GQaggie said:
Of course it doesn't mean it is true. Neither does the destructive nature of solipsism mean it is not true. I didn't reason that way. I simply pushed back against your assertion that belief in axiomatic objective morality is silly because it isn't demanded. Nothing is demanded in that sense.
This isn't the case in philosophy extreme parsimony is used when selecting presuppositions. We generally limit these to things upon which are required to build and justify our knowledge of things without getting into a loop of solipsism or mind in a vat type thinking. Assuming moral objectivity is more similar to assuming the earth is 6k years old than it is to assume a universe exists as far as being foundational.
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I believe in trees. When I am conceptualizing a tree in my mind, I think of a trunk, branches, twigs, and leaves. When I hear and read others describe trees in ways similar to my understanding, I am confident that my idea of a tree is consistent with some reality. If everyone else were to describe trees in ways completely foreign to my understanding, I would begin to question whether or not I actually had the right idea about trees.
But we actually have that for morality. People even of identical culture and faith have a different moral view on all kinds of things. How do you explain this?
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Similarly, I believe in good and evil. When I hear and read others describe good and evil in ways similar to my understanding, I am confident that my idea of good and evil is consistent with some reality.
People have very wide-ranging beliefs of what is good and evil, and that various even more across history.
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If the premise is that morality is axiomatic and imbedded within us, then we would expect to see collective opinions as evidence of it.
No we would expect to see almost perfectly unanimous collective opinions, as we do for say vision, hearing, mathematics. For morals we don't see this at all.
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I don't think your assertion is clear at all. I believe there is remarkable consistency throughout time and throughout cultures of the basic moral principles. Certainly how they are applied has changed greatly over time and place, but I believe the basic principles endure.
Really? You think you have much in common with many ancient peoples with regard to your moral views? You are talking of people who think slavery is morally acceptable, racism is morally justified, sexism is morally justified, divine right of kings and their commands, murder, theft, and even genocide of people outside the tribe are morally justified, forced marriage, torture of infidels witches is morally justified. The list goes on.
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Why would I be confident that my sense of vision provides access to an objective reality but think that my sense of right and wrong does not?
Do you have ancient peoples who 's vision lead to dramatically different claims about reality like we do for morals?
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For the purposes of this discussion, I am absolutely presupposing the God revealed in the Hebrew and New Testament scriptures exists. That is the God in which I believe and the God under consideration for my part of the discussion with respect to the validity of Euthyphro's dilemma. If those terms are unacceptable, then, as I said, this just becomes another argument about whether or not God exists.
Again, you can pick any god you wish-but for the purposes of the euthyphro dilemma you can't pressupose they are good. This then isn't philosophy is sophistry. You aren't engaging with the question.
That's like having a debate about the existence of god and you pressupposing god exists and claiming you've dealt with the question-you haven't, you simply aren't interested in engaging it.
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As I understand the dilemma, the first horn is the idea that the good is simply a function of God's whim and power. God likes these things, and he has the power to declare them good. Good is therefore arbitrary.
It's broader than that. The second horn (you have them backwards) deals with the fact that the nature of god isn't logically fixed. So rooting morals in god simply because they are god leads to them being fundamentally arbitrary. The god in this scenario need not be whimsical or capricious, he can be totally immutable and unchanging and the issue remains.
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The second horn presents a good grounded in some standard external to God, to which he then conforms himself. Good is therefore above and apart from God.
This is correct except it's the first horn.
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It seems to me that a third option is for good to be grounded in God himself.
This doesn't work, it's really just the second horn. Grounding good in god's nature is no less arbitrary than grounding good in god's power or god's opinion. You are sill hosed unless you can logically demonstrate that gods nature MUST be good. And you are no more stronger ground than someone who claims god's opinion, or god's commands are good.
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I believe it also avoids the first since good would not subject to whim or change as God and his nature are immutable.
A completely immutable god is still subject to the second horn. The issue with the second horn isn't caprice, it's that the nature of god isn't logically bound to be any certain way.
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The question of whether a thing is good because God loves it, or if he loves it because it is good becomes nonsensical when both love and good are grounded in God. There can be no temporal or causative relationship between the two.
You misunderstand. You aren't asking the right question which still applies. It's a sidestep not meeting it head on.
The basic question is in the form:
Is that which is good commanded by god because it's good, or is it good because God commands it.
It's the same question when you try and substitute gods nature:
Is god's nature good because it's good, or is it good because it matches god's nature?
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We come to know good via God's revelation.
This actually takes you back to the first horn where god's good is being judged.
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He has revealed it to us via our moral intuition and via his written revelation.
You are now switching to an external standard of how we know god is good.