I have a few questions on the B Theory of Time:
1.) Are there any ways to physically distinguish a B theory of time universe from a determinist's A theory of time universe?
2.) The (slightly modified to fit the relativity of simultanaeity) A theory of time has the causal structure and time orientation of the universe fall out of it quite naturally. How does the B theory of time explain these phenomena?
3.) Is it possible for the universe to be anything but deterministic in the B theory of time?
4.) Is the concept of a "present" incompatible with the B-theory of time? I haven't given this much thought in the past so please excuse my armchair philosophy here, but if we understand the universe as a 4-dimensional manifold it seems that something like B-theory universe is kind of naturally built in. However, I've also envisioned the concept of "present" to be observer dependent, and real to the observer. I've pictured an observer as a traveler on his world line, with the worldline ever-expanding with respect to some parameter. Although, I also don't see anything wrong with seeing it as worldlines both extending into the past and future. But, I'm meandering now. The point is, given the first interpretation, is there really anything incompatible between B-theory and the concept of the present?
5.) What, if any, implications does the B-theory of time have for free-will?
1.) Are there any ways to physically distinguish a B theory of time universe from a determinist's A theory of time universe?
2.) The (slightly modified to fit the relativity of simultanaeity) A theory of time has the causal structure and time orientation of the universe fall out of it quite naturally. How does the B theory of time explain these phenomena?
3.) Is it possible for the universe to be anything but deterministic in the B theory of time?
4.) Is the concept of a "present" incompatible with the B-theory of time? I haven't given this much thought in the past so please excuse my armchair philosophy here, but if we understand the universe as a 4-dimensional manifold it seems that something like B-theory universe is kind of naturally built in. However, I've also envisioned the concept of "present" to be observer dependent, and real to the observer. I've pictured an observer as a traveler on his world line, with the worldline ever-expanding with respect to some parameter. Although, I also don't see anything wrong with seeing it as worldlines both extending into the past and future. But, I'm meandering now. The point is, given the first interpretation, is there really anything incompatible between B-theory and the concept of the present?
5.) What, if any, implications does the B-theory of time have for free-will?