The prosecution seems to want to convict Trump of just simply intending to commit a non specified crime. Like they can read his mind and just know he was intending to do something.

Be careful the lawyer who swore Fani did nothing wrong and the judge was stupid may get upset.

Casual Cynic said:

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The prosecution seems to want to convict Trump of just simply intending to commit a non specified crime. Like they can read his mind and just know he was intending to do something.

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They aren't sure what he did, but they know for sure he is guilty.

Casual Cynic said:

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The prosecution seems to want to convict Trump of just simply intending to commit a non specified crime. Like they can read his mind and just know he was intending to do something.

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Not just the prosecution. The judge has ruled already that the jurors need not agree on which of the 3 underlying theories the prosecution has laid out are true, as long as they agree he is guilty of any one of them.

It's akin to a guy being charged for conspiracy to commit murder and theft (past the statute of limitations), on the basis of a recent federal speeding on an interstate claim (which doesn't have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt), and the judge saying it doesn't matter if the 12 jurors agree if anyone died or any property were stolen, as long as they all agree either happened and think he was speeding when pulled over, he can be thrown in prison for life.

Oh, and no testimony allowed about why the feds didn't prosecute the federal speeding claim (yes I know that's absurd but it's intentionally so). Oh again, and the state's witness is a serial perjurer disbarred felon whose own attorney said he is full of crap about the murder/theft claims.

nortex97 said:

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Casual Cynic said:

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The prosecution seems to want to convict Trump of just simply intending to commit a non specified crime. Like they can read his mind and just know he was intending to do something.

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Not just the prosecution. The judge has ruled already that the jurors need not agree on which of the 3 underlying theories the prosecution has laid out are true, as long as they agree he is guilty of any one of them.

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Which seems unconstitutional (not to mention unfair) for a myriad of reasons, but I guess I am just a bitter clinger.

Ellis Wyatt said:

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nortex97 said:

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Casual Cynic said:

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The prosecution seems to want to convict Trump of just simply intending to commit a non specified crime. Like they can read his mind and just know he was intending to do something.

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Not just the prosecution. The judge has ruled already that the jurors need not agree on which of the 3 underlying theories the prosecution has laid out are true, as long as they agree he is guilty of any one of them.

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Which seems unconstitutional (not to mention unfair) for a myriad of reasons, but I guess I am just a bitter clinger.

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In what way do you believe that is unconstitutional? Juries in general don't have to agree on how a criminal defendant met an element of a crime. They just have to agree the element was met in some way. And relevant to this case, the Supreme Court has said there is no general rule that jury has to agree on object crimes.

Quote:

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A jury in a federal criminal case cannot convict unless it unanimously finds that the Government has proved each element of the offense. However, it need not always decide unanimously which of several possible means the defendant used to commit an element.....then the jury need only agree that the defendant committed at least three underlying crimes, and need not agree about which three.

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Richardson v United States

TXAggie2011 said:

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Ellis Wyatt said:

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nortex97 said:

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Casual Cynic said:

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The prosecution seems to want to convict Trump of just simply intending to commit a non specified crime. Like they can read his mind and just know he was intending to do something.

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Not just the prosecution. The judge has ruled already that the jurors need not agree on which of the 3 underlying theories the prosecution has laid out are true, as long as they agree he is guilty of any one of them.

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Which seems unconstitutional (not to mention unfair) for a myriad of reasons, but I guess I am just a bitter clinger.

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In what way do you believe that is unconstitutional? Juries in general don't have to agree on how a criminal defendant met an element of a crime. They just have to agree the element was met in some way. And relevant to this case, the Supreme Court has said there is no general rule that jury has to agree on object crimes.

Quote:

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A jury in a federal criminal case cannot convict unless it unanimously finds that the Government has proved each element of the offense. However, it need not always decide unanimously which of several possible means the defendant used to commit an element.....then the jury need only agree that the defendant committed at least three underlying crimes, and need not agree about which three.

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Richardson v United States

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WTAF are you talking about? First, that's a federal statutory interpretation case, and second it says the opposite.

Quote:

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We must decide whether a jury has to agree unanimously about which specific violations make up the "continuing series of violations." We hold that the jury must do so. That is to say, a jury in a federal criminal case brought under 848 must unanimously agree not only that the defendant committed some "continuing series of violations" but also that the defendant committed each of the individual "violations" necessary to make up that "continuing series."

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Quote:

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Second, the Government points to a different portion of the statute, which requires a defendant to have supervised "five or more other persons." The Government says that no one claims that the jury must unanimously agree about the identity of those five other persons. It adds that the jury may also disagree about the brute facts that make up other statutory elements such as the "substantial income" that the defendant must derive from the enterprise(B), or the defendant's role in the criminal organization. Assuming, without deciding, that there is no unanimity requirement in respect to these other provisions, we nonetheless find them significantly different from the provision before us. They differ in respect to language, breadth, tradition, and the other factors we have discussed.

These considerations, taken together, lead us to conclude that the statute requires jury unanimity in respect to each individual "violation." We leave to the Court of Appeals the question of whether to engage in harmless error analysis, and if so, whether the error was harmless in this case.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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If it were a constitutional requirement, it would not matter what the statute says. It would be a problem for every statute. That case clearly shows it's a statutory interpretation issue and not a Constitutional baseline.

It was claimed that there is something unconstitutional about it. I asked what Constitutional provision is violated by allowing the jury to disagree as to the object crime.

TXAggie2011 said:

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If it were a constitutional requirement, it would not matter what the statute says. It would be a problem for every statute. That case clearly shows it's a statutory interpretation issue and not a Constitutional baseline.

It was claimed that there is something unconstitutional about it. I asked what Constitutional provision is violated by allowing the jury to disagree as to the object crime.

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To me, the unconstitutionality of it is that the state is not forced to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the object crime was committed by the defendant. If the defendant is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty, then the jury cannot just pick or choose which of the object crimes the defendant might have thought he was trying to cover up. The prosecution should have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the object crime occurred, or the jury should not be allowed to consider it in forming the verdict because the defendant is presumed to be innocent.

My opinion is that in the case of the NY law, the jury should have to vote on whether they think any of the 3 object crimes were proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution before considering any of the charges. If they do not have a unanimous guilty verdict on one or more of the crimes, then the rest of the case is moot because the statute of limitations applies to the other charges.

Quote:

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To me, the unconstitutionality of it is that the state is not forced to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the object crime was committed by the defendant.

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even Trump's lawyers aren't arguing that, as the object crime does not have to committed under this statute, just an intent to commit or cover up

Quote:

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If the defendant is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty, then the jury cannot just pick or choose which of the object crimes the defendant might have thought he was trying to cover up.

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I agree with this.

By the way, I've read the charge conference transcript, and there is no clear NY case on this. So its not a matter of NY law saying this is the way to do it.

TXAggie2011 said:

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If it were a constitutional requirement, it would not matter what the statute says. It would be a problem for every statute. That case clearly shows it's a statutory interpretation issue and not a Constitutional baseline.

It was claimed that there is something unconstitutional about it. I asked what Constitutional provision is violated by allowing the jury to disagree as to the object crime.

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Presume innocent until proven guilty.

Adding context to the Richardson post by 2011: the "held" provision and the "conversely" sentence before and after the bold

"Held: A jury in a 848 case must unanimously agree not only that the defendant committed some "continuing series of violations," but also about which specific "violations" make up that "continuing series." Pp. 817-824.

(a) A jury in a federal criminal case cannot convict unless it unanimously finds that the Government has proved each element of the offense. However, it need not always decide unanimously which of several possible means the defendant used to commit an element. If 848(c)'s phrase "series of violations" refers to one element, a "series," in respect to which individual "violations" are but the means, then the jury need only agree that the defendant committed at least three underlying crimes, and need not agree about which three. Conversely, if the statute creates several elements, the several "violations," then the jury must agree unanimously about which three crimes the defendant committed. Pp. 817-818."

BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
A federal criminal statute forbids any "person" from "engag[ing] in a continuing criminal enterprise." 84 Stat. 1264, 21 U. S. C. 848(a). It defines "continuing criminal enterprise" (CCE) as involving a "violat[ion]" of the drug statutes where "such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations." 848(c). We must decide whether a jury has to agree unanimously about which specific violations make up the "continuing series of violations." We hold that the jury must do so. That is to say, a jury in a federal criminal case brought under 848 must unanimously agree not only that the defendant committed some "continuing series of violations" but also that the defendant committed each of the individual "violations" necessary to make up that "continuing series."

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/526/813/

Another snippet from Richardson that seems to ring close to the events of this case:

" The first of these considerations increases the likelihood that treating violations simply as alternative means, by permitting a jury to avoid discussion of the specific factual details of each violation, will cover up wide disagreement among the jurors about just what the defendant did, or did not, do. The second consideration significantly aggravates the risk (present at least to a small degree whenever multiple means are at issue) that jurors, unless required to focus upon specific factual detail, will fail to do so, simply concluding from testimony, say, of bad reputation, that where there is smoke there must be fire."

The USSC was worried about the word "violation" in Richardson and says this:

"But the language is not totally neutral. The words "violates" and "violations" are words that have a legal ring. A "violation" is not simply an act or conduct; it is an act or conduct that is contrary to law. Black's Law Dictionary 1570 (6th ed. 1990). That circumstance is significant because the criminal law ordinarily entrusts a jury with determining whether alleged conduct "violates" the law, see infra, at 822, and, as noted above, a federal criminal jury must act unanimously when doing so. Indeed, even though the words "violates" and "violations" appear more than 1,000 times in the United States Code, the Government has not pointed us to, nor have we found, any legal source reading any instance of either word as the Government would have us read them in this case. To hold that each "violation" here amounts to a separate element is consistent with a tradition of requiring juror unanimity where the issue is whether a defendant has engaged in conduct that violates the law. To hold the contrary is not."

NY's law specifically says "crime."

A person is guilty of falsifying business records in the first degree when he commits the crime of falsifying business records in the second degree, and when his intent to defraud includes an intent to commit another crime or to aid or conceal the commission thereof.

Quote:

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I agree with this.

By the way, I've read the charge conference transcript, and there is no clear NY case on this. So its not a matter of NY law saying this is the way to do it.

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So, all the way around this is just a conviction for headline purposes only that will certainly be overturned. It's the worst kind of lawfare. Completely absurd.

BMX Bandit said:

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Quote:

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To me, the unconstitutionality of it is that the state is not forced to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the object crime was committed by the defendant.

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even Trump's lawyers aren't arguing that, as the object crime does not have to committed under this statute, just an intent to commit or cover up

Quote:

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If the defendant is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty, then the jury cannot just pick or choose which of the object crimes the defendant might have thought he was trying to cover up.

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I agree with this.

By the way, I've read the charge conference transcript, and there is no clear NY case on this. So its not a matter of NY law saying this is the way to do it.

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Under People v Mackey, the top court in New York said (45 years ago) "the State "need not establish what particular crime the intruder intended to commit" in the context of a charge of breaking into a home with the intent to a commit a crime therein.

The State has certainly brought that case up (and others) a few times, and I believe that'll largely be adopted here.

TXAggie2011 said:

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BMX Bandit said:

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Quote:

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To me, the unconstitutionality of it is that the state is not forced to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the object crime was committed by the defendant.

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even Trump's lawyers aren't arguing that, as the object crime does not have to committed under this statute, just an intent to commit or cover up

Quote:

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If the defendant is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty, then the jury cannot just pick or choose which of the object crimes the defendant might have thought he was trying to cover up.

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I agree with this.

By the way, I've read the charge conference transcript, and there is no clear NY case on this. So its not a matter of NY law saying this is the way to do it.

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Under People v Mackey, the top court in New York said (45 years ago) "the State "need not establish what particular crime the intruder intended to commit", nor is it necessary that the intended crime in fact be committed" in the context of a charge of breaking into a home with the intent to a commit a crime therein.

The State has certainly brought that case up (and others) a few times, and I believe that'll largely be adopted here.

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What you are leaving out is that the prosecution has to prove intent to do a crime. What crime did Trump intend on covering up? That has to be proven and has not been.

Feds proved no campaign violation finance violation.
There are no election laws he intended to break.

This is not a crime that intended to be done but never carried out.

Science Denier said:

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TXAggie2011 said:

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BMX Bandit said:

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Quote:

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To me, the unconstitutionality of it is that the state is not forced to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the object crime was committed by the defendant.

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even Trump's lawyers aren't arguing that, as the object crime does not have to committed under this statute, just an intent to commit or cover up

Quote:

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If the defendant is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty, then the jury cannot just pick or choose which of the object crimes the defendant might have thought he was trying to cover up.

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I agree with this.

By the way, I've read the charge conference transcript, and there is no clear NY case on this. So its not a matter of NY law saying this is the way to do it.

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Under People v Mackey, the top court in New York said (45 years ago) "the State "need not establish what particular crime the intruder intended to commit", nor is it necessary that the intended crime in fact be committed" in the context of a charge of breaking into a home with the intent to a commit a crime therein.

The State has certainly brought that case up (and others) a few times, and I believe that'll largely be adopted here.

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What you are leaving out is that the prosecution has to prove intent to do a crime. What crime did Trump intend on covering up? That has to be proven and has not been.

Feds proved no campaign violation finance violation.
There are no election laws he intended to break.

This is not a crime that intended to be done but never carried out.

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I'm not leaving anything out.

The State absolutely has to prove the elements of the crime. And I've expressed skepticism over and over that the State will do that.

Of course, none of that has anything to do with what I (or BMX) were talking about, which is what are the elements of the crime in the first place.

TXAggie2011 said:

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Science Denier said:

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TXAggie2011 said:

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BMX Bandit said:

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Quote:

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To me, the unconstitutionality of it is that the state is not forced to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the object crime was committed by the defendant.

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even Trump's lawyers aren't arguing that, as the object crime does not have to committed under this statute, just an intent to commit or cover up

Quote:

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If the defendant is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty, then the jury cannot just pick or choose which of the object crimes the defendant might have thought he was trying to cover up.

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I agree with this.

By the way, I've read the charge conference transcript, and there is no clear NY case on this. So its not a matter of NY law saying this is the way to do it.

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Under People v Mackey, the top court in New York said (45 years ago) "the State "need not establish what particular crime the intruder intended to commit", nor is it necessary that the intended crime in fact be committed" in the context of a charge of breaking into a home with the intent to a commit a crime therein.

The State has certainly brought that case up (and others) a few times, and I believe that'll largely be adopted here.

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What you are leaving out is that the prosecution has to prove intent to do a crime. What crime did Trump intend on covering up? That has to be proven and has not been.

Feds proved no campaign violation finance violation.
There are no election laws he intended to break.

This is not a crime that intended to be done but never carried out.

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I'm not leaving anything out.

The State absolutely has to prove the elements of the crime. And I've expressed skepticism over and over that the State will do that.

Of course, none of that has anything to do with what I (or BMX) were talking about, which is what are the elements of the crime in the first place.

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No. Not elements of the crime. They have to specifically prove he intended on committing a crime while misrepresenting the documentation. And prove that the misrepresentation was specifically to cover the crime up.

They mentioned that case in the transcript. So I read it.

It desls with why the indictment or instructions don't need to say that specific other crime intended. It would let a defendant say "I didn't intend to do crime X, I intended crime Y" and get off.

Mackey does not say that the state can allege multiple other crimes and the jury can all pick a separate one to decide there is no reasonable doubt on. There's no NY case in that either way I'm assuming because neither side cited it.

BMX Bandit said:

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They mentioned that case in the transcript. So I read it.

It desls with why the indictment or instructions don't need to say that specific other crime intended. It would let a defendant say "I didn't intend to do crime X, I intended crime Y" and get off.

Mackey does not say that the state can allege multiple other crimes and the jury can all pick a separate one to decide there is no reasonable doubt on. There's no NY case in that either way I'm assuming because neither side cited it.

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I would agree there (although there's a strong implication***). Haven't read all the cases Mackey builds off of, etc. But I think Mackey is still quite on point to the many comments here complaining that the State has not been claiming a specific crime or whatever. And there might be a statutory construction question but certainly not a Constitutional question

There's been no obligation on the state to do so. Their only "obligation" is to tie it together in closing.


*** There's a federal case about the same statute that says as much, though. (DeVonish)

"In order to secure a conviction for burglary, the People need only allege a knowing and unlawful entry coupled with an intent to commit a crime therein. There is no requirement that the People allege or establish what particular crime was intended, or that the intended crime actually be committed."

Foreverconservative said:

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The entire prosecution case hinges on the word of a person that has lied every time he swore not to including this current trial. The idiot claim that there was a booking fraud to influence an election after the election was over is ludicrous

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Yup, Without Cohen's testimony stating things as facts, no other evidence was offered with regards to intent or knowledge.


I still don't know what to make of this Jury...it hasn't gone well with EJean Carrol or judge Engoron

Trump has much, much better attorneys in these cases, and the prosecutors have to overcome a much higher standard.

Ellis Wyatt said:

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TXAggie2011 said:

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Under People v Mackey, the top court in New York said (45 years ago) "the State "need not establish what particular crime the intruder intended to commit", nor is it necessary that the intended crime in fact be committed" in the context of a charge of breaking into a home with the intent to a commit a crime therein.

The State has certainly brought that case up (and others) a few times, and I believe that'll largely be adopted here.

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Breaking into a home is a crime. Making accounting entries is not a crime.

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At that, no evidence Trump even made the entries or directed them to be made

Do what now?

Ellis Wyatt said:

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Quote:

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In what way do you believe that is unconstitutional? Juries in general don't have to agree on how a criminal defendant met an element of a crime. They just have to agree the element was met in some way. And relevant to this case, the Supreme Court has said there is no general rule that jury has to agree on object crimes.

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He is being accused of covering up an unspecified crime. A crime that has not been proven. A crime that has not even really been alleged. I don't care what New York law says, if you have not been proven of committing that crime, which you may or may not have committed, how can you be guilty of illegally covering up something that might not be a crime? You haven't even been given the opportunity of defending yourself against that allegation. Even worse, there is no specific allegation, and jury members can believe he did one of three different things (and not agree what that thing was), but he's still guilty?

There is nothing about this that is in search of justice. This is utter horse**** and will not stand no matter what this jury decides. That you defend it is quite telling.

He is not even being afforded the opportunity to mount a defense of a crime he isn't being directly accused of. That is blatantly unconstitutional, no matter how you leftists love to twist the law to fit your political games.

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This is scary...

So, if the prosecution brings up 12 different "theories" and on each of those "theories" only one juror agrees, then you'd have 12 votes towards "intent to commit" ONE of the object crimes...although the vote on each one of those theories would be 1-11 AGAINST "intent to commit" it...

Hell, it could possibly be worse. It could be 0-12 on 5 of the object crimes and 1-11 on just 7 of them to get to 7-5 agree that AN object crime was "intended to be committed"...so the prosecution could potentially get 7 out of 144 possible votes and get past the threshold.

Because, that's how it sounds like this is being presented by the prosecution (and judge).

ETA: Changed to "intent to commit" rather than "commit"

Stat Monitor Repairman said:

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Do what now?

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That's absolutely false. One might even say, fake news.

TXAggie2011 said:

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Ellis Wyatt said:

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nortex97 said:

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Casual Cynic said:

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The prosecution seems to want to convict Trump of just simply intending to commit a non specified crime. Like they can read his mind and just know he was intending to do something.

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Not just the prosecution. The judge has ruled already that the jurors need not agree on which of the 3 underlying theories the prosecution has laid out are true, as long as they agree he is guilty of any one of them.

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Which seems unconstitutional (not to mention unfair) for a myriad of reasons, but I guess I am just a bitter clinger.

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In what way do you believe that is unconstitutional? Juries in general don't have to agree on how a criminal defendant met an element of a crime. They just have to agree the element was met in some way. And relevant to this case, the Supreme Court has said there is no general rule that jury has to agree on object crimes.

Quote:

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A jury in a federal criminal case cannot convict unless it unanimously finds that the Government has proved each element of the offense. However, it need not always decide unanimously which of several possible means the defendant used to commit an element.....then the jury need only agree that the defendant committed at least three underlying crimes, and need not agree about which three.

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Richardson v United States

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Did you even read the part that YOU bolded? The jury must agree that the defendant committed at least THREE (3) underlying crimes.

Please elaborate on the 3+ crimes alleged. As at least a couple of others have pointed out, this case is not your friend.

That case is not about this law. It is about another law. It's an example. The point was it's not a *Constitutional* requirement the jury agrees on the object crimes