Has anyone here ever spent time thinking about how the Civil War goes differently if Stonewall hadn't died? It could be argued that the next few months after his death ended up swinging the war. He was borderline unstoppable during his time in the war (i may be wrong on this). I'm not saying the South wins with him, but it makes me wonder has much longer the war would have lasted with him.

Borderline unstoppable is an interesting statement. He certainly displayed intense will and motivation and clearly dominated weaker opponents. However, his weaknesses often get glossed over. His performance during the Seven Days was marginal at best and his performance during the Antietam Campaign was spotty. And it's not apparent why that is. There's no good explanation or excuse that I've found. He just sort of lost his sense or motivation for awhile at times.

The biggest drawback with Jackson were his tactics. Superior will meant superior casualties. That's fine against folks like Banks who didn't want to take the casualties, but Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan were different animals. I once had a friend who said the only difference in the outcome at Gettysburg had Jackson been there would have been the casualties: they would have been higher for the South. I don't know if that's the only difference (though I think they would have been higher), but it makes a good point. Jackson in independent command was different from Jackson the subordinate.

Interesting!

No question about it. The Battle at Gettysburg was lost on day one when Stonewall's replacement, Robert Ewell, failed to act decisively and take Culp's Hill. The Northern troops were allowed to take the high ground putting the South at a disadvantage on day two. I've always thought that Jackson's death following his injury at Chancellorsville was a divine act allowing the Union to remain united.

The real what-if in the same time frame is probably the Battle / Fall of New Orleans. If that doesn't come-off, if Farragut is turned back, it changes the complexion of much of the war in 1862. And it is not a given that the ironclads that could have made the difference could not have been made ready--- stupid things like inter-state bickering and rivalry kept needed parts from being delivered, which was fatal as the difficulties of having to have some items like shafts forged as far away as Tredegar iron works in Richmond and shipped out were serious enough by themselves and would continue to be.

Titan,

Agreed.

A broad question is was the Civil War winnable militarily? Or, like the Pacific War, did it depend on a big enough victory and setback against Washington to make a political settlement possible? Of course Pearl made that impossible in WW II--- but what about 1864 election?

The Original AG 76 said:

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Grant and Sherman were willing to lose any number of men necessary and slaughter, rape and pillage as many innocent civilians as could be brought under the sword to not just defeat but destroy the South...in order to " save" it for their so-called union.

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Seems like a pretty even handed analysis.

IDAGG said:

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The Original AG 76 said:

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IDAGG said:

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The Original AG 76 said:

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Grant and Sherman were willing to lose any number of men necessary and slaughter, rape and pillage as many innocent civilians as could be brought under the sword to not just defeat but destroy the South...in order to " save" it for their so-called union.

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Seems like a pretty even handed analysis.

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Grant never made it any secret that he was willing to take and inflict as many casualties are necessary to wear down Lee. He had no regard for the losses. Much like Gen Patton and other successful military leaders.
Sherman...well...the March to the Sea was a war crime in any other war. Total destruction and slaughter. Took generations for Georgia and the Carolinas to recover. As a side note read up on Beast Butler in New Orleans . His general order 28 called for the RAPE of any Southern lady who did not bow down to an occupying yankee. Damn near jap like for that bast$rd. For decades a chamber pot was called a Butler in S Louisiana.

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Here is a recent post of yours from the politics forum:

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The leaders may be the artsy-tartsies and the ultra white guilt rich libs but the foot soldiers are the 97% black population who are nothing more than parasitical slaves to the dem plantation faithfully voting EXACTLY as their WHITE massas be a tolding dim to does ! As long as we allow the white dem slave owners to use OUR tax money to continue to buy these votes there is no way that these people can free themselves. They have proven , beyond a doubt, that they do not possess the ability nor the drive to leave the new slave system on their own volition . They have to be forced or starved OUT !

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I hardly think you have the temperament to analyze anything related to the civil war or race in any sort of even handed way. That is my point.

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Well.... aren't WE special !!!
I bow down to your typically morally superior self. So unworthy to even be in the presence of such an enlightened being....

It was Richard Ewell not Robert, and his performance on July 1 up until he elected not to attack Cemetery Hill or Culp's Hill was impeccable, as good as or better than Jackson could have done. Ewell reversed his march as the battle commenced, marched his men in good order 15 miles in the heat of the day, threw them immediately into a tough five hour battle and caused the Federals to break their line north of Gettysburg.


Lee gave him the discretion that evening and he took it, he knew better than anyone the condition of his men after such a grueling day. He was an experienced enough and competent commander to know what his men could do and not do. He would mess up on other days later in the war but not here. It may be fun to debate counterfactual history but it is pretty pointless too. But let's just remember the situation, exhausted Confederate second corps with only one division that had not been heavily engaged in five hours of fighting that day. On Cemetery Hill and to its east you have the first division of the First Corps, including the Iron Brigade, partially dug in on the high ground of the Hill. They had not been routed off the field they had withdrawn in good order when the Eleventh Corps collapsed. On Culp's Hill you had the reserve troops of the First Corps who had not been engaged at all in combat so far and were already dug in pretty well on the heights. To add to that defense you had the whole XII Corps under Slocum arriving. Johnson's Division, the only fresh one Ewell had, probed Culp's Hill and Johnson was surprised when troops got on his flank and nearly captured him personally. He reported back to Ewell and suggested an attack on the hill in the increasing darkness might not be a good idea. Ewell used his discretion and did not attack under the circumstances.


We can debate all day what Jackson would have done or not. He was no super hero that was undefeated or undefeatable. His worse days were when he was exhausted and while serving as a subordinate to Lee. His strength had always been at independent command. He might have done exactly what Ewell did that day. But let's say he does attack with exhausted men against the defenses I described above. We have many examples of tired troops attacking relatively fresh troops, dug in on the high ground in the Civil War and seldom are they successful. The ones that were successful were because the defenses were set up on the hill top versus the military crest or consisted of a layered defense that precluded the lines behind to fire for fear of hitting their own men retreating. I cannot think of one situation with the defenses like the Federals had on Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill and the Confederates as fatigued as they were where a successful attack was made. So if Jackson had done it, it would have been a unique circumstance of the war in my opinion.

In actuality, Ewell's Third Division under Gen Allegheny Johnson had just arrived on the field and had not participated in the earlier fighting. Ewell ordered them to take the hill. Instead of attacking, Johnson sent a party to reconnoiter the hill and they ran into the remnants of the Iron Brigade digging in. The party was almost captured but returned with their information that the hill was occupied. There was also information that large Federal units (the XII Corps) were approaching from the east on the Hanover Road. That all contributed to the decision not to attack that evening.

I am not totally convinced that Jackson would have come to the same conclusion. Jackson was very reactionary. I really think he would have followed up breaking Barlow's lines on Barlow's Knoll and continued to press the assault along Rock Creek through the eastern edge of town, which is what Early actually did. There was nothing in front of him at this point. I think Jackson would have continued to press until he was on Culp's Hill. This would have been before the Iron Brigade got there after they broke. Of course we don't know how Steinwehr, who on Cemetery Ridge at the time, would have reacted to Jackson appearing on his right .

Say Gettysburg turned out exactly the same with Jackson still alive. I do not think that Jackson would have contributed that greatly to the ANV during the Overland Campaign and ending with Petersburg. All the battles (except for the Wilderness) were very set piece and left little opportunities for independent command, which was Jackson at his best. I think he would have have been trapped, just as Ewell/Early, Hill and Longstreet were, into reacting to Grant's every move.

Now had he had been in command of the Second Corps in the '64 Valley Campaign, that is a topic for a whole new discussion.

Cougar:

That assumes you don't get the Jackson of the Seven Day's or Kernstown or McDowell or Fredericksburg and get the one who had good days against very inferior opponents.

Keep in mind that Lee always thought Longstreet was his best subordinate, after the army realigned after the Seven Day's Lee gave more units to Longstreet because he thought Longstreet could handle them and Jackson could not. Lee always made his camp by Longstreet and never with Jackson, part of it was his greater faith in Longstreet and his advice rather than Jackson. I admit that part of it was Longstreet was a bit more lively than Jackson who was too Presbyterian, heck even after Old Pete lost three children to scarlet fever in early 1862 his camp was still more lively than Jackson's.

I might even go as far to say that the greatest flank ever performed in the Wilderness was done by Longstreet, not Jackson. Jackson took too long in deploying his men, wasting day light and using a line of divisions his fourth division never really got into the fight at all and they all jumbled up and stalled well before dark, that is why he was thinking of continuing the offensive in a risky night attack when he was wounded.

Longstreet probably saved Lee's bacon in the Wilderness with his flank attack that he had to plan and execute on the fly. He crushed the best union corps in the AoP (not the lowly 11th corps like Jackson) and they were never the same after that day. Their commander Winfield Scott Hancock admitted that he had been "rolled up like a wet blanket" by Longstreet.

As stated in my first post, Jackson died at the perfect time. He was an amazing fighter but no demi-god. We could talk about his failure to communicate with his subordinates and petty squabbles with them (he got Garnett killed at Gettysburg) but he has been put so high on a pedestal that there is no bringing him back to reality anymore for the general masses.

ChiliBeans said:

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For every Southern boy fourteen years old, not once but whenever he wants it, there is the instant when it's still not yet two o'clock on that July afternoon in 1863, the brigades are in position behind the rail fence, the guns are laid and ready in the woods and the furled flags are already loosened to break out and Pickett himself with his long oiled ringlets and his hat in one hand probably and his sword in the other looking up the hill waiting for Longstreet to give the word and it's all in the balance, it hasn't happened yet, it hasn't even begun yet, it not only hasn't begun yet but there is still time for it not to begin against that position and those circumstances which made more men than Garnett and Kemper and Armistead and Wilcox look grave yet it's going to begin, we all know that, we have come too far with too much at stake and that moment doesn't need even a fourteen-year-old boy to think This time. Maybe this time with all this much to lose than all this much to gain: Pennsylvania, Maryland, the world, the golden dome of Washington itself to crown with desperate and unbelievable victory the desperate gamble, the cast made two years ago; or to anyone who ever sailed a skiff under a quilt sail, the moment in 1492 when somebody thought This is it: the absolute edge of no return, to turn back now and make home or sail irrevocably on and either find land or plunge over the world's roaring rim.

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Wow, impressive that you just wrote that beautiful passage by yourself. You're very talented

The Original AG 76 said:

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IDAGG said:

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The Original AG 76 said:

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IDAGG said:

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The Original AG 76 said:

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Grant and Sherman were willing to lose any number of men necessary and slaughter, rape and pillage as many innocent civilians as could be brought under the sword to not just defeat but destroy the South...in order to " save" it for their so-called union.

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Seems like a pretty even handed analysis.

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Grant never made it any secret that he was willing to take and inflict as many casualties are necessary to wear down Lee. He had no regard for the losses. Much like Gen Patton and other successful military leaders.
Sherman...well...the March to the Sea was a war crime in any other war. Total destruction and slaughter. Took generations for Georgia and the Carolinas to recover. As a side note read up on Beast Butler in New Orleans . His general order 28 called for the RAPE of any Southern lady who did not bow down to an occupying yankee. Damn near jap like for that bast$rd. For decades a chamber pot was called a Butler in S Louisiana.

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Here is a recent post of yours from the politics forum:

Quote:

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The leaders may be the artsy-tartsies and the ultra white guilt rich libs but the foot soldiers are the 97% black population who are nothing more than parasitical slaves to the dem plantation faithfully voting EXACTLY as their WHITE massas be a tolding dim to does ! As long as we allow the white dem slave owners to use OUR tax money to continue to buy these votes there is no way that these people can free themselves. They have proven , beyond a doubt, that they do not possess the ability nor the drive to leave the new slave system on their own volition . They have to be forced or starved OUT !

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I hardly think you have the temperament to analyze anything related to the civil war or race in any sort of even handed way. That is my point.

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Well.... aren't WE special !!!
I bow down to your typically morally superior self. So unworthy to even be in the presence of such an enlightened being....

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Cmon Preston, we know it's you

BQ78 said:

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Cougar:

That assumes you don't get the Jackson of the Seven Day's or Kernstown or McDowell or Fredericksburg and get the one who had good days against very inferior opponents.

Keep in mind that Lee always thought Longstreet was his best subordinate, after the army realigned after the Seven Day's Lee gave more units to Longstreet because he thought Longstreet could handle them and Jackson could not. Lee always made his camp by Longstreet and never with Jackson, part of it was his greater faith in Longstreet and his advice rather than Jackson. I admit that part of it was Longstreet was a bit more lively than Jackson who was too Presbyterian, heck even after Old Pete lost three children to scarlet fever in early 1862 his camp was still more lively than Jackson's.

I might even go as far to say that the greatest flank ever performed in the Wilderness was done by Longstreet, not Jackson. Jackson took too long in deploying his men, wasting day light and using a line of divisions his fourth division never really got into the fight at all and they all jumbled up and stalled well before dark, that is why he was thinking of continuing the offensive in a risky night attack when he was wounded.

Longstreet probably saved Lee's bacon in the Wilderness with his flank attack that he had to plan and execute on the fly. He crushed the best union corps in the AoP (not the lowly 11th corps like Jackson) and they were never the same after that day. Their commander Winfield Scott Hancock admitted that he had been "rolled up like a wet blanket" by Longstreet.

As stated in my first post, Jackson died at the perfect time. He was an amazing fighter but no demi-god. We could talk about his failure to communicate with his subordinates and petty squabbles with them (he got Garnett killed at Gettysburg) but he has been put so high on a pedestal that there is no bringing him back to reality anymore for the general masses.

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I totally agree about Lee's affection for Longstreet.

I am familiar with it, though I haven't seen the entire thing, just an edited volume. I also really like Stephen Sears' short volume on the Maryland Campaign.

Yep, Sears' "Landscape Turned Red" is my favorite Sharpsburg book.

BQ78,

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. I admit that part of it was Longstreet was a bit more lively than Jackson who was too Presbyterian, heck even after Old Pete lost three children to scarlet fever in early 1862 his camp was still more lively than Jackson's.

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Curious --- am I reading your paragraph correctly that what is being referred to there was that Longstreet was more likely to see to matters of keeping troop morale, than Jackson? The mention of too Presbyterian --- is it meaning in some ethical sense---- like the difference between the Royal Navy's rum ration and the USN ban?

Jackson's very very devout faith hasn't been mentioned much in the thread, so was curious.

Jackson was not personally popular with his soldiers. In fact, he gave the appearance of not caring much about their suffering. They followed him because he won.

Quote:

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Jackson was not personally popular with his soldiers. In fact, he gave the appearance of not caring much about their suffering. They followed him because he won.

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Thanks. So it was not some oblique reference to Jackson being too strait-laced. That is almost how it read. Sounds like more refers to a lack of empathy, and that Longstreet was more connected in this regard. Interesting.

Yeah, Longstreet partied and Jackson prayed.

Jackson's men came to like him because they won.

Dr. Watson said:

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I am familiar with it, though I haven't seen the entire thing, just an edited volume. I also really like Stephen Sears' short volume on the Maryland Campaign.

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To the Gates of Richmond. Great book!