Excellent
summary of the 'counter-offensive.'
Quote:
Ukraine's last uncommitted brigade the elite 82nd airborne (named after the US division with the same name) was sent to Rabotino, along with the rest of 10 Corps and the 47th and 65th brigades of 9 Corps, recalled after phase 1. Ukraine also sent in the only new unit it could find, the 15th National guard brigade and mentioned 10 brigades that were involved in the capture of Rabotino. Subsequently,
10 Corps reached the first Russian defensive line south of the village, where they were halted by
Russian counter attacks. Since this was the only Ukrainian effort along a very narrow front, any
advance by Ukraine without strengthening the flanks, would result in a dangerously long salient, liable to being cut off, or attacked from 3 sides. All Russian reserves 2 regiments of the 7th Guards Airborne, 2 BARS brigades (10 and 11) and a newly arrived rifle brigade from the Far East, were sent to Rabotino.
Thus 10 Ukrainian brigades in Rabotino, will find it difficult to make any further breakthrough against 8 opposing Russian brigades. The conundrum for Ukraine is that the harder they try to breakthrough, the more losses they will take and any further advance harms their position (lengthening salient with a small base pushing against increasing larger forces). It was a similar situation to that of the SS Panzer Corps in Kursk 1943, when they made a breakthrough and seemed to have won the critical battle of Prokhorova, but retreated because of a similar situation as Ukraine's 10 Corps (which has not defeated the Russians in any set piece battle) finds itself in now. The Ukrainians cannot remain in place, because they do not have enough ammunition for extended combat.
It has been acknowledged by the Western media that the 10 Corps and the theatre reserve 61 Brigade, represent Ukraine's last reserves. There are no further units available anywhere, barring undermanned and under equipped territorial army units. Russia, on the other hand has around (as per Ukraine) 100,000 men in reserve along the northern (Kharkov Kupiansk) front, which is of less strategic importance than the Zaporozhe counter-offensive. This figure seems credible, since we know these man have been mobilized and trained (after considering replacements into existing units) but do not feature in any of the units currently fighting - as I have explained in part 1 of this Ukraine blog. If Russia needed more reserves in the South, they can tap into this source, or move the experienced 150th Rifle division, which is part of 8th Army and was moved to the Bakhmut front. It can ideally get back to its parent formation, while new brigades (located closer) can move into Bakhmut.
Implications: Ukraine has exhausted its reserves and have announced a fresh round of mobilization where 200,000 men are sought to be recruited. The recruits from this round, will have lesser experience and willingness to fight as compared to previous rounds of mobilization. They cannot be equipped untilspring of 2024 at the earliest and that assumes that NATO ramps up armament production and continues to support Ukraine at the same rate. Mere NATO support, at current levels of production is not enough, because whatever could be transferred from existing stocks has been sent. Ramping up production would in many cases, be contingent on Ukraine demonstrating a path to victory. Trying to do so (as the CO has demonstrated) will result in higher losses relative to Russia, particularly considering the poorer quality of manpower and equipment of the Ukraine army after this CO.
If Ukraine goes on the defensive, Russia has an opportunity to conduct its own offensive, either in Sept, until the Oct rains, or in winter after the ground freezes. The Sept-Mar period will be when Russia is strongest relative to Ukraine's manpower and armaments. After March, Russian production of key items will equal consumption (assuming Russia conducts defensive operations only).
More at the link.
Russian source
claims to have destroyed 4 Ukrainian 'commando' speed boats. Kiev was rocked by some fires/explosions over the past 5 hours.
The airfield attack at Pskov is going to be an interesting one for the timeline.
Quote:
Biggest development of the ongoing Ukrainian War today was a massive drone attack on Pskov Airfield that appears to have destroyed two Il-76 transport planes and started a fuel fire.
Here's the issue - Pskov is on the other side of Belarus from Ukraine.
So our options are:
1. 20+ Ukrainian strike drones flew over 660km of hostile territory (including the entire breadth of Belarus) without anyone noticing. This is unlikely;
2. Ukrainian DRGs launched 20+ strike drones from inside Russia. This is well beyond any capability they've ever demonstrated and would represent a major waste of assets against a peripheral target; or
3. The drones were launched from Latvia or Estonia, or ships in the Baltic Sea and overflew them en route. This explains why Pskov was targeted and the lack of prior warning given the city is only about 60km from the border. I find this theory most likely.
Why now? Well, the great Ukrainian counteroffensive is culminating about 10km from its line of departure and with it hopes of Ukrainian victory. The Baltic States have distinguished themselves in their belligerence during this war and likely see the postwar writing clearly on the wall for their own long-term fates sandwiched between an ascendant Russia and the Baltic Sea. I can see a sufficiently irresponsible leader authorizing such an attack in the hopes of Russian retaliation triggering a general war with NATO to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat.
Here's the thing though - NATO isn't remotely ready for that war right now, and anyone claiming they are is deluded. NATO does not have the troops and gear in Eastern Europe to fight Russia right now. It's furthermore made quite clear to members that alliance membership does not guarantee NATO sponsorship if you just decide to attack someone. All loud talk aside, the NATO heavy hitters are about as interested in war with Russia as the Russians are in war with them right now. With that said, face must be saved.
The Russian authorities have yet to release an official statement placing blame for the attack at Pskov. This is quite significant because they've already released statements for the usual drizzle of sporadic Ukrainian drone attacks last night. If my assessment is correct and this attack came out of the Baltic States, I expect a tightly controlled Russian response - and I expect NATO proper to stay on the sidelines for it. Discussions about what exactly this will look like are probably ongoing between the parties as we speak.
(Armchair warlord is I believe a former US Army artillery officer). More:
Taking out a couple/few old IL-76 transports and some fuel depot fires at a remote/Baltic air base with 20+ small drones, well, ok, it's clearly a fair military target after all, but this could have outsized impacts/ramifications if Russia strikes at one of the Nato-member Baltic states it likely was launched from.
The Ukrainians (and some Brits) have wanted to more directly bring nato into the conflict for many months.
