Repost:bonfarr said:
This War resembles more of the WWI stalemate than the quick thrusts of WWII. I had hoped to see more movement of the battle lines favoring the Ukrainians by now as I just don't think time is on their side.
The offensive is still focused on attriting Russian logistics, command centers and artillery, so Ukraine doesn't need to thrust all the way to hubs like Mariupol and Melitopol in the near term, just get close enough to place them under fire.
Getting close enough to hit them and the LOCs running from them is an important step towards starving the Russian force in the south of the high resupply volume needed to service its usual prolific munitions expenditure--particularly artillery fires.
The broad-front Ukranian advance compliments this interdiction campaign and is intended, amongst other things, to keep as many Russians as possible in contact and steadily drawing down their forward stockpiles of increasingly hard to get munitions.
Meanwhile, it appears that Ukraine's primary mechanized force is being held in reserve until sufficient Russian weakness develops to make a concentrated assault on a narrower front feasible.
Will this approach succeed? I have no particular insight, but the strategy seems a good ends-ways-means fit for Ukrainian strengths and Russian weaknesses.