74OA said:
The missing piece is airpower. It is a key component of combined arms operations and particularly valuable for reaching into a defense in depth to disrupt it and interdict its supporting LOCs.
At the moment, however, air defenses are denying both sides the ability to effectively employ airpower in most of its traditional combat roles.
Within its range limits, HIMARS' responsiveness and accuracy do give Ukraine a facsimile of some aspects of airpower and it is more operationally impactful than are Russia's longer-ranged but intermittent and low-volume cruise missile/suicide drone strikes.
Most occupied territory is now within HIMARS range, so it will be interesting to see if it can substitute for airpower sufficiently to break open Russia's well-prepared defenses for a ground attack in the South.
Aye. Definitely not alone in thinking lack of air superiority is the number one failing of the Russians to date by a large margin. I think you are right in the role of HIMARS to some extent but I see it more as a strategic asset, going after supply dumps, command and control centers, troop barracks and repair shops, etc. Quick tactical long range assets still seems to fall to arty and maybe drones a bit. Which is not a real substitute for the Ukes I don't think.
Also question the numbers of HIMARS available. We don't make THAT many of them and the Russians are proving a very old theory of war. No matter how good your best weapon is, it usually is not enough to stop a determined enemy by itself. The Ukes have done great work with HIMARS to date but damn me if it doesn't look like whack a mole.
