrition warfare is over. We will not build tank for tank like we did in the 80s.

---

Ukraine must be really making people question what they thought they knew.

---

In some ways, yes, in others, no.

The toys may change, but some principles (such as maneuver and relative speed) remain pretty entrenched (irony intended).

And that's the big problem with EAOB: if your dinky island has a causing problems for China - it may well just disappear. In a vast ocean with sparse islands, HIMARS launchers with anti-ship ammo will have few operationally useful options and very few of those will afford meaningful mobility.

---

Maybe. But if there's a patriot system on that island as well as Marine Air Defense Integrated System that becomes a lot harder. And China has to use ships for an invasion to work in the Pacific.

Not to mention if the new Marine tomahawk batteries are sitting there as well just begging China tries to run ships by.

Because the only way to solve that is to get a nuclear missile hit on the island because the Marine principal of hiding a small, but deadly force anywhere on that island (including F35s from roads) should scare the hell out of China. Because their task force can suddenly disappear as well without knowing which of the 100 islands within range just did so.

AgLA06 said:

---

Get Off My Lawn said:

---

AgLA06 said:

---

Fly Army 97 said:

---

Upgrading tanks a 100 a year is not transformational change, and maybe that's fine....but to CT's point (I think), attrition warfare is over. We will not build tank for tank like we did in the 80s.

---

Ukraine must be really making people question what they thought they knew.

---

In some ways, yes, in others, no.

The toys may change, but some principles (such as maneuver and relative speed) remain pretty entrenched (irony intended).

And that's the big problem with EAOB: if your dinky island has a causing problems for China - it may well just disappear. In a vast ocean with sparse islands, HIMARS launchers with anti-ship ammo will have few operationally useful options and very few of those will afford meaningful mobility.

---

Maybe. But if there's a patriot system on that island as well as Marine Air Defense Integrated System that becomes a lot harder. And China has to use ships for an invasion to work in the Pacific.

Not to mention if the new Marine tomahawk batteries are sitting there as well just begging China tries to run ships by.

Because the only way to solve that is to get a nuclear missile hit on the island because the Marine principal of hiding a small, but deadly force anywhere on that island (including F35s from roads) should scare the hell out of China. Because their task force can suddenly disappear as well without knowing which of the 100 islands within range just did so.

---

Exactly. The concept is for the Marines to keep moving among the hundreds of islands and be gone to a new location before the Chinese can react to their presence. The dispersed teams will be primarily tasked with reconnaissance of choke points in the island chains and sea denial to prevent the enemy fleet from transiting through them. It won't be an autonomous Marine operation but will operate in direct support of the Navy's sea campaign, which also means our warships typically won't be far away.

AgLA06 said:

---

Get Off My Lawn said:

---

AgLA06 said:

---

Fly Army 97 said:

---

Upgrading tanks a 100 a year is not transformational change, and maybe that's fine....but to CT's point (I think), attrition warfare is over. We will not build tank for tank like we did in the 80s.

---

Ukraine must be really making people question what they thought they knew.

---

In some ways, yes, in others, no.

The toys may change, but some principles (such as maneuver and relative speed) remain pretty entrenched (irony intended).

And that's the big problem with EAOB: if your dinky island has a causing problems for China - it may well just disappear. In a vast ocean with sparse islands, HIMARS launchers with anti-ship ammo will have few operationally useful options and very few of those will afford meaningful mobility.

---

Maybe. But if there's a patriot system on that island as well as Marine Air Defense Integrated System that becomes a lot harder. And China has to use ships for an invasion to work in the Pacific.

Not to mention if the new Marine tomahawk batteries are sitting there as well just begging China tries to run ships by.

Because the only way to solve that is to get a nuclear missile hit on the island because the Marine principal of hiding a small, but deadly force anywhere on that island (including F35s from roads) should scare the hell out of China. Because their task force can suddenly disappear as well without knowing which of the 100 islands within range just did so.

---

Execution is key. The lift required to pop in and out of existence is no small feat, and the enemy DOES get a say.

Ex: F-35s STOVLing off of an island is appealing, but the'll burn so much fuel getting up that they'll need a tanker asset in the skies above. Similarly, you're not going to swim launchers from island to island - you're going to be using ships at some point.

Also - all those missiles are lovely, but gps-guided is far shy of anti-ship.

And all of that is predicated on there being islands to use. The above post shows China trying to alter allegiances, and if they decide to contaminate some piles of rock (bikini atoll style) - they could defang our approach before it gets going.


…and all of this is based on the nostalgic notion that the Pacific island campaign 2.0 is going to be the playground as opposed economic havoc via cutting off commercial shipping lanes. China is so dependent on shipping (oil inbound through the Indian Ocean and exports in massive cargo ships) that we could initiate tens of millions of deaths by cutting off global trade via the sinking a handful of super tankers and container ships.

74OA said:

---

AgLA06 said:

---

Get Off My Lawn said:

---

AgLA06 said:

---

Fly Army 97 said:

---

Upgrading tanks a 100 a year is not transformational change, and maybe that's fine....but to CT's point (I think), attrition warfare is over. We will not build tank for tank like we did in the 80s.

---

Ukraine must be really making people question what they thought they knew.

---

In some ways, yes, in others, no.

The toys may change, but some principles (such as maneuver and relative speed) remain pretty entrenched (irony intended).

And that's the big problem with EAOB: if your dinky island has a causing problems for China - it may well just disappear. In a vast ocean with sparse islands, HIMARS launchers with anti-ship ammo will have few operationally useful options and very few of those will afford meaningful mobility.

---

Maybe. But if there's a patriot system on that island as well as Marine Air Defense Integrated System that becomes a lot harder. And China has to use ships for an invasion to work in the Pacific.

Not to mention if the new Marine tomahawk batteries are sitting there as well just begging China tries to run ships by.

Because the only way to solve that is to get a nuclear missile hit on the island because the Marine principal of hiding a small, but deadly force anywhere on that island (including F35s from roads) should scare the hell out of China. Because their task force can suddenly disappear as well without knowing which of the 100 islands within range just did so.

---

Exactly. The concept is for the Marines to keep moving among the hundreds of islands and be gone to a new location before the Chinese can react to their presence. The dispersed teams will be primarily tasked with reconnaissance of choke points in the island chains and sea denial to prevent the enemy fleet from transiting through them. It won't be an autonomous Marine operation but will operate in direct support of the Navy's sea campaign, which also means our warships typically won't be far away.

---

Marines being dependent upon "nearby" warships in the Pacific? Yeah. Call me incredulous, but I've read beyond page 2 on how that worked out for us the last time…

Get Off My Lawn said:

---

74OA said:

---

AgLA06 said:

---

Get Off My Lawn said:

---

AgLA06 said:

---

Fly Army 97 said:

---

Upgrading tanks a 100 a year is not transformational change, and maybe that's fine....but to CT's point (I think), attrition warfare is over. We will not build tank for tank like we did in the 80s.

---

Ukraine must be really making people question what they thought they knew.

---

In some ways, yes, in others, no.

The toys may change, but some principles (such as maneuver and relative speed) remain pretty entrenched (irony intended).

And that's the big problem with EAOB: if your dinky island has a causing problems for China - it may well just disappear. In a vast ocean with sparse islands, HIMARS launchers with anti-ship ammo will have few operationally useful options and very few of those will afford meaningful mobility.

---

Maybe. But if there's a patriot system on that island as well as Marine Air Defense Integrated System that becomes a lot harder. And China has to use ships for an invasion to work in the Pacific.

Not to mention if the new Marine tomahawk batteries are sitting there as well just begging China tries to run ships by.

Because the only way to solve that is to get a nuclear missile hit on the island because the Marine principal of hiding a small, but deadly force anywhere on that island (including F35s from roads) should scare the hell out of China. Because their task force can suddenly disappear as well without knowing which of the 100 islands within range just did so.

---

Exactly. The concept is for the Marines to keep moving among the hundreds of islands and be gone to a new location before the Chinese can react to their presence. The dispersed teams will be primarily tasked with reconnaissance of choke points in the island chains and sea denial to prevent the enemy fleet from transiting through them. It won't be an autonomous Marine operation but will operate in direct support of the Navy's sea campaign, which also means our warships typically won't be far away.

---

Marines being dependent upon "nearby" warships in the Pacific? Yeah. Call me incredulous, but I've read beyond page 2 on how that worked out for us the last time…

---

Don't put words in my mouth, I didn't say "dependent" or "nearby".

A distinction without a difference. Is EAOB a winning a strategy? I remain dubious.

I get not wanting to release your war games results to the public and that significant changes often ruffle feathers, but it does feel like champions of this strategy are hedging against potential criticism rather than embracing the debate. Strategic masterminds should revel the rare opportunity to gloat about their top-secret prowess. …but they're not and that makes me think there's something else afoot.

It was colonel mustard in the library with the candlestick!

Balderdash!

12th Marines stood up as an official Marine Littoral Regiment. One of the three planned. 4th Marines to follow in a few years.

Interesting to see an Arty regiment get the nod but I guess with the radical force restructure, it really doesn't matter in the end. Not too cognizant of the overall TOE plans for these MLRs so need to do some further reading but thought it was worth bringing up here.

https://news.usni.org/2023/11/16/u-s-marines-stand-up-new-regiment-chinese-warships-sail-in-east-china-sea

https://dailycaller.com/2023/12/28/marine-generals-classified-dissent-memo-warned-of-consequences-china-focused-overhaul/

NDAs not to discuss the assumptions used in the wargames to validate FD 2030 with other officers? That's one way to tamp down dissent.

Ulysses90 said:

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https://dailycaller.com/2023/12/28/marine-generals-classified-dissent-memo-warned-of-consequences-china-focused-overhaul/

NDAs not to discuss the assumptions used in the wargames to validate FD 2030 with other officers? That's one way to tamp down dissent.

---

"These plans all work great so long as we get a nice long head start!"

Well, that's interesting. Just another naysayer?

"How to Ruin the Marine Corps

FD 2030 reduced the US Marine Corps to something between coastal artillery and naval infantry."

https://www.thedefensepost.com/2024/02/23/ruin-us-marine-corps/

Easy to poke holes - harder to sell a superior vision.

Armor and arms are cyclical, and the race to up armor has created a massive financial asymmetry. In Ukraine, for example, Russia would like have been far better off invading with a massive fleet of hilux technicals rather than tanks. It's only a matter of time before Russia or China mount shape charges to a drone and get Javelin style capabilities on the cheap. So I'm not sold that getting rid of tanks is unwise…

What I continue to take issue with is the sacrificial fire base strategy, the decade long capabilities gap, and the downplaying of historic artillery capabilities. Precision fire is a lovely concept - but there are problems which call for volume of fire that 6 relatively small HE shots/hour just can't match even if they're bulls-eyes (technically 18, but travel time between firing point and reload point and firing point must be factored).

I expect expendable attack drones with a combination of programmed target recognition and human augmentation are the future of close quarters fire support. Think: personally targeting scalable DPICM with a loiter feature. If that's also being developed in the DARPA back corners, then maybe I can see how things mesh into. Future force capability. Otherwise I just see holes.