fasthorses05 said:
Legal query for our barristers regarding 1512 (c) (2). from the Epoch Times article "Tracing the Beginnings of the Dems "obstruction" strategy".
It appears to me that 1512 (c) (2) has a broad opening to be considered a thought crime, plus it's being considerred being used on the Comey firing. First of all, everything I've read that's reputable has stated the President has the executive authority to fire the head of the FBI, among many others, which I'm sure is correct. Secondly, if 1512 (c) (2) were used to impeach someone, President, judge, or others, for thought crimes, doesn't that open a massive gap to impeach nearly anyone the Dems want to?
Assuming my words above are correct, how did the damned thing get passed in Congress, who was President, and how has SCOTUS not ruled against 1512 (c) (2)?
I wanted to put this out yesterday, but life got in the way me paying attention to the Democratic party sniffing the butts of every dictator in the world.
It's pretty simple actually. It is the broadest of the obstruction statutes because it does not specifically require and actual "proceeding", such as a grand jury investigation. It is arguable that just the forseeability of such a proceeding in the future. (And yet, even with that broad of an interpretation, Mueller declined to make a charging decision.)
In relation to Comey's firing, Trump had been told repeatedly that he was not under investigation. So how could he intend to obstruct something that he had no knowledge of nor could forsee a future grand jury investigation?
Further, as Barr has explained, 1512(c)(2) hits a stumbling block called Article II of the Constitution when applying it to the President. His powers and duties to run the Executive Branch includes plenary power to fire members of his own administration.
Couple the fact that Trump was not under investigation and his plenary power to fire Executive Branch members and there is no evidence of a corrupt intent. In addition, Comey's own bad acts, including his lambasting Hillary while declining to refer charges and then the later discovery of his memos including classified information being unlawfully disseminated provided ample reason to support his termination.
As for the legislative history of 18 USC 1512(c)(2), it was modified by Sarbanes-Oxley, passed in 2002, in the wake of Enron, Worldcom and other corporate scandals.The broad language was used to apply to corporate accounting and reporting requirements where no proceeding is ongoing. Fudge the reports? Obstruction of justice.
(Overkill IMO but it is what it is.) Challenges to Sarbanes-Oxley have been on narrow and different grounds other than the application of 1512(c)(2) as contemplated here, AFAIK.