cottonpatchag said:

---

Just as I am ready to transition into wearing these and joining the coffee club at Whataburger with my nickel cup, they pull this. Now I have to rethink everything!

---

They're going to start looking like this now

Trajan88 said:

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So is the company offering the employees that are going to move to California a massive pay increase due to higher housing costs, costs of living in California (i.e car registrations... will their cars not be Calif. emissions certified, state income tax, etc.)?

Has to be a massive employment cost increase for the company.

---

didn't click the article but the snip in OP seems to indicate that 150 people in Ft. Tx are losing their jobs; not being transferred to CA. ...sounds like consolidation where not many are actually moving and will require the COL adjustments to be in Orange County.

That's right, I had forgotten that the whole deal moved there. When the Denver deal started to gain traction it was supposed to be only the Kootour spinoff and then went whole hog.

VF lost a ton of their senior legacy employees when that happened. What VF is now resembles nothing of what it was even 10 years ago.

I have heard from acquaintances in the industry that Ft. Worth is a mess for W-D. VF was also able to kill the niche, but well followed, Walls brand, from Cleburne, TX. At least W-D had kept it, and some of the Walls people around.

Nah. They're moving in with the Vans creative team. More like…

California is about 2 clicks away from a regulatory dress code for citizens. Maybe we have some forward thinking here with Dickeys. That or just some dumb ass making dumb ass decisions.

Following VF Corporation's acquisition of Dickies from the Williamson family in 2017, the workwear brand embarked on a strategic overhaul aimed at repositioning itself in the marketplace. Around this same period, VF acquired Supreme - a prominent name in streetwearand its then-CEO, Steve Rendle, championed the idea that streetwear would serve as the primary growth driver for VF's entire brand portfolio. As a result, Dickies was rapidly redirected away from its heritage consumer base toward a new, more fashion-forward audience.

By 2020, Dickies began aggressively pursuing a streetwear-oriented approach. The company closed all of its in-house manufacturing facilities and prioritized contract manufacturing, producing apparel lines intended to appeal to trend-oriented consumers. This pivot came at the expense of Dickies' traditional workwear products, despite internal data cautioning against deprioritizing the brand's core market.

The untested strategy resulted in significant overproduction of lifestyle merchandise. Consumer research-though sporadic-indicated limited enthusiasm for the newer designs, and major retailers showed little interest. Rather than curtail production or re-evaluate the pivot, leadership allowed inventory to accumulate in VF's warehouses. When sell-through proved disappointing, much of the excess product was routed to off-price retailers such as Ross and TJ Maxx, exacerbating brand dilution and creating supply shortages for Dickies' core workwear lines.

Concurrently, Dickies launched marketing campaigns that prominently embraced socially progressive or "woke" themes, from emphasizing diversity and inclusion to highlighting activist messages like BLM support and mask advocacy. Though well-intentioned in some respects, these campaigns alienated many long-time Dickies customers who valued the brand for its historic association with tradespeople and manual laborers. Compounding the disconnect, Dickies' promotional material increasingly featured non-workers posing in choreographed scenes, a stark departure from the authenticity that core consumers expected.

Rather than formally analyze the success or failure of these campaigns, leadership neglected or outright refused to conduct post-campaign reviews. Internal feedback from market research teams was largely disregarded, revealing a leadership intent on pushing a fashionable, lifestyle-oriented narrative regardless of its alignment with Dickies' core identity.

During this time, Dickies saw high turnover among its executive ranks. Presidents Denny Bruce, Lance Meller, and Todd Dalhausser each took a turn at the helm. However, critics note these executives neither fully grasped the workwear category nor demonstrated willingness to heed cautious voices within the organization. Instead, they appeared to treat the company's budget as "house money," pursuing short-term marketing experiments and production gambles.

When early signs of revenue decline emerged, Denny Bruce departed rather than steer a potentially challenging turnaround. Leadership churn was not limited to the presidential level; frequent restructures affected marketing, merchandising, e-commerce, and sales roles, leading to a "rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic" dynamic. The brand ultimately lost several key licensing partners who migrated to competitors like Wrangler, amplifying the erosion of market share.

After a temporary pandemic-related boost (attributable to essential workers, Walmart's operational status, and Dickies' relatively low price point), revenue dropped by 10-25% annually post-pandemic. By 2024, Dickies' business was reported to be half the size it was prior to VF's ownership, with iconic workwear lines increasingly absent from shelves. Search volume for the brand plunged to roughly a quarter of its previous peak, underscoring shrinking consumer mindshare.

Meanwhile, new offices in Fort Worth remained partially vacant, reflecting stalled hiring and diminished morale. Similar challenges plagued other VF brands, such as Vans, indicating deeper corporate issues. Ultimately, when Bracken Darrell assumed the interim presidency at Dickies, he discovered a hollowed-out brand - it's factories shuttered, core customer segments alienated, and unprofitable marketing endeavors depleting resources.

Dickies' fall from iconic workwear staple to diminished corporate asset illustrates the pitfalls of chasing unverified market trends while alienating the customers who built the brand. By eliminating all internal manufacturing capabilities, mismanaging crucial licensing agreements, and ignoring both internal and external research, Dickies forfeited the competitive advantage it had cultivated over decades.

Moreover, the reliance on overtly "woke" campaigns without corresponding authenticity or brand alignment undercut Dickies' historical identity. Intensifying the problem, a shift to performance marketing and deep discounting eroded margins and cheapened brand equity. Combined, these factors suggest that significant damage to the brand was inevitable once VF chose to prioritize streetwear's perceived profitability over Dickies' proven core business.

In retrospect, leadership might have safeguarded Dickies' reputation and financial performance by:

- Maintaining a balanced product portfolio, preserving the profitable workwear line until a new consumer base was demonstrably established.
- Conducting rigorous market assessments and post-campaign analyses, rather than suppressing data that contradicted strategic narratives.
- Fostering brand authenticity within marketing efforts, using genuine worker stories and environments to engage both traditional and prospective customers.
- Keeping experienced operators and advisors in place, rather than cycling through leadership ill-prepared to navigate complex changes.

Instead, Dickies' trajectory stands as a cautionary tale: even the most recognized and resilient heritage brands can falter when they neglect foundational consumer relationships, ignore solid research, and prioritize trend-chasing over core value propositions.

Seems like a great opportunity for a VC to back the experience of these displaces employees to launch a new Cowtown brand to fill the void

TommyTexas said:

---

Following VF Corporation's acquisition of Dickies from the Williamson family in 2017, the workwear brand embarked on a strategic overhaul aimed at repositioning itself in the marketplace. Around this same period, VF acquired Supreme - a prominent name in streetwearand its then-CEO, Steve Rendle, championed the idea that streetwear would serve as the primary growth driver for VF's entire brand portfolio. As a result, Dickies was rapidly redirected away from its heritage consumer base toward a new, more fashion-forward audience.

By 2020, Dickies began aggressively pursuing a streetwear-oriented approach. The company closed all of its in-house manufacturing facilities and prioritized contract manufacturing, producing apparel lines intended to appeal to trend-oriented consumers. This pivot came at the expense of Dickies' traditional workwear products, despite internal data cautioning against deprioritizing the brand's core market.

The untested strategy resulted in significant overproduction of lifestyle merchandise. Consumer research-though sporadic-indicated limited enthusiasm for the newer designs, and major retailers showed little interest. Rather than curtail production or re-evaluate the pivot, leadership allowed inventory to accumulate in VF's warehouses. When sell-through proved disappointing, much of the excess product was routed to off-price retailers such as Ross and TJ Maxx, exacerbating brand dilution and creating supply shortages for Dickies' core workwear lines.

Concurrently, Dickies launched marketing campaigns that prominently embraced socially progressive or "woke" themes, from emphasizing diversity and inclusion to highlighting activist messages like BLM support and mask advocacy. Though well-intentioned in some respects, these campaigns alienated many long-time Dickies customers who valued the brand for its historic association with tradespeople and manual laborers. Compounding the disconnect, Dickies' promotional material increasingly featured non-workers posing in choreographed scenes, a stark departure from the authenticity that core consumers expected.

Rather than formally analyze the success or failure of these campaigns, leadership neglected or outright refused to conduct post-campaign reviews. Internal feedback from market research teams was largely disregarded, revealing a leadership intent on pushing a fashionable, lifestyle-oriented narrative regardless of its alignment with Dickies' core identity.

During this time, Dickies saw high turnover among its executive ranks. Presidents Denny Bruce, Lance Meller, and Todd Dalhausser each took a turn at the helm. However, critics note these executives neither fully grasped the workwear category nor demonstrated willingness to heed cautious voices within the organization. Instead, they appeared to treat the company's budget as "house money," pursuing short-term marketing experiments and production gambles.

When early signs of revenue decline emerged, Denny Bruce departed rather than steer a potentially challenging turnaround. Leadership churn was not limited to the presidential level; frequent restructures affected marketing, merchandising, e-commerce, and sales roles, leading to a "rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic" dynamic. The brand ultimately lost several key licensing partners who migrated to competitors like Wrangler, amplifying the erosion of market share.

After a temporary pandemic-related boost (attributable to essential workers, Walmart's operational status, and Dickies' relatively low price point), revenue dropped by 10-25% annually post-pandemic. By 2024, Dickies' business was reported to be half the size it was prior to VF's ownership, with iconic workwear lines increasingly absent from shelves. Search volume for the brand plunged to roughly a quarter of its previous peak, underscoring shrinking consumer mindshare.

Meanwhile, new offices in Fort Worth remained partially vacant, reflecting stalled hiring and diminished morale. Similar challenges plagued other VF brands, such as Vans, indicating deeper corporate issues. Ultimately, when Bracken Darrell assumed the interim presidency at Dickies, he discovered a hollowed-out brand - it's factories shuttered, core customer segments alienated, and unprofitable marketing endeavors depleting resources.

Dickies' fall from iconic workwear staple to diminished corporate asset illustrates the pitfalls of chasing unverified market trends while alienating the customers who built the brand. By eliminating all internal manufacturing capabilities, mismanaging crucial licensing agreements, and ignoring both internal and external research, Dickies forfeited the competitive advantage it had cultivated over decades.

Moreover, the reliance on overtly "woke" campaigns without corresponding authenticity or brand alignment undercut Dickies' historical identity. Intensifying the problem, a shift to performance marketing and deep discounting eroded margins and cheapened brand equity. Combined, these factors suggest that significant damage to the brand was inevitable once VF chose to prioritize streetwear's perceived profitability over Dickies' proven core business.

In retrospect, leadership might have safeguarded Dickies' reputation and financial performance by:

- Maintaining a balanced product portfolio, preserving the profitable workwear line until a new consumer base was demonstrably established.
- Conducting rigorous market assessments and post-campaign analyses, rather than suppressing data that contradicted strategic narratives.
- Fostering brand authenticity within marketing efforts, using genuine worker stories and environments to engage both traditional and prospective customers.
- Keeping experienced operators and advisors in place, rather than cycling through leadership ill-prepared to navigate complex changes.

Instead, Dickies' trajectory stands as a cautionary tale: even the most recognized and resilient heritage brands can falter when they neglect foundational consumer relationships, ignore solid research, and prioritize trend-chasing over core value propositions.

---

Sounds like their leadership must have attended the Anheuser-Bush/ Bud Light Marketing Academy of Everything That You Could Possibly Do to Ensure Failure Across The Board.

How, exactly do you get away with this? What about the BOD and stockholders? Is there iterally nobody watching what's happening?

cottonpatchag said:

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Just as I am ready to transition into wearing these and joining the coffee club at Whataburger with my nickel cup, they pull this. Now I have to rethink everything!

---

My dad had them in three colors, I think.

Is there something about having the name Dick in your company name that makes you stupid?

rwtxag83 said:

---

TommyTexas said:

---

Following VF Corporation's acquisition of Dickies from the Williamson family in 2017, the workwear brand embarked on a strategic overhaul aimed at repositioning itself in the marketplace. Around this same period, VF acquired Supreme - a prominent name in streetwearand its then-CEO, Steve Rendle, championed the idea that streetwear would serve as the primary growth driver for VF's entire brand portfolio. As a result, Dickies was rapidly redirected away from its heritage consumer base toward a new, more fashion-forward audience.

By 2020, Dickies began aggressively pursuing a streetwear-oriented approach. The company closed all of its in-house manufacturing facilities and prioritized contract manufacturing, producing apparel lines intended to appeal to trend-oriented consumers. This pivot came at the expense of Dickies' traditional workwear products, despite internal data cautioning against deprioritizing the brand's core market.

The untested strategy resulted in significant overproduction of lifestyle merchandise. Consumer research-though sporadic-indicated limited enthusiasm for the newer designs, and major retailers showed little interest. Rather than curtail production or re-evaluate the pivot, leadership allowed inventory to accumulate in VF's warehouses. When sell-through proved disappointing, much of the excess product was routed to off-price retailers such as Ross and TJ Maxx, exacerbating brand dilution and creating supply shortages for Dickies' core workwear lines.

Concurrently, Dickies launched marketing campaigns that prominently embraced socially progressive or "woke" themes, from emphasizing diversity and inclusion to highlighting activist messages like BLM support and mask advocacy. Though well-intentioned in some respects, these campaigns alienated many long-time Dickies customers who valued the brand for its historic association with tradespeople and manual laborers. Compounding the disconnect, Dickies' promotional material increasingly featured non-workers posing in choreographed scenes, a stark departure from the authenticity that core consumers expected.

Rather than formally analyze the success or failure of these campaigns, leadership neglected or outright refused to conduct post-campaign reviews. Internal feedback from market research teams was largely disregarded, revealing a leadership intent on pushing a fashionable, lifestyle-oriented narrative regardless of its alignment with Dickies' core identity.

During this time, Dickies saw high turnover among its executive ranks. Presidents Denny Bruce, Lance Meller, and Todd Dalhausser each took a turn at the helm. However, critics note these executives neither fully grasped the workwear category nor demonstrated willingness to heed cautious voices within the organization. Instead, they appeared to treat the company's budget as "house money," pursuing short-term marketing experiments and production gambles.

When early signs of revenue decline emerged, Denny Bruce departed rather than steer a potentially challenging turnaround. Leadership churn was not limited to the presidential level; frequent restructures affected marketing, merchandising, e-commerce, and sales roles, leading to a "rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic" dynamic. The brand ultimately lost several key licensing partners who migrated to competitors like Wrangler, amplifying the erosion of market share.

After a temporary pandemic-related boost (attributable to essential workers, Walmart's operational status, and Dickies' relatively low price point), revenue dropped by 10-25% annually post-pandemic. By 2024, Dickies' business was reported to be half the size it was prior to VF's ownership, with iconic workwear lines increasingly absent from shelves. Search volume for the brand plunged to roughly a quarter of its previous peak, underscoring shrinking consumer mindshare.

Meanwhile, new offices in Fort Worth remained partially vacant, reflecting stalled hiring and diminished morale. Similar challenges plagued other VF brands, such as Vans, indicating deeper corporate issues. Ultimately, when Bracken Darrell assumed the interim presidency at Dickies, he discovered a hollowed-out brand - it's factories shuttered, core customer segments alienated, and unprofitable marketing endeavors depleting resources.

Dickies' fall from iconic workwear staple to diminished corporate asset illustrates the pitfalls of chasing unverified market trends while alienating the customers who built the brand. By eliminating all internal manufacturing capabilities, mismanaging crucial licensing agreements, and ignoring both internal and external research, Dickies forfeited the competitive advantage it had cultivated over decades.

Moreover, the reliance on overtly "woke" campaigns without corresponding authenticity or brand alignment undercut Dickies' historical identity. Intensifying the problem, a shift to performance marketing and deep discounting eroded margins and cheapened brand equity. Combined, these factors suggest that significant damage to the brand was inevitable once VF chose to prioritize streetwear's perceived profitability over Dickies' proven core business.

In retrospect, leadership might have safeguarded Dickies' reputation and financial performance by:

- Maintaining a balanced product portfolio, preserving the profitable workwear line until a new consumer base was demonstrably established.
- Conducting rigorous market assessments and post-campaign analyses, rather than suppressing data that contradicted strategic narratives.
- Fostering brand authenticity within marketing efforts, using genuine worker stories and environments to engage both traditional and prospective customers.
- Keeping experienced operators and advisors in place, rather than cycling through leadership ill-prepared to navigate complex changes.

Instead, Dickies' trajectory stands as a cautionary tale: even the most recognized and resilient heritage brands can falter when they neglect foundational consumer relationships, ignore solid research, and prioritize trend-chasing over core value propositions.

---

Sounds like their leadership must have attended the Anheuser-Bush/ Bud Light Marketing Academy of Everything That You Could Possibly Do to Ensure Failure Across The Board.

How, exactly do you get away with this? What about the BOD and stockholders? Is there iterally nobody watching what's happening?

---

Welcome to "stakeholder capitalism!" Wall Street picks CEOs who run the Wall Street approved playbook. They want 'new' ideas to increase revenue streams. They want change agents who can create excitement and growth. They want lean organizations with ever decreasing payroll and "waste." They champion disruption as if change is the penultimate goal.

If their puppet fails to reinvigorate the brand, they just dump the stock and move to the next company.

They talk joyfully about the increasing churn within Fortune 500 ranks as if change for the sake of change is good. As if the fall of corporations is an inconsequential event or even a good thing for accelerating the circulation of currency. And why shouldn't they? There's opportunity in every market movement.

This is what happens when bankers seize control of companies from producers. They have accountants translate entire industries into quarterly reports & balance sheets so they can make decisions without ever learning about the markets or their industries they trade.

And this wouldn't be so terrible if they paid for their mistakes. But they use other people's money and there are few private entities positioned to capitalize on their hubris, so they can just jump ship as their play flounders. As long as they time it right, they only need a big win every once in a while to reinforce the continued implementation of this "transformational" drivetrain.

If we could reshape the stock market to include vesting periods and elimination of proxy-voting; you'd see stability and long term growth prioritized to a far greater degree.

That statement is a word salad of corporate/PR speech loaded with flowery BS that they're consolidating headquarters so they can cut staff expenses and the California executives had more pull and wanted to stay put.

Steve Rendle - How do people this ****ing dumb become CEOs?

TommyTexas said:

---

Following VF Corporation's acquisition of Dickies from the Williamson family in 2017, the workwear brand embarked on a strategic overhaul aimed at repositioning itself in the marketplace. Around this same period, VF acquired Supreme - a prominent name in streetwearand its then-CEO, Steve Rendle, championed the idea that streetwear would serve as the primary growth driver for VF's entire brand portfolio. As a result, Dickies was rapidly redirected away from its heritage consumer base toward a new, more fashion-forward audience.

By 2020, Dickies began aggressively pursuing a streetwear-oriented approach. The company closed all of its in-house manufacturing facilities and prioritized contract manufacturing, producing apparel lines intended to appeal to trend-oriented consumers. This pivot came at the expense of Dickies' traditional workwear products, despite internal data cautioning against deprioritizing the brand's core market.

The untested strategy resulted in significant overproduction of lifestyle merchandise. Consumer research-though sporadic-indicated limited enthusiasm for the newer designs, and major retailers showed little interest. Rather than curtail production or re-evaluate the pivot, leadership allowed inventory to accumulate in VF's warehouses. When sell-through proved disappointing, much of the excess product was routed to off-price retailers such as Ross and TJ Maxx, exacerbating brand dilution and creating supply shortages for Dickies' core workwear lines.

Concurrently, Dickies launched marketing campaigns that prominently embraced socially progressive or "woke" themes, from emphasizing diversity and inclusion to highlighting activist messages like BLM support and mask advocacy. Though well-intentioned in some respects, these campaigns alienated many long-time Dickies customers who valued the brand for its historic association with tradespeople and manual laborers. Compounding the disconnect, Dickies' promotional material increasingly featured non-workers posing in choreographed scenes, a stark departure from the authenticity that core consumers expected.

Rather than formally analyze the success or failure of these campaigns, leadership neglected or outright refused to conduct post-campaign reviews. Internal feedback from market research teams was largely disregarded, revealing a leadership intent on pushing a fashionable, lifestyle-oriented narrative regardless of its alignment with Dickies' core identity.

During this time, Dickies saw high turnover among its executive ranks. Presidents Denny Bruce, Lance Meller, and Todd Dalhausser each took a turn at the helm. However, critics note these executives neither fully grasped the workwear category nor demonstrated willingness to heed cautious voices within the organization. Instead, they appeared to treat the company's budget as "house money," pursuing short-term marketing experiments and production gambles.

When early signs of revenue decline emerged, Denny Bruce departed rather than steer a potentially challenging turnaround. Leadership churn was not limited to the presidential level; frequent restructures affected marketing, merchandising, e-commerce, and sales roles, leading to a "rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic" dynamic. The brand ultimately lost several key licensing partners who migrated to competitors like Wrangler, amplifying the erosion of market share.

After a temporary pandemic-related boost (attributable to essential workers, Walmart's operational status, and Dickies' relatively low price point), revenue dropped by 10-25% annually post-pandemic. By 2024, Dickies' business was reported to be half the size it was prior to VF's ownership, with iconic workwear lines increasingly absent from shelves. Search volume for the brand plunged to roughly a quarter of its previous peak, underscoring shrinking consumer mindshare.

Meanwhile, new offices in Fort Worth remained partially vacant, reflecting stalled hiring and diminished morale. Similar challenges plagued other VF brands, such as Vans, indicating deeper corporate issues. Ultimately, when Bracken Darrell assumed the interim presidency at Dickies, he discovered a hollowed-out brand - it's factories shuttered, core customer segments alienated, and unprofitable marketing endeavors depleting resources.

Dickies' fall from iconic workwear staple to diminished corporate asset illustrates the pitfalls of chasing unverified market trends while alienating the customers who built the brand. By eliminating all internal manufacturing capabilities, mismanaging crucial licensing agreements, and ignoring both internal and external research, Dickies forfeited the competitive advantage it had cultivated over decades.

Moreover, the reliance on overtly "woke" campaigns without corresponding authenticity or brand alignment undercut Dickies' historical identity. Intensifying the problem, a shift to performance marketing and deep discounting eroded margins and cheapened brand equity. Combined, these factors suggest that significant damage to the brand was inevitable once VF chose to prioritize streetwear's perceived profitability over Dickies' proven core business.

In retrospect, leadership might have safeguarded Dickies' reputation and financial performance by:

- Maintaining a balanced product portfolio, preserving the profitable workwear line until a new consumer base was demonstrably established.
- Conducting rigorous market assessments and post-campaign analyses, rather than suppressing data that contradicted strategic narratives.
- Fostering brand authenticity within marketing efforts, using genuine worker stories and environments to engage both traditional and prospective customers.
- Keeping experienced operators and advisors in place, rather than cycling through leadership ill-prepared to navigate complex changes.

Instead, Dickies' trajectory stands as a cautionary tale: even the most recognized and resilient heritage brands can falter when they neglect foundational consumer relationships, ignore solid research, and prioritize trend-chasing over core value propositions.

---

First post on TexAgs and you paste something out of ChatGPT?

BTKAG97 said:

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Steve Rendle - How do people this ****ing dumb become CEOs?

---

Again - because Wall Street picks folks that'll run their preferred playbook which gambles on unlocking a new revenue stream.

They think THIS is the way to market a brand like Dickies? With what, over a century of association of working-class people? This just shows how much the marketing *******s on the coasts do not get Middle America.

https://www.dickies.com/mens-clothing/skate-clothes

This is disheartening because I have some family history with the company. My grandmother arrived in Fort Worth in the 1940s, newly divorced with two small children and no formal education. She worked for several years at Dickies.

torrid said:

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They think THIS is the way to market a brand like Dickies? With what, over a century of association of working-class people? This just shows how much the marketing *******s on the coasts do not get Middle America.

https://www.dickies.com/mens-clothing/skate-clothes

This is disheartening because I have some family history with the company. My grandmother arrived in Fort Worth in the 1940s, newly divorced with two small children and no formal education. She worked for several years at Dickies.

---

Carhart has been wildly popular outside of the working class/working clothes brand it once was. It's very cool now and people wear it all over the world in urban environments.

Dickies has always had a following in the skate/snowboard community.

Bingo. And if Dickies had manage to create a similar fad surge the CEO would have been hailed as a hero given a huge bonus and departed the company before the bubble fully deflated.

It's boring to be a dependable consistent brand for the working class. It's much more fun to pivot from an inherited position of strength, make one big push, be a flash in the pan, and ride off into the sunset.

Quote:

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Dickies has always had a following in the skate/snowboard community.

---

...and the cholos. Seriously. But I think that's because it was an everyman brand.

These people are idiots.

As a native Texan, I'm not sure I even realized this company still existed and was based here. I thought a Dickey was what Cousin Eddie wore in Christmas Vacation.

cottonpatchag said:

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Just as I am ready to transition into wearing these and joining the coffee club at Whataburger with my nickel cup, they pull this. Now I have to rethink everything!

---

My Dad loved those. He had them in multiple colors and he always smelled of Old Spice.

Logos Stick said:

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bmks270 said:

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Barnyard96 said:

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People with money make these decisions. California is still awesome if you have the means.

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True.

Executives in 3 million dollar homes in safe beach neighborhoods.

While their workers can barely afford a 2 bedroom apartment surrounded by homeless.

---

It's becoming a state with the very rich and the very poor who serve them. The perfect liberal utopia.

I don't get why any company would choose very heavy regulations, high taxes, and high cost of doing business relative to other alternatives.

Cali is a lost cause.

---

I've got news for you. Texas is a high tax state. I pay 3% of my properties value every year in taxes. And I don't make as much in annual salary as my home is worth, so the property tax equivalent is much higher in a % basis. Then we add in 8.25% sales tax. It's time for us to wise up and realize our tax structure in this state is a sham, and we're all buying into the lie

jt16 said:

---

Logos Stick said:

---

bmks270 said:

---

Barnyard96 said:

---

People with money make these decisions. California is still awesome if you have the means.

---

True.

Executives in 3 million dollar homes in safe beach neighborhoods.

While their workers can barely afford a 2 bedroom apartment surrounded by homeless.

---

It's becoming a state with the very rich and the very poor who serve them. The perfect liberal utopia.

I don't get why any company would choose very heavy regulations, high taxes, and high cost of doing business relative to other alternatives.

Cali is a lost cause.

---

I've got news for you. Texas is a high tax state. I pay 3% of my properties value every year in taxes. And I don't make as much in annual salary as my home is worth, so the property tax equivalent is much higher in a % basis. Then we add in 8.25% sales tax. It's time for us to wise up and realize our tax structure in this state is a sham, and we're all buying into the lie

---

And I have news for you.

California's tax burden is 13.6% placing it the 46th worst in the country.

Texas is 8.6% placing it 6th best in the country.

On a per capita basis and as % of income, California is 43 and Texas is 4.

None of us are happy about our property taxes but your post is a sham.

Source: The Tax Foundation