MASSIVE changes coming to USMC

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Eliminatus
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11:31a, 3/23/20
AG
Look slike the major shift most of us suspected was coming is starting and will continue for next 10 years.

In summary:
  • Chopping ALL tank battalions along with dedicated MP units
  • 3 infantry battalions going away. Looks like the 8th Marines are the target. 1/8 and 2/8 changing regimental HQs and 3/8 being disbanded.
  • 16 arty batteries chopped. from 21 down to 5. Wow.
  • Helo airlift being cut back. Unknown numbers yet.
  • Advanced fighter squadrons also being scaled down by a large percentage.

Drastic shift in capability coming. Looks like the goal is to concentrate solely on amphib and lightness. With a focus on China.

More here.

https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2020/03/23/the-corps-is-axing-all-of-its-tank-battalions-and-cutting-grunt-units/?utm_campaign=Socialflow+MAR&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_medium=social&fbclid=IwAR2mOiVRuiH24WigtAZoQI9eGji_z2gA2Dv8Dt2FvaQdWobgJh22kEcLuZE

Pretty crazy. But all in all, can't say that I disagree with this on the surface. Something I have always thought would be for the best anyways. Especially when drunk and asked my opinion on the future of the Corps.

Thoughts?

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74OA
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12:21p, 3/23/20
AG
Yep, the Marines are all-in restructuring themselves to focus on a dispersed, fast-moving Pacific "island-hopping" campaign (Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO)) in support of the Navy's potential ops against China.

Lots more: HERE and HERE.
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Eliminatus
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In reply to 74OA • 9:57p, 3/23/20
AG
Great links. Thanks.

After pondering it a lot more, gotta say I am definitely a fan of this move. I served at the height of the ME conflicts and it always bothered me that I trained as a light fighter non-stop stateside, then deploy as essentially heavy occupational infantry. I understand the demands of the conflict dictated that, but still.

I am also firmly in the camp of the threat of China so this is a great focus to go back to the essence of the USMC while addressing the need for a true dedicated expeditionary branch of the military. Exciting times ahead for the Marines currently in.

Will also add that my views are from a 4 year enlisted grunt only so definitely not privy to the higher level thinking and logistics of it all, but on the surface this all just makes so much sense to me. The only head scratcher I have is the scale back on helo capabilities. Figured if anything it would need to be expanded if anything to maintain the "lightness" the Corps seems to be seeking.
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Jock 07
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10:08p, 3/23/20
AG
The shift in focus to the very real threat our peer and near peer adversaries pose to us and our allies and partners is very much needed. After spending a recent assignment at USSTRATCOM it has become clear to me that this pivot is long overdue.
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74OA
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In reply to Eliminatus • 8:56a, 3/24/20
AG
I find the decision to reduce helo heavy lift and F-35Bs confusing, too. You'd think the Marines would need more lift, not less, to resupply and reposition dispersed island forces and that every STOVL F-35 would be invaluable for both offense and defense since it can operate from austere forward locations.

Of course the Marines have thought thru the trade-offs, but their rationale in those two instances isn't obvious to me either.
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cavscout96
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10:29a, 3/25/20
AG
Diclaimer: haven;t read the articles yet, but quickly...

I tend to agree with 740A. The great advantage USMC has over Army, IMO, is its own movement and CAS assets. If I had a nickel for every time I had to wait on the AF......
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74OA
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In reply to cavscout96 • 12:20p, 3/25/20
AG
Actually, in its vast utility helicopter fleet (~2000 airframes) the Army has comparable organic tactical airlift capability to the Marines.

The reason the Marines have their own small fleet of fixed-wing attack aircraft is because they are very light in artillery, which they field proportionately far less than does the Army which is very heavily invested in indirect fires.

The tradeoffs the USMC is choosing reflect a return to its original maritime mission in direct support of the Navy's sea campaign and moving away from being a mini-Army built for extended land operations.

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Fly Army 97
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7:03a, 3/26/20
Esper has been very clear that China is the #1 priority to face in terms of modernizing the force. Trade offs beginning with fewer tanks in the USMC to facilitate the requirements listed above make sense - particularly in INDOPACOM. Even with fewer ARTY BNs, the USMC is touting better capability with it's modernization in field artillery (mentioned in the article, see the link). While the Army perfects extended range 155 cannon artillery, the USMC will benefit with the extended range/accuracy (I assume, someone help me with that if you know). I doubt the aviation lift assets go away vs getting absorbed into the fleet...every service is modernizing their vertical take-off fleets, so there will be force structure changes to come anyway. That's probably factored into the decision making.

The Joint Force is modernizing to face a 2030-2040 operating environment. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/MECC2019/mecc2019day1brief6_jointfutures_concepts.pdf?ver=2019-10-17-143319-517. It won't all happen overnight, but the trade offs need to take place now. I've heard the Commandant speak about it, and I'm inspired by his dialogue.
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Get Off My Lawn
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2:40p, 3/26/20
As a Redleg, I am saddened by 155 reduction (as with 5/10 raining shuttered), but I understand the desire for mobility. As much as the M777A2 brings to the fight, it does take time and effort to relocate. What it did provide was all weather near endless indirect fire support, which is a gap that additional HIMARS doesn't totally fill. The added range, mobility, and precision may outweigh the reduced persistence.

The Lilly pad strategy of fuel barges is one I certainly support given growing shore to ship ranges / threats.

The LCAC has always seemed to be a waste to me. (Twice as fast and less than half as capable compared to the boats they replaced.) Being lighter makes them a bit more usable.

Heavy armor could still be mobilized by augmenting with Marines with Army assets (given enough time to coordinate), but it does reduce a MEU commander's options (but again, the LCAC already tied their hands against landing under heavy fire). Basically the abandoned capability is a rapid succession of ship to semi-permissive landing to hard-target.

When we reorient to amphibious landings via air lift - the tanks and some of the howitzers were getting left on the boats anyhow.
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JABQ04
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In reply to Get Off My Lawn • 3:08p, 3/26/20
AG
Army Redleg here, why didn't/don't the Marines use 105mm. Mobile, easy to helo in and out, a good section can have ready to shoot with in 4-6 mins. I think we had to be laid within 2 mins, safed within 4 and ready to fire by 6 mins for section certs. With RAP munitions can still reach out and touch some one.
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74OA
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3:09p, 3/26/20
AG
Here's the Commandant's report. Lots of uncertainties still to be resolved: 2030
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74OA
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In reply to JABQ04 • 3:15p, 3/26/20
AG
JABQ04 said:
Army Redleg here, why didn't/don't the Marines use 105mm. Mobile, easy to helo in and out, a good section can have ready to shoot with in 4-6 mins. I think we had to be laid within 2 mins, safed within 4 and ready to fire by 6 for section carts. With RAP munitions can still reach out and touch some one.
Because, in general, tube artillery is useless for the sea denial (i.e. anti-ship) mission the Marines are taking on. It's not just about getting lighter, it's also about restructuring the force to work with the Navy to counter China in the Pacific littorals.
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cavscout96
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In reply to 74OA • 4:31p, 3/26/20
AG
74OA said:
Actually, in its vast utility helicopter fleet (~2000 airframes) the Army has comparable organic tactical airlift capability to the Marines.

The reason the Marines have their own small fleet of fixed-wing attack aircraft is because they are very light in artillery, which they field proportionately far less than does the Army which is very heavily invested in indirect fires.

The tradeoffs the USMC is choosing reflect a return to its original maritime mission in direct support of the Navy's sea campaign and moving away from being a mini-Army built for extended land operations.

I don't disagree that the army has a metric ton of assets (although they seem pretty hard to get sometimes), still surprised that they would sacrifice the flexibility and the CAS capability. Seems short-sighted.

Ditching the tanks probably does make sense for the same reasons. Armored engagements, pretty darn fast and flexible, logistics tail..... absolute nightmare sometimes.
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Get Off My Lawn
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In reply to 74OA • 9:15p, 3/26/20
74OA said:
JABQ04 said:
Army Redleg here, why didn't/don't the Marines use 105mm. Mobile, easy to helo in and out, a good section can have ready to shoot with in 4-6 mins. I think we had to be laid within 2 mins, safed within 4 and ready to fire by 6 for section carts. With RAP munitions can still reach out and touch some one.
Because, in general, tube artillery is useless for the sea denial (i.e. anti-ship) mission the Marines are taking on. It's not just about getting lighter, it's also about restructuring the force to work with the Navy to counter China in the Pacific littorals.
Plus, we got 120mm mortars that can fit inside Ospreys to fill that gap, and the self-laying capability of the M777A2 enables first round FFE which to my knowledge the M119 still can't do.
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JABQ04
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In reply to Get Off My Lawn • 11:25a, 3/27/20
AG
The new 119A3 is almost the same as the M777. DFCS and all
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Get Off My Lawn
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In reply to JABQ04 • 12:58p, 3/27/20
Nice. I was unaware. And it looks like the mortars got moth-balled, so there may be merit to downsizing to a light howitzer as a compromise.

Thinking about light howitzers, though: perhaps their utility has disappeared as near-peer forces have developed capabilities to counter fire on in-range 105mm units. Outside of near-peer battles, the asymmetric battlefield remains open to our 60mm & 81mm mortars, drones, Javalins, and/or rockets - all of which encroach upon the unique roles filled by a 105.

It makes me a bit sad, but perhaps technological advancements have rendered steel rain an archaic method of fighting.
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74OA
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In reply to Get Off My Lawn • 1:02p, 3/27/20
AG
None of those systems have the range and moving-target precision needed to execute the Marine's new littoral strategy. They will still be in the Corps arsenal for a range of other missions, but the new sea-denial weapons being tested will take priority.

The Commandant adresses these issues in the "2030" document I linked above. Additional related material is in the two other articles I linked near the top.

Here's more explanation: HARD CHOICES
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Jock 07
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In reply to Jock 07 • 1:15p, 3/27/20
AG
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Get Off My Lawn
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In reply to 74OA • 8:18a, 3/28/20
I fully appreciate that - and also have an appreciation for HIMARS. I get the litoral strategy - I think we're all on the same page there that more launchers and shore-to-ship missiles are the way to go for that mission.

It's the other roles that have traditionally fallen on 155mm batteries that I'm curious about. Are we abandoning suppressive missions, SEAD, Final Protective Fires, etc? Are we creating a gap in our fire support capabilities and if so, is it a big deal?
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Fly Army 97
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9:02a, 3/28/20
You getting rid of 155s??
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74OA
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In reply to Get Off My Lawn • 10:20a, 3/28/20
AG
Get Off My Lawn said:
I fully appreciate that - and also have an appreciation for HIMARS. I get the litoral strategy - I think we're all on the same page there that more launchers and shore-to-ship missiles are the way to go for that mission.

It's the other roles that have traditionally fallen on 155mm batteries that I'm curious about. Are we abandoning suppressive missions, SEAD, Final Protective Fires, etc? Are we creating a gap in our fire support capabilities and if so, is it a big deal?
Are any of those capabilities essential for small, dispersed, sea-denial forces fighting from islands? In his "2030" report, the Commandant says that the Marines are still going to be able to participate in ROMO, but having that broad capability isn't going to define the Corps or be allowed to detract from its primary littoral mission in support of the Navy. So, if the capabilities you mention aren't useful for the Marines primary mission, they will be reduced so that finite resources can be focused elsewhere. The days of the Corps being a mini-Army are over.
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Eliminatus
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In reply to 74OA • 10:52a, 3/28/20
AG
74OA said:
Get Off My Lawn said:
I fully appreciate that - and also have an appreciation for HIMARS. I get the litoral strategy - I think we're all on the same page there that more launchers and shore-to-ship missiles are the way to go for that mission.

It's the other roles that have traditionally fallen on 155mm batteries that I'm curious about. Are we abandoning suppressive missions, SEAD, Final Protective Fires, etc? Are we creating a gap in our fire support capabilities and if so, is it a big deal?
Are any of those capabilities essential for small, dispersed, sea-denial forces fighting from islands? In his "2030" report, the Commandant says that the Marines are still going to be able to participate in ROMO, but having that broad capability isn't going to define the Corps or be allowed to detract from its primary littoral mission in support of the Navy. So, if the capabilities you mention aren't useful for the Marines primary mission, they will be reduced so that finite resources can be focused elsewhere. The days of the Corps being a mini-Army are over.
Bolded makes me pretty damn happy.

Again, I know why the Corps became what it did over the last 15 years or so. The nation needed heavy occupation troops. Sucks but it is was the cards dealt. Having gone through it, it was kinda deflating. We worked with a Royal Marine unit in Afghaniland and I gotta say, nearly all of us were extremely jealous. They were the premier light fighters of a first world nation and acted like it AND had the mission to go along with it. It was what I thought we should have always been. I know that the RMCs and the USMC are not really designed to be the same but still. We wanted to be proactive and we were actively prohibited from doing so.

I am excited for the future of the Corps. Hope this really locks down a true defined mission for the Marines that is actually maintained. That subject always seem to be muddied up. Always been defined as light amphibious assault troops but never felt that way for my generation. I was in a boat company and I never spent a second on a Navy ship. Hell, we never even did another swim qual after basic.

Really makes me hate the ME conflicts even more and the amount of damage it did to our forces overall. There has been talk for years now of shifting back to our amphibious roots and away from the "mini-Army" but seems like it is truly starting now and again, pretty damn happy about it. Almost makes me wish I were back in to experience it.

.....almost.
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74OA
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In reply to Eliminatus • 10:57a, 3/28/20
AG
........and as the Commandant says, there are still many unanswered questions remaining and the time between now and 2030 will be spent in intensive experimentation and analysis to drill down to the answers. Stand by.
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bigtruckguy3500
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8:29p, 3/28/20
Not too long ago there was talk that the amphibious/beach landing role of the Marines was virtually obsolete. Big shift.
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Get Off My Lawn
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In reply to bigtruckguy3500 • 6:41a, 3/30/20
bigtruckguy3500 said:
Not too long ago there was talk that the amphibious/beach landing role of the Marines was virtually obsolete. Big shift.
...and then we launched and amphibious assault into a landlocked country... Sea-to-land without getting wet is still "amphibious!"
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Get Off My Lawn
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In reply to 74OA • 7:07a, 3/30/20
Quote:
Are any of those capabilities essential for small, dispersed, sea-denial forces fighting from islands? ... The days of the Corps being a mini-Army are over.

Thus the discussion. An FPF is a nice thing to have in an infantry unit's back pocket, and would be a desired capability in an Iwo Jima / Okinawa style island fight. I'll grant you though that risk of counter attack is lessened on the less fortified or smaller islands that were more frequently selected in our last island hopping campaign. And the army got in on Oki, so there's one more point in the "leave it to the army" column.

I will forever remain leery of depending on the Navy (abandonment), the air (inclimate weather), or mortars (range & packed ammo constraint) for fire support, though. Just as the battleship may have been proven obsolete in the early 1940s, but still saw some use all the way up to 1991; history cautions us against doing away with old technologies until the new ones prove themselves.
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JABQ04
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In reply to Get Off My Lawn • 8:25a, 3/30/20
AG
Quote:
And the army got in on Oki


There was Army support on Iwo too. I know I've mentioned this several times on the History board but the only action my grandfather saw in the Pacifc was when his infantry regiment landed on Iwo Jima to support the USMC. Have some of his souvenirs from the island.
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Ulysses90
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In reply to JABQ04 • 8:58p, 4/1/20
AG
JABQ04 said:
Army Redleg here, why didn't/don't the Marines use 105mm. Mobile, easy to helo in and out, a good section can have ready to shoot with in 4-6 mins. I think we had to be laid within 2 mins, safed within 4 and ready to fire by 6 mins for section certs. With RAP munitions can still reach out and touch some one.


That's a long bitter story dating back to 1994 when we ditched the last of our 105s. The party line was that the M777 was going to be light enough to be sling loaded under and MV-22 and the lighter weight of a 105mm would provide any significant advantage in tactical mobility and would not pack the punch of 155s.

That rationale was a lie that the Marine Corps told Congress even though they knew that the concept of sling loading howitzers beneath Ospreys was a diversionary take that we used to prevent Congress or the SecDef from cancelling the Osprey program during the years it was crashing during operational testing and costs were spiraling out of control.

It worked. The Osprey survived and the M777 was fielded in2007, ten years later than originally planned. Thirteen years after the M777 was fielded coincident with fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria there has not been a single operational case where a battery of M777s was emplaced by air transport with Ospreys. It's not for lack of power. The Osprey has more than enough power to carry an M777. It's because when a tiltrotor is carrying a very heavy external load it never transitions to level flight and gets the efficiency of aerodynamic lift. It remains in vertical mode. The turbines don't mind but the gearboxes get loads of wear.

The Marine Corps bought the M777 as part of a deal with the Brits in which they would buy US made aircraft if we bought their gun. The Marine Corps should not have bought a towed 155 but rather a wheeled SP gun like the KMW Boxer with the 155 turret or the GIAT Caesar.

Then, having failed to appreciate the error of getting rid of 105s the Marine Corps bought the 120mm mortar that was a solution in search if a problem and never saw combat before it was divested.

The best idea I have seen for artillery that supports the Marine Corps' operational concept (at least the ones before EABO pushed everything else aside) is the AM General 105 howitzer mounted on a HMMWV chassis. You could fit at least two of those on a C130 at a time and have real Operational mobility to remote locations. The AM General 155 mounted on an FMTV chassis is a better package than an M777 and an MTVR in most situations as well. If the Marine Corps artillery had not been so hellbent on the M777 we wouldn't be cutting so may batteries today. We focused on tradition rather than our likely enemies in the future and where we would fight them. We chose a gun that would provide job security for cannoneers rather than on automating the operation of the gun and how fast it could emplace and displace.

Actually, what I meant to say is that I have no opinion.
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Get Off My Lawn
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In reply to Ulysses90 • 9:10a, 4/2/20
Ulysses slingin knowledge, as usual!
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Fly Army 97
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In reply to Ulysses90 • 8:05a, 4/3/20
Ulysses90 said:
JABQ04 said:
Army Redleg here, why didn't/don't the Marines use 105mm. Mobile, easy to helo in and out, a good section can have ready to shoot with in 4-6 mins. I think we had to be laid within 2 mins, safed within 4 and ready to fire by 6 mins for section certs. With RAP munitions can still reach out and touch some one.


That's a long bitter story dating back to 1994 when we ditched the last of our 105s. The party line was that the M777 was going to be light enough to be sling loaded under and MV-22 and the lighter weight of a 105mm would provide any significant advantage in tactical mobility and would not pack the punch of 155s.

That rationale was a lie that the Marine Corps told Congress even though they knew that the concept of sling loading howitzers beneath Ospreys was a diversionary take that we used to prevent Congress or the SecDef from cancelling the Osprey program during the years it was crashing during operational testing and costs were spiraling out of control.

It worked. The Osprey survived and the M777 was fielded in2007, ten years later than originally planned. Thirteen years after the M777 was fielded coincident with fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria there has not been a single operational case where a battery of M777s was emplaced by air transport with Ospreys. It's not for lack of power. The Osprey has more than enough power to carry an M777. It's because when a tiltrotor is carrying a very heavy external load it never transitions to level flight and gets the efficiency of aerodynamic lift. It remains in vertical mode. The turbines don't mind but the gearboxes get loads of wear.

The Marine Corps bought the M777 as part of a deal with the Brits in which they would buy US made aircraft if we bought their gun. The Marine Corps should not have bought a towed 155 but rather a wheeled SP gun like the KMW Boxer with the 155 turret or the GIAT Caesar.

Then, having failed to appreciate the error of getting rid of 105s the Marine Corps bought the 120mm mortar that was a solution in search if a problem and never saw combat before it was divested.

The best idea I have seen for artillery that supports the Marine Corps' operational concept (at least the ones before EABO pushed everything else aside) is the AM General 105 howitzer mounted on a HMMWV chassis. You could fit at least two of those on a C130 at a time and have real Operational mobility to remote locations. The AM General 155 mounted on an FMTV chassis is a better package than an M777 and an MTVR in most situations as well. If the Marine Corps artillery had not been so hellbent on the M777 we wouldn't be cutting so may batteries today. We focused on tradition rather than our likely enemies in the future and where we would fight them. We chose a gun that would provide job security for cannoneers rather than on automating the operation of the gun and how fast it could emplace and displace.

Actually, what I meant to say is that I have no opinion.
Very interesting - esp now considering the USMC is at EABO and going beyond that idea to further integrate with the Navy. That means addressing the A2/AD and not just tactical unit-level fires mentioned in a previous post. Army has the same operational (and strategic fires that probably won't end up in the USMC) level fires and organizational changes coming.

So, if stand-off, penetration of the A2/AD, elimination of ships in the AO, and all the other tactical fires are part of the USMC portfolio...what does that mean in terms of structure? NMESIS --> GLCM --> HIMARS

https://defpost.com/u-s-marine-corps-seeking-to-integrate-naval-strike-missile-on-unmanned-jltv-rogue-fires-vehicle-for-anti-ship-capability/

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74OA
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10:44a, 4/3/20
AG
Here's the related thinking of the regional commander: CHINA

And here's the Commandant again talking about all the uncertainties in the Corps transformation: Long Road to 2030
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ArmyAg2002
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6:57a, 4/5/20
AG
Lack pf pilots may have something to do with the reduction in aviation assets.

https://theaviationgeekclub.com/us-marine-corps-does-not-have-enough-pilots-to-fly-the-f-35b/
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Buck Turgidson
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9:59p, 4/5/20
Forgive the stupid question, but who do we consider "peer adversaries"? These articles keep talking about combating China and "peer adversaries".
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bigtruckguy3500
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In reply to Buck Turgidson • 10:25p, 4/5/20
Don't know if we officially classify Russia/China as peer adversaries or near peer. But those would be the two big ones. Basically anyone that can potentially keep us from controlling the air space over, and coastal areas near, a contested piece of land.
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Fly Army 97
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9:47a, 4/7/20
Like bigtruck said...

The National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy clearly mark China and Russia as competitors who are advancing their military modernization efforts and security influence around the world. While those official documents do not use the term peer/near-peer, the Services often use those terms to describe the pacing threats, doctrine, national power, etc that we must address. I've seen people use them interchangeably - with one noted speaker saying he views China as a peer, in terms of threat capability...particularly if they are more willing to use a 'whole of government' (communist) approach, act just below the threshold of war, and invest around the world as much as they do.

So, I'd take that a step further and include all domains...cyber, space, etc.
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