Red1 said:

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The 42nd Russian Division is trapped on the West side of the Dnipro River, and it's a major river. I read the SECDEF and Biden gave the Ukrainians weapons more suitable for counterattacking. However, they were not specific about the military aid. There are reports of Ukraine breaching Russian defenses.

The bridges have been destroyed which means the 42nd is trapped, can't be reinforced, and can't be resupplied.

Here are some thoughts:

- The 42nd is trapped on the West side of the Dnipro River. I believe the bridges used for logistics, retreat, and reinforcements have been destroyed. The 42nd is isolated.

- The Russians might have to defend a front that could be 200 miles or more. The division has approximately 25,000 soldiers. That is not large enough to defend such a large front, and it gives Ukrainian forces lot of room to maneuver in the area of operations which should mean they might be able to attack at a place of choosing, flanking, and surprising the Russians.

- I don't know if the Russians are capable of conducting a mobile defense. The Ukrainians can mass forces and have greater numbers at critical points of attack if the Russians cannot counter Ukraine's offensive operations. Nothing leads me to believe the Russians have the military acumen to execute mobile defenses. Conducting offensive operations and maneuvering are key components of warfare. Bad things can happen if a force cannot move.

The CPT Obvious statement is attrition to vital and necessary assets and resources leads to losing a battle and war. A Russian division that has little fuel, supplies, and munitions is a division that can't defend itself.

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except the Russkies still have air supremacy and potentially could risk dropping supplies into Kherson

also as the kessel pocket constricts, the defensive lines grow shorter.

as I mentioned before, the Ukes should figure a way to cross at the mouth of the Dnipro onto the long peninsula just south of the Antonivka bridge

then not only is the 42nd surrounded on the north bank, their supplies are being interdicted on the SOUTH bank. that would really sow mass confusion and panic

In Denys youtube video- I noticed there were A LOT OF FIRES on the map in that section of the peninsula! why would that be when there are no Uke forces there and it is not a battleground?!?

maybe someone is as innovative in their thinking as I am and willing to risk a softening operation before a landing

Nice piece outlining the impact of rampant corruption on Russia's military.

Ulysses90 said:

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I believe supremacy is stretching it to describe Russian control trol of air space. Heavily contested aitr superiority might be a better description of the situation.

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Agreed. And I'm sure the Ukes will look to crater the Crimean airfields, if/when they take control of Kherson. They have been slowly chipping away at the Russian air defenses. Hopefully we'll see some fighter launched HARMs enter the frame in the near future.

You can see the smoke trails of three other missiles fired from the same site. It never gets vertical like the previous ones.

Tripacer said:

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You can see the smoke trails of three other missiles fired from the same site. It never gets vertical like the previous ones.

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RuZZians really do suck at what they do.

Red1 said:

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I would like to know what kind of military hardware and weapons we gave to Ukraine to facilitate their mission to counterattack. I find this intriguing.

Considering aiding and equipping of Ukraine, our huge logistics footprint for resupply, giving them intelligence, training, giving planning advice and guidance, it's like we are fighting Russia with Ukrainian bodies. We are very much committed to this war.

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I think the most significant item given to UKR in supporting counter attack to reclaim land in the south is intelligence and planning assistance. It is extremely doubtful russia has overlapping indirect fire support across the frontline, and for a long time they have been very hesitant to use manned air assets in a meaningful way. Given the 3 rivers and limited paved roads, maneuver is an issue. Over the last month both intel and HIMARS/EXC have been hitting ammo dumps, supply lines, and C2 assets significantly degrading their offensive or defensive abilities while providing a more clear view of what lines of approach might be most effective. This would have included contingency plans in which locations russians would be expected to mass/reinforce. This said some of these salients were probably feints in order to fix the russians. Someday we will get to read books about this and hopefully first in Ukrainian than English.

740 has linked the weapons/AID lists, that has been publicly announced each time or they are easily searchable.

IMO all of it has helped; especially noting: HIMARS, Counter Battery radar, M777s w smart ammo, drones and anti drones, training, manpads, ATGMs. Some of the T72s Poland gave them are clearly involved in the attack along with some of the other armor from various EU nations. I am also of the opinion the at least 2 ATACAM mission, that caused MASSIVE damage in crimea (some of which still not released) had significant psychological effect in prepping for this assault, which was already influencing orcs to leave.

JFABNRGR said:

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Red1 said:

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I would like to know what kind of military hardware and weapons we gave to Ukraine to facilitate their mission to counterattack. I find this intriguing.

Considering aiding and equipping of Ukraine, our huge logistics footprint for resupply, giving them intelligence, training, giving planning advice and guidance, it's like we are fighting Russia with Ukrainian bodies. We are very much committed to this war.

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I think the most significant item given to UKR in supporting counter attack to reclaim land in the south is intelligence and planning assistance. It is extremely doubtful russia has overlapping indirect fire support across the frontline, and for a long time they have been very hesitant to use manned air assets in a meaningful way. Given the 3 rivers and limited paved roads, maneuver is an issue. Over the last month both intel and HIMARS/EXC have been hitting ammo dumps, supply lines, and C2 assets significantly degrading their offensive or defensive abilities while providing a more clear view of what lines of approach might be most effective. This would have included contingency plans in which locations russians would be expected to mass/reinforce. This said some of these salients were probably feints in order to fix the russians. Someday we will get to read books about this and hopefully first in Ukrainian than English.

740 has linked the weapons/AID lists, that has been publicly announced each time or they are easily searchable.

IMO all of it has helped; especially noting: HIMARS, Counter Battery radar, M777s w smart ammo, drones and anti drones, training, manpads, ATGMs. Some of the T72s Poland gave them are clearly involved in the attack along with some of the other armor from various EU nations. I am also of the opinion the at least 2 ATACAM mission, that caused MASSIVE damage in crimea (some of which still not released) had significant psychological effect in prepping for this assault, which was already influencing orcs to leave.

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I have no doubt that 5th Corps HQs forward with 600+ staff members in Poland is knee deep with planning, coordination, and advising. This is definitely a joint environment with lots of moving parts. An example of the complexity is tracking the status of Ukrainian munitions and resupplying them. There has to be reach back capability to the US. That is just one piece.

At 1:19, Denys shows the fires map. It looks like there are a lot of fires in the Northeast part of this area on the Mykolaiv side of the river. Would this indicate Ukraine is trying to divide and conquer, taking the Northeastern-most part first and then taking consecutive chunks as their gains reach down to the Black Sea?



At about 2:25, it looks like Russia has firmed up control over most of the village of Pisky, which has a crossroads they want.

At 7:53, he pulls up this map. I'm not sure of the source. Interesting to see gains, however. It seems like the pink area is recovered by Ukraine. He speculates that this offensive is not designed to go very quickly, which makes sense, actually. Why not let Russia degrade more and more over time while you minimize risks to your less numerous troops? If Russia can't really resupply very well across the river, then they're in for some starving and pain.

Waffledynamics said:

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At 1:19, Denys shows the fires map. It looks like there are a lot of fires in the Northeast part of this area on the Mykolaiv side of the river. Would this indicate Ukraine is trying to divide and conquer, taking the Northeastern-most part first and then taking consecutive chunks as their gains reach down to the Black Sea?



At about 2:25, it looks like Russia has firmed up control over most of the village of Pisky, which has a crossroads they want.

At 7:53, he pulls up this map. I'm not sure of the source. Interesting to see gains, however. It seems like the pink area is recovered by Ukraine. He speculates that this offensive is not designed to go very quickly, which makes sense, actually. Why not let Russia degrade more and more over time while you minimize risks to your less numerous troops? If Russia can't really resupply very well across the river, then they're in for some starving and pain.

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I suspect that some of the Ukrainian advances are poking the bear to see where he brings reinforcements/supplies from in reaction. That allows Ukraine to pound those resupply/reserve forces at their source or when they are out in the open on the move with longer range artillery to bleed them dry before they reach the point of battle.

⚡️CNN: US conducted 'war games' with Kyiv before Kherson counteroffensive.

The U.S. suggested keeping the offensive limited in geography to avoid overextension along the extensive front line, CNN reported citing multiple U.S., Ukrainian, and Western officials.

— The Kyiv Independent (@KyivIndependent) August 31, 2022

I think I remember in the last video, Denys had said he thought the Ukes would assault the NE region first and work down toward Kherson.

Given that they have cutoff the Crimean access points, this would make sense. Taking control of the NE quadrant would allow them to strategically engage and prevent reinforcements from the Donbas joining the Kherson fight.

txags92 said:

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Waffledynamics said:

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⚡️CNN: US conducted 'war games' with Kyiv before Kherson counteroffensive.

The U.S. suggested keeping the offensive limited in geography to avoid overextension along the extensive front line, CNN reported citing multiple U.S., Ukrainian, and Western officials.

— The Kyiv Independent (@KyivIndependent) August 31, 2022

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Why report that? What possible good does it do for Ukraine or the US for Russia to know that?

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Journalists are always looking for a new story. I can't see us not helping Ukrainian forces with as much help as possible. We are knee deep in our commitment to Ukraine. US Army commanders will use their experiences and staffs to help Ukraine plan military operations. The staffs are COLs with a hell of a lot of experience and the commanders rely on them. The process of our brigade on up planning is often methodical and logical. They sift through facts and assumptions. Eventually they war game various courses of actions of friendly and enemy forces. This is a description in a nutshell.

p_bubel said:

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txags92 said:

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Waffledynamics said:

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⚡️CNN: US conducted 'war games' with Kyiv before Kherson counteroffensive.

The U.S. suggested keeping the offensive limited in geography to avoid overextension along the extensive front line, CNN reported citing multiple U.S., Ukrainian, and Western officials.

— The Kyiv Independent (@KyivIndependent) August 31, 2022

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Why report that? What possible good does it do for Ukraine or the US for Russia to know that?

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To be fair, no one pays attention to CNN anymore.

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The last place Russia would expect to look.

AGS-R-TUFF said:

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Given that they have cutoff the Crimean access points, this would make sense. Taking control of the NE quadrant would allow them to strategically engage and prevent reinforcements from the Donbas joining the Kherson fight.

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If the bridges at Diryivka (Inuets River) and Nova Kakhovka (Dnipro River) are kaput - the Orks are looking at the Inuets/Dnipro (anvil) and the Ukes (hammer) - essentially trapped inside a 2,000 sq mile cauldron without hope of meaningful resupply. It's a classic Kessel pocket. Inside this pocket there aren't any large cities to hide and there aren't many all-weather roads to move supplies this winter. It's shaping up to be a tough gig for lots of Orks unless Putin orders a massive retreat.

benchmark said:

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AGS-R-TUFF said:

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Given that they have cutoff the Crimean access points, this would make sense. Taking control of the NE quadrant would allow them to strategically engage and prevent reinforcements from the Donbas joining the Kherson fight.

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If the bridges at Diryivka (Inuets River) and Nova Kakhovka (Dnipro River) are kaput - the Orks are looking at the Inuets/Dnipro (anvil) and the Ukes (hammer) - essentially trapped inside a 2,000 sq mile cauldron without hope of meaningful resupply. It's a classic Kessel pocket. Inside this pocket there aren't any large cities to hide and there aren't many all-weather roads to move supplies this winter. It's shaping up to be a tough gig for lots of Orks unless Putin orders a massive retreat.

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And you have to think partisan saboteurs and SOF teams will be causing the Orcs all kinds of pain within the pocket. In time, the pressure may trigger some sporadic surrenders and desertions, further degrading Orc morale and troop effectiveness.

Today's SITREP.

The constant stream of wounded from the NE sector back to Kherson is going to unnerve the remaining troops. When their artillery and food supplies start running low the orcs are likely to break and run. They have no incentive to hold out like the steel plant defenders in Mariupol.

AGS-R-TUFF said:

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benchmark said:

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AGS-R-TUFF said:

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Given that they have cutoff the Crimean access points, this would make sense. Taking control of the NE quadrant would allow them to strategically engage and prevent reinforcements from the Donbas joining the Kherson fight.

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If the bridges at Diryivka (Inuets River) and Nova Kakhovka (Dnipro River) are kaput - the Orks are looking at the Inuets/Dnipro (anvil) and the Ukes (hammer) - essentially trapped inside a 2,000 sq mile cauldron without hope of meaningful resupply. It's a classic Kessel pocket. Inside this pocket there aren't any large cities to hide and there aren't many all-weather roads to move supplies this winter. It's shaping up to be a tough gig for lots of Orks unless Putin orders a massive retreat.

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And you have to think partisan saboteurs and SOF teams will be causing the Orcs all kinds of pain within the pocket. In time, the pressure may trigger some sporadic surrenders and desertions, further degrading Orc morale and troop effectiveness.

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Agreed!!! The high elf's have the orcs right where they want them!!

Ukraine nuclear reactor shut down due to shelling, operator says https://t.co/dihPPpQuRK pic.twitter.com/NjiwJQsMZY

— Reuters World (@ReutersWorld) September 1, 2022

I'm skeptical. "Shelling" could be the new term for a Russian major pointing a gun at the operators head. If the IAEA weee allowed in, all "shelling" would stop. If not, i don't quite trust the statement made in occupied territory. Shelling could be local, precise but not fire for effect.

ISW: RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 31

Quote:

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Military operations on the scale of this counteroffensive do not succeed or fail in a day or a week. Ukrainian officials have long acknowledged that they do not have the sheer mass of mechanized forces that would have been needed to conduct a blitzkrieg-like drive to destroy the Russian defenses in Kherson Oblast or anywhere. They have instead been setting conditions for months by attacking and disrupting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs), Russian command and control, and Russian logistics systems throughout southwestern occupied Ukraine. The timing of the start of the counteroffensive is consistent with the observed degradation of Russian capabilities in western Kherson Oblast balanced against the need to start liberating occupied Ukrainian lands and people as soon as possible. There is no reason to suspect that the timing has been materially influenced by inappropriate considerations or tensions. Counteroffensive operations now underway will very likely unfold over the coming weeks and possibly months as Ukrainian forces take advantage of the conditions they have set to defeat particular sectors of the line they have identified as vulnerable while working to retake their cities and towns without destroying them in the process.

Military forces that must conduct offensive operations without the numerical advantages normally required for success in such operations often rely on misdirections and feints to draw the defender away from the sectors of the line on which breakthrough and exploitation efforts will focus. The art of such feints is two-fold. First, they must be conducted with sufficient force to be believable. Since they are feints, however, rather than deliberate attacks expected to succeed, they often look like failuresthe attacking units will fall back when they feel they have persuaded the defender of their seriousness. Second, they take time to have an effect. When the purpose of the feint is to draw the defender's forces away from the intended breakthrough sectors, the attacker must wait until the defender has actually moved forces. There will thus likely be a delay between the initial feint operations and the start of decisive operations. The situation during that delay may well look like the attack has failed.

The Ukrainian military and government are repeating requests to avoid any reporting or forecasting of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, a measure that is essential if the counteroffensive includes feints or misdirections. It is of course possible that the counteroffensive will fail, that any particular breakthrough attempt that fails was not a feint, or that the Ukrainian military has made some error in planning, timing, or execution that will undermine the success of its operations. But the situation in which Ukraine finds itself calls for a shrewd and nuanced counteroffensive operation with considerable misdirection and careful and controlled advances. It is far more likely in these very early days, therefore, that a successful counteroffensive would appear to be stalling or unsuccessful for some time before its success became manifest.

ISW and other analysts studying this war have been appropriately cautious and circumspect in announcing the culmination or defeat of major Russian offensive operations. ISW will apply the same caution and circumspection to assessing the progress of the Ukrainian counteroffensive and exhorts others to do the same.

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While this is unconfirmed, it will inevitably have a psychological effect on the Russians if they're reporting this.

UNCOMFIRMED: Russians reporting multiple Ukrainian paratrooper landings, the most significant appears in Enerhodar this morning.
Russians APC moving through Enerhodar pic.twitter.com/woUwFMJrVk

— Dmitri (@wartranslated) September 1, 2022

Glory to our Defenders!

English subtitles

📹 - alex_kill_smail / TikTok pic.twitter.com/HVWpLsiwUu

— Anton Gerashchenko (@Gerashchenko_en) September 1, 2022

black_ice said:

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AGS-R-TUFF said:

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benchmark said:

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AGS-R-TUFF said:

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Given that they have cutoff the Crimean access points, this would make sense. Taking control of the NE quadrant would allow them to strategically engage and prevent reinforcements from the Donbas joining the Kherson fight.

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If the bridges at Diryivka (Inuets River) and Nova Kakhovka (Dnipro River) are kaput - the Orks are looking at the Inuets/Dnipro (anvil) and the Ukes (hammer) - essentially trapped inside a 2,000 sq mile cauldron without hope of meaningful resupply. It's a classic Kessel pocket. Inside this pocket there aren't any large cities to hide and there aren't many all-weather roads to move supplies this winter. It's shaping up to be a tough gig for lots of Orks unless Putin orders a massive retreat.

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And you have to think partisan saboteurs and SOF teams will be causing the Orcs all kinds of pain within the pocket. In time, the pressure may trigger some sporadic surrenders and desertions, further degrading Orc morale and troop effectiveness.

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Agreed!!! The high elf's have the orcs right where they want them!!

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Tolkien having a moment on F16.

This is from the plant operator themselves, and they have a Telegram post (that I saw translated in a chat that I'm in) blaming the Russians for triggering an automatic shutdown.

⚡️Intelligence: Russian forces to evacuate Rosatom personnel from Russian-seized Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant.

According to Ukraine's Intelligence Directorate, Russian state nuclear monopoly Rosatom is keeping the preparation for the evacuation a secret to avoid panic.

— The Kyiv Independent (@KyivIndependent) September 1, 2022

Waffledynamics said:

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This is from the plant operator themselves, and they have a Telegram post (that I saw translated in a chat that I'm in) blaming the Russians for triggering an automatic shutdown.

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So what does this mean? Chances of an accident going up?

Not sure, but there is an IAEA mission there right now.

I am just summarizing what I read this morning.

- Russian defenses can be thin.
- The US has given Ukraine Vampire systems. They are missiles that take down UAVs and can be mounted on the bed of civilian trucks. This is one more example of partisan involvement in the war.
- Ukraine is using armor to punch through the Russian defenses.
- HIMARS continues to be revolutionary due to its precision, range, and efficacy. Instead of using hundreds of artillery rounds with no guarantee of hitting the target, HIMARS can accomplish the task with a few missiles.
- Russian command centers need to keep moving due to the threat by HIMARS which degrades planning, command and control. I believe this has a significant impact on the Russians because of the centralized decision making. Ukraine wanted it's military to be similar to ours in regard to a strong NCO Corps. This makes the Ukrainian military significantly more agile than the Russians because experienced NCOs are entrusted to make quick unilateral decisions. Battles require quick actions not indecisiveness.
- Is this an odd WWIII but with Ukranian bodies and blood?

This is my one post for the day.

Waffledynamics said:

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Not sure, but there is an IAEA mission there right now.

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Has it been confirmed that they actually made it there? Last I read, they were being denied access at a Russian checkpoint because they were trying to come to the plant via Ukraine. The Russians wanted them to leave and come back to the plant via Russia.