titan said:

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Jackson was not personally popular with his soldiers. In fact, he gave the appearance of not caring much about their suffering. They followed him because he won.

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Thanks. So it was not some oblique reference to Jackson being too strait-laced. That is almost how it read. Sounds like more refers to a lack of empathy, and that Longstreet was more connected in this regard. Interesting.

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I think Jackson's uber-Calvinist view of life probably had as much to do with what seemed like a laissez-faire attitude toward the lives of his troops.

XUSCR said:

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titan said:

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Jackson was not personally popular with his soldiers. In fact, he gave the appearance of not caring much about their suffering. They followed him because he won.

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Thanks. So it was not some oblique reference to Jackson being too strait-laced. That is almost how it read. Sounds like more refers to a lack of empathy, and that Longstreet was more connected in this regard. Interesting.

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I think Jackson's uber-Calvinist view of life probably had as much to do with what seemed like a laissez-faire attitude toward the lives of his troops.

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He had a very Calvinist personality in addition to his Calvinist religious beliefs. Had he been born in the 17th Century he would have given Cromwell a run for his fervent money. Both were great generals. Makes you wonder if there's coincidence or correlation in that.

Good read

Been Waiting Too Long:"Lee's strangely worded order that allowed Ewell to rationalize not capturing Culp's Hill and Cemetery Ridge."

With all due respect -- Lee's orders were not so "strangely worded" - rather he regularly gave them in such a way as to allow his Lieutenants to exercise discretion in the field. He was accustomed to Stonewall accepting the orders adn exercising decisive and aggressive discretion - Ewell - bless his heart - was reluctant to exercise discretion in the same way and to take the high ground of Culp's Hill on Day 1. In the end, it made a huge difference in the outcome of the battle. Stonewall's death at the hands of his own men was divine intervention that saved the Union. Had the South won Gettysburg, the North would have likely pursued for peace allowing the South to remain separate.

Stonewall understood that his life was in God's hands and that he would be a faithful servant to God's will even if it meant he must die:

"Captain, my religious belief teaches me to feel as safe in battle as in bed. God has fixed the time for my death. I do not concern myself about that, but to be always ready, no matter when it may overtake me. Captain, that is the way all men should live, and then all would be equally brave."

Sorry, but Ewell had been extremely aggressive all day. One could even argue he was overaggressive with a piecemealing of his available forces and no solid knowledge of the AoP's location. That lack of knowledge and the exhaustion of his forces meant that any serious resistance along the flanks of his advance would cause an understandable pause. Despite Early's later claims, he advocated for Ewell to hold off a full attack when reports of resistance on Culp's Hill reached them. As it was, XII Corps was in fact very near the battlefield and could have been brought into action if a sustained fight was started. I Corps was bloodied but hardly done, and Cemetery Ridge was a formidable position.

We also have no proof Jackson would have made such an assault. For every example in the Shenandoah, we can find an example as part of Lee's main force where he made questionable or dilatory decisions.

There's also zero way of knowing if the north would have sued for peace after a hypothetical Gettysburg loss. Isn't that a bit of revisionist history?

Undoubtedly Lee and the army would have been better off had Jackson not been killed. Would he have changed the outcome of the war? Perhaps. Perhaps he would have changed Day 1 at Gettysburg, or even part of Day 2.

More impactful, if Lee had listened to Longstreet, the outcome may have been different. I doubt Jackson would have sided with Longstreet in that dispute though.

I have a hard time understanding the lack of rationality behind Lee's orders for Day 3, Pickett's charge.

On Day 2 Lee's troops briefly attacked and held Cemetary Hill and a portion of Cemetary Ridge. Although G.T. Anderson and Longstreet told Lee they did not think they could duplicate that feat on Cemetary Ridge even with a bigger force, Lee had high expectations for his men. With a fresh, although not complete division, in Pickett's men and two divisons (Heth/ Pettigrew's and Pender/Trimbles's) who had rested on the second day of the battle, he felt he could break the Federals. Lee was not wrong in thinking the Federals were close to breaking on the second and he thought a concerted effort by his men on the third would suceed. Given a better artillery bombardment (bad ammo and overshooting the Federal lines) he might have been right.

It's hard to imagine an improvement to the bombardment would have altered the result of marching a mile uphill in the face of an entrenched enemy. And, if you're going to risk so much in an attempt to win a major victory and force peace, why not commit more to the assault or at least cover the ground quicker?

How many examples are there of such and assault succeeding? Lookout mountain and Missionary Ridge, but Bragg was horrible.

claym711 said:

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It's hard to imagine an improvement to the bombardment would have altered the result of marching a mile uphill in the face of an entrenched enemy. And, if you're going to risk so much in an attempt to win a major victory and force peace, why not commit more to the assault or at least cover the ground quicker?

How many examples are there of such and assault succeeding? Lookout mountain and Missionary Ridge, but Bragg was horrible.

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The slope of the Missionary Ridge assault at Chattanooga made Confederate rifle fire pretty useless, and artillery couldn't depress far enough to render effective aid, so I don't think even that's a fair comparison.

What's baffling about the artillery bombardment is that they had some positions that offered a partial enfilade of the copse of trees, but they didn't use them. They just went for the straight shot and wound up hitting the reserve artillery park.

The soldiers went as quickly as they could, but the Hollywood picture of a charge as a free-for-all is horribly inaccurate. A 19th century charge was only effective if you provided a united front in line and under control.

So why did Lee do it? At that point, the center of the Union line probably was legitimately the weakest point in the defense. Oh, Meade absolutely could have called divisions into action that had been placed into the rear to rest after the 2nd day to plug any gaps, and Lee had no force capable of exploiting any breakthrough, but it was the weakest point. There's not much attention given to the cavalry fight early on the 3rd, but I've read a couple of interesting pieces that argue the cavalry was intended to be a bigger piece of the day's strategy and that the failure of that attack meant the infantry assault had little if any hope of success.

With the benefit of hindsight, we can say Lee should have broken camp on the night of the 2nd. He lost his chance to win that afternoon, before VI Corps arrived on the field in force, and nothing was going to work. And the entire basis of the invasion, as a way to relieve pressure on Vicksburg and end the war (which made no strategic sense in the first place), had badly failed even before the battle began. Major Civil War armies did not disintegrate after losses (until you beat them into oblivion over the course of months) and Washington was not going to fall. But if I'm Lee on the 3rd, I probably do the same damn thing. It's hard to know and admit when you're beaten. And the best generals can't admit it. Grant made similar mistakes during his campaigns.

Gaines' Mill and Wright's breakthough at Petersburg are two that come to mind quickly, granted for every success there are probably three failures.

Unrelated question that pops up for me when reading biographies and recounts, how much adrenaline and power addiction was at play with some Generals? I don't ask that in a disparaging way. These were the highest quality honorable men, for the most part, sacrificing their lives. Lead up to battle, it often seems as if these men truly loved what they were doing (war), savoring those moments (Jackson especially), which is hard to imagine.

claym711 said:

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Unrelated question that pops up for me when reading biographies and recounts, how much adrenaline and power addiction was at play with some Generals? I don't ask that in a disparaging way. These were the highest quality honorable men, for the most part, sacrificing their lives. Lead up to battle, it often seems as if these men truly loved what they were doing (war), savoring those moments (Jackson especially), which is hard to imagine.

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Robert E Lee as quoted by in a work by Douglas Freeman:

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Lee's eyes flashed as he saw them, and the blood of "Light-Horse Harry" fought in his veins with the calmer strain of the peace-loving Carters. Turning to Longstreet he revealed the whole man in a single sentence: "It is well that war is so terrible......we would grow too fond of it!" As he uttered the words, he seemed in the eyes of a British correspondence who stood by to have about him an "antique heroism."

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This utterance by one of the greatest generals of all time has always stuck with me. I think that most sane men , especially those whose orders and direction led to the death of thousands, feel this way. It must be a tremendous burden that none of us can even fathom.

It's fictional, but a good line that Michael Shaara wrote in the Killer Angels for Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain:

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There's nothing so much like a god on earth as a General on a battlefield

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claym711 said:

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Unrelated question that pops up for me when reading biographies and recounts, how much adrenaline and power addiction was at play with some Generals? I don't ask that in a disparaging way. These were the highest quality honorable men, for the most part, sacrificing their lives. Lead up to battle, it often seems as if these men truly loved what they were doing (war), savoring those moments (Jackson especially), which is hard to imagine.

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Yes they loved it. Most of the higher ranked generals (both sides) had previous experience in the Mexican War. But think of it this way, You train your entire life to do nothing other than to win a battle/war.

You can see it in today's military. The young soldiers that I was around in Iraq and Afghanistan could only think about getting home the whole time they were there. Yet a month or two afterward getting home, all they could talk about was getting back to the war. My nephew in the 101st was assigned as FoB Mayor in Paktia Province, Afghanistan. He never got to go outside the wire and was totally devastated by that.

It is hard to imagine unless you have experienced yourself. It is both the most exhilarating and terrifying experience of your life.

Lee was exactly right.

Stive said:

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There's also zero way of knowing if the north would have sued for peace after a hypothetical Gettysburg loss. Isn't that a bit of revisionist history?

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Agree. Washington City was heavily fortified and guarded. Even if Lee wins Gettysburg, could you have really besieged Washington? I liken it to Hannibal after Cannae...couldn't besiege and take Rome.