Landing craft pulled up, men with 100 pounds of equipment waddled out and were then riddled with machine gun fire.
Was there not a better way?
Was there not a better way?
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Would it be accurate to say that the invasion of "Omaha" Beach was poorly planned?
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Last: 3 yr ago by nortex97
Compared to Italy it was a better run landing.
Compared to the Operation tiger, Normandy was near flawless. Over 700 men died in a practice landing
The reality is that omaha was one of five beaches that day plus Pointe du hoc, was the the most heavily defended and had the worst landing conditions.
I'm not sure what else could be done. Those men drew the short straw, if you will.
Compared to the Operation tiger, Normandy was near flawless. Over 700 men died in a practice landing
The reality is that omaha was one of five beaches that day plus Pointe du hoc, was the the most heavily defended and had the worst landing conditions.
I'm not sure what else could be done. Those men drew the short straw, if you will.
A lot of preparation was done to divert German forces to other locations in advance of the landing. I agree with the 2nd poster that it was pretty much flawless when considering the huge logistical challenges of taking a beach head. We didn't simply send men into the meat grinder blindly.
The real question you are raising is if we would accept casualties on that scale as part of a successful operation today. And on that point I think you'd be correct, if planned and executed today and resulting with the same casualties, the media coverage and public opinion would be far different. Losing 10000 wounded with 2500 dead is a high cost for a single beachhead at Omaha and I find it likely that we would have trouble as a society making similar sacrifices today.
The real question you are raising is if we would accept casualties on that scale as part of a successful operation today. And on that point I think you'd be correct, if planned and executed today and resulting with the same casualties, the media coverage and public opinion would be far different. Losing 10000 wounded with 2500 dead is a high cost for a single beachhead at Omaha and I find it likely that we would have trouble as a society making similar sacrifices today.
Could they have done a better job of protecting the men that had to go ashore? Could they have brought in their own obstacles to give the men some cover? Could they have used a lot of smoke to obscure the vision of the gunners? Could they have used dive bombers and dropped bunker-busting bombs on various emplacements? Could they have allowed the first couple waves of men to go in with a much lighter load so that they could get up to the bottom of the cliff to avoid German fire?
It would be interesting to see what modern commanders think about how the invasion was handled.
It would be interesting to see what modern commanders think about how the invasion was handled.
I think part of the issue here is that you are confused on the types of weapons and equipment we had available.
There were no bunker buster bombs, and even if there were, too much focus on Normandy before the landing would have brought German reinforcements which would have been really bad.
If we drop smoke on the beach, our own guys would also be confused. This isn't modern special forces with thermal goggles. We'd be blinding our own troops.
The main issue here is that too much preparation in getting the Normandy beaches ready for invasion in order to reduce casualties, likely alerts German high command that Normandy is the landing spot. If they know Normandy is the landing spot they then can reinforce their positions and potentially kick us off the beach. The critical moment in the invasion is when the Germans hesitate on sending reinforcements because they think Normandy is a diversion from the true invasion at Calais. That mistake allows allied forces the time to establish the beach head AND penetrate further inland than initially thought possible.
There were no bunker buster bombs, and even if there were, too much focus on Normandy before the landing would have brought German reinforcements which would have been really bad.
If we drop smoke on the beach, our own guys would also be confused. This isn't modern special forces with thermal goggles. We'd be blinding our own troops.
The main issue here is that too much preparation in getting the Normandy beaches ready for invasion in order to reduce casualties, likely alerts German high command that Normandy is the landing spot. If they know Normandy is the landing spot they then can reinforce their positions and potentially kick us off the beach. The critical moment in the invasion is when the Germans hesitate on sending reinforcements because they think Normandy is a diversion from the true invasion at Calais. That mistake allows allied forces the time to establish the beach head AND penetrate further inland than initially thought possible.
There were two major factors that made OMAHA as tough of a fight as it was. The first was terrain. OMAHA had by far the most difficult terrain of any of the landing beaches. But the landings at OMAHA were necessary, because without them there would be too much of a gap between UTAH and the British beaches. OMAHA was the best place to land in that stretch of coast - most of the rest of it there was no beach at all. And the Germans could read maps, too.
The second factor was the (undetected by Allied intelligence) presence of a regular German army infantry division in the immediate vicinity of OMAHA beach. Maybe it was bad luck, maybe lousy work by the intel guys, probably some mix of both. But a regular division was a much tougher opponent than the second rate static beach defense units at the other beaches.
Then there just plain old friction. The amphibious tanks drowned. The weather royally screwed up boats getting to the correct area of the beach. The weather also played havoc with planned bombing attacks on the beaches, as the bombers dropped well inland when the couldn't see the target, to avoid hitting friendly troops.
As an earlier poster mentioned, there were no "bunker buster" bombs in WWII. No air dropped munition had the necessary accuracy. (Look at the number of bombs the RAF dropped to hit the anchored Tirpitz - and a battleship is much, much larger than a bunker. The main bunker busting weapons of WWII were satchel charges and flamethrowers, both employed by the infantry, until the introduction of the flamethrower equipped tanks. (Which, for the US Army, were mainly a Pacific thing.)
The second factor was the (undetected by Allied intelligence) presence of a regular German army infantry division in the immediate vicinity of OMAHA beach. Maybe it was bad luck, maybe lousy work by the intel guys, probably some mix of both. But a regular division was a much tougher opponent than the second rate static beach defense units at the other beaches.
Then there just plain old friction. The amphibious tanks drowned. The weather royally screwed up boats getting to the correct area of the beach. The weather also played havoc with planned bombing attacks on the beaches, as the bombers dropped well inland when the couldn't see the target, to avoid hitting friendly troops.
As an earlier poster mentioned, there were no "bunker buster" bombs in WWII. No air dropped munition had the necessary accuracy. (Look at the number of bombs the RAF dropped to hit the anchored Tirpitz - and a battleship is much, much larger than a bunker. The main bunker busting weapons of WWII were satchel charges and flamethrowers, both employed by the infantry, until the introduction of the flamethrower equipped tanks. (Which, for the US Army, were mainly a Pacific thing.)
AggieEP said:
I think part of the issue here is that you are confused on the types of weapons and equipment we had available.
There were no bunker buster bombs, and even if there were, too much focus on Normandy before the landing would have brought German reinforcements which would have been really bad.
If we drop smoke on the beach, our own guys would also be confused. This isn't modern special forces with thermal goggles. We'd be blinding our own troops.
The main issue here is that too much preparation in getting the Normandy beaches ready for invasion in order to reduce casualties, likely alerts German high command that Normandy is the landing spot. If they know Normandy is the landing spot they then can reinforce their positions and potentially kick us off the beach. The critical moment in the invasion is when the Germans hesitate on sending reinforcements because they think Normandy is a diversion from the true invasion at Calais. That mistake allows allied forces the time to establish the beach head AND penetrate further inland than initially thought possible.
Nice post. Thank you.
It still begs the question of the paucity of direct fire support for the D-Day beaches despite having both air and naval supremacy. Allied aircraft of all types flew over 11,000 sorties on D-Day. We also had 284 allied warships, including five battleships, 23 cruisers, and scores of destroyers and destroyer escorts available off of Normandy.
Even after acknowledging this overwhelming force had many other tasks to perform besides supporting the landings, it nonetheless seems very little fighter close air support or naval gunfire was dedicated to providing Omaha with responsive on-call fires on the day. This is particularly odd in light of the extensive US experience in the Pacific which demonstrated how crucial both were for successful amphibious assaults. When Omaha bogged down, instead of a well thought-out, extensively exercised close fire support plan coming into play, it was mostly an ad hoc scramble.
Even after acknowledging this overwhelming force had many other tasks to perform besides supporting the landings, it nonetheless seems very little fighter close air support or naval gunfire was dedicated to providing Omaha with responsive on-call fires on the day. This is particularly odd in light of the extensive US experience in the Pacific which demonstrated how crucial both were for successful amphibious assaults. When Omaha bogged down, instead of a well thought-out, extensively exercised close fire support plan coming into play, it was mostly an ad hoc scramble.
I think the difference is that those naval and aerial bombardments occurred before we were on the beach. They were designed to soften up the defense in preparation for the invasion. My guess would be that we didn't have confidence in the accuracy of our close fore support and it wasn't worth the risk of nailing our own guys.
Again, you have to remember, this isn't modern technology.
WWII close air support was VFR only. The planes had to be able to see both their target(s), and any friendly troops in the area. For that they needed daylight, and clear weather. The weather over the beaches wasn't clear enough to allow that.
Naval gunfire support requires either the ability to see and identify the target(s), or someone onshore with a radio to identify targets. The big gun ships - cruisers and battleships - generally couldn't get close enough to the beach for direct visual targeting, partly because other ships needed that real estate, and partly because big ships need deep water. Some of the destroyers could get in close, and did.
The big guns are also very difficult to use in close proximity to friendly troops. 'Danger close' for modern 155mm howitzers is 600m. During WWII, ti would have been bigger. And the bigger the gun, the bigger the distance. With naval guns, it's going to be even more, especially more along the gun-to-target line due to the much flatter trajectory of naval guns. The 6", 8" and especially 14" naval guns (USS Texas was part of the OMAHA fire support) would have been almost useless for close support once the troops landed.
There were naval gunfire support parties that were sent ashore - mayble not enough of them, you can argue that point, I'm sure. But they were subject to all the same problems that the other landing troops had. Equipment lost, damaged, or destroyed - and you can't talk to the ship without a working radio. Landing on the wrong section of beach, and not being able to identify landmarks well enough to call for fire. Or just plain being killed and/or wounded.
WWII close air support was VFR only. The planes had to be able to see both their target(s), and any friendly troops in the area. For that they needed daylight, and clear weather. The weather over the beaches wasn't clear enough to allow that.
Naval gunfire support requires either the ability to see and identify the target(s), or someone onshore with a radio to identify targets. The big gun ships - cruisers and battleships - generally couldn't get close enough to the beach for direct visual targeting, partly because other ships needed that real estate, and partly because big ships need deep water. Some of the destroyers could get in close, and did.
The big guns are also very difficult to use in close proximity to friendly troops. 'Danger close' for modern 155mm howitzers is 600m. During WWII, ti would have been bigger. And the bigger the gun, the bigger the distance. With naval guns, it's going to be even more, especially more along the gun-to-target line due to the much flatter trajectory of naval guns. The 6", 8" and especially 14" naval guns (USS Texas was part of the OMAHA fire support) would have been almost useless for close support once the troops landed.
There were naval gunfire support parties that were sent ashore - mayble not enough of them, you can argue that point, I'm sure. But they were subject to all the same problems that the other landing troops had. Equipment lost, damaged, or destroyed - and you can't talk to the ship without a working radio. Landing on the wrong section of beach, and not being able to identify landmarks well enough to call for fire. Or just plain being killed and/or wounded.
I'm not buying that. By D-Day the AAF had fighter close air support down to a fine art and it took atrocious weather to hold them off. The weather on D-Day was not bad enough to keep fighters off target and the cliff-line was an obvious gunfire deconfliction line. More to the point, they weren't even committed in numbers to give it a try. Same with naval gunfire, it can be very precise but our warships were kept too far off-shore until things got really bad. Then two (two!) of the dozens of destroyers went in close and plugged away. Once committed, those two were instrumental in knocking out strongpoints and getting us moving. They could have done that hours earlier.Langenator said:
Again, you have to remember, this isn't modern technology.
WWII close air support was VFR only. The planes had to be able to see both their target(s), and any friendly troops in the area. For that they needed daylight, and clear weather. The weather over the beaches wasn't clear enough to allow that.
Naval gunfire support requires either the ability to see and identify the target(s), or someone onshore with a radio to identify targets. The big gun ships - cruisers and battleships - generally couldn't get close enough to the beach for direct visual targeting, partly because other ships needed that real estate, and partly because big ships need deep water. Some of the destroyers could get in close, and did.
The big guns are also very difficult to use in close proximity to friendly troops. 'Danger close' for modern 155mm howitzers is 600m. During WWII, ti would have been bigger. And the bigger the gun, the bigger the distance. With naval guns, it's going to be even more, especially more along the gun-to-target line due to the much flatter trajectory of naval guns. The 6", 8" and especially 14" naval guns (USS Texas was part of the OMAHA fire support) would have been almost useless for close support once the troops landed.
There were naval gunfire support parties that were sent ashore - mayble not enough of them, you can argue that point, I'm sure. But they were subject to all the same problems that the other landing troops had. Equipment lost, damaged, or destroyed - and you can't talk to the ship without a working radio. Landing on the wrong section of beach, and not being able to identify landmarks well enough to call for fire. Or just plain being killed and/or wounded.
My point is that there was inadequate preparation to conduct close fires and inadequate resources committed to it. If the weather had been perfect, it wouldn't have altered that.
The U.S. Army rejected all the recommendations of Vice Admiral Daniel E. Barbey who commanded the amphibious forces in the Pacific. He recommended use of the amphibious tractors to transport the soldiers right up to the shingle.
Getting Admiral King to give up any amtracs from the Pacific (or production destined for the Pacific) to give them to Eisenhower would have been one hell of a bureaucratic fight...especially since that would slow the advance of the Marines in the Central Pacific far more than MacArthur in New Guinea.
A month-ish later under better weather conditions the AAF still bombed our own guys during operation cobra (twice).
For all the problems, it was an astounding success.
And just to think, those young men did that without any emotional support animals.
And just to think, those young men did that without any emotional support animals.
Martin Cash said:
And just to think, those young men did that without any emotional support animals.
You want to bet? Mascots, working dogs, strays picked up along the line of advance, etc. all serve(d) an emotional support function.
Part of what made the War on Terror so emotionally damaging is that we completely changed the way we put things on the front line troops while at the same time removing things that can help a soldier (Marine, sailor, or airman) decompress when not directly engaged in combat.
Not at all the same thing, but believe what you want.denied said:Martin Cash said:
And just to think, those young men did that without any emotional support animals.
You want to bet? Mascots, working dogs, strays picked up along the line of advance, etc. all serve(d) an emotional support function.
Part of what made the War on Terror so emotionally damaging is that we completely changed the way we put things on the front line troops while at the same time removing things that can help a soldier (Marine, sailor, or airman) decompress when not directly engaged in combat.
Bombers from altitude, not fighters doing close support.JABQ04 said:
A month-ish later under better weather conditions the AAF still bombed our own guys during operation cobra (twice).
I think King had his hand on this to begin with.Langenator said:
Getting Admiral King to give up any amtracs from the Pacific (or production destined for the Pacific) to give them to Eisenhower would have been one hell of a bureaucratic fight...especially since that would slow the advance of the Marines in the Central Pacific far more than MacArthur in New Guinea.
not sure he was talking about dogs.........denied said:Martin Cash said:
And just to think, those young men did that without any emotional support animals.
You want to bet? Mascots, working dogs, strays picked up along the line of advance, etc. all serve(d) an emotional support function.
Part of what made the War on Terror so emotionally damaging is that we completely changed the way we put things on the front line troops while at the same time removing things that can help a soldier (Marine, sailor, or airman) decompress when not directly engaged in combat.
Fighters were not engaging ground targets at OMAHA Beach as their primary mission was to protect the bombers and gliders from any enemy aircraft and to destroy any inbound German armor, motorized vehicles and troops, which they did very effectively.74OA said:Bombers from altitude, not fighters doing close support.JABQ04 said:
A month-ish later under better weather conditions the AAF still bombed our own guys during operation cobra (twice).
I acknowledged those other missions in my first post, but since the Allies had overall air supremacy and an overwhelming abundance of fighters, it still begs the question why so few were dedicated to on-call close support of the landings when the Pacific experience demonstrated how important it was to a successful amphibious assault.ABATTBQ87 said:Fighters were not engaging ground targets at OMAHA Beach as their primary mission was to protect the bombers and gliders from any enemy aircraft and to destroy any inbound German armor, motorized vehicles and troops, which they did very effectively.74OA said:Bombers from altitude, not fighters doing close support.JABQ04 said:
A month-ish later under better weather conditions the AAF still bombed our own guys during operation cobra (twice).
Setting aside close air support, why wasn't there also a robust plan for on-call naval gunfire support? The great work the two destroyers did when they were finally allowed to press in close is illustrative of how effective it could've been much earlier when things first began to bog down.
-Weather on June 6 was still pretty ****ty
- who was calling for fire on Omaha? COs? Naval Personnel?
- the bigger sexier landings in the pacific took place post D-Day (Saipan, Philippines, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, Okinawa) and it took the Marines sometime to refine their TTPs from Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Gloucester, as well as army ops in Alaska
- Marines and Army, IIRC, didn't really collaborate a lot and are in constant competition for resources
-
In regards to naval gunfire support, when was it effective in the Pacific? I can't think of a single landing that naval gunfire turned the tide. Wasn't it mostly preparatory? It was all done on the backs of the Marines and Soldiers one pillbox at a time. Armor in larger amounts would have made a way bigger effect in my opinion.
- who was calling for fire on Omaha? COs? Naval Personnel?
- the bigger sexier landings in the pacific took place post D-Day (Saipan, Philippines, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, Okinawa) and it took the Marines sometime to refine their TTPs from Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Gloucester, as well as army ops in Alaska
- Marines and Army, IIRC, didn't really collaborate a lot and are in constant competition for resources
-
In regards to naval gunfire support, when was it effective in the Pacific? I can't think of a single landing that naval gunfire turned the tide. Wasn't it mostly preparatory? It was all done on the backs of the Marines and Soldiers one pillbox at a time. Armor in larger amounts would have made a way bigger effect in my opinion.
The battle was not conducive to use air support as the front line was not discernable during the first hours of the landings.74OA said:I acknowledged those other missions in my first post, but since the Allies had overall air supremacy and an overwhelming abundance of fighters, it still begs the question why so few were dedicated to on-call close support of the landings when the Pacific experience demonstrated how important it was to a successful amphibious assault.ABATTBQ87 said:Fighters were not engaging ground targets at OMAHA Beach as their primary mission was to protect the bombers and gliders from any enemy aircraft and to destroy any inbound German armor, motorized vehicles and troops, which they did very effectively.74OA said:Bombers from altitude, not fighters doing close support.JABQ04 said:
A month-ish later under better weather conditions the AAF still bombed our own guys during operation cobra (twice).
Setting aside close air support, why wasn't there also a robust plan for on-call naval gunfire support? The great work the two destroyers did when they were finally allowed to press in close is illustrative of how effective it could've been.
There were Navy personnel on the beach calling in gunfire from the destroyers and battleships, but until the destroyers moved in close and scraped the bottom of the channel most gun fire was inefficient as the targets were not clear due to smoke and haze.
One of the most devastating weapons the Germans used that day were pre-sighted mortars that were almost impossible to see as they were scattered along the bluffs. No naval fire would be able to hit them as they were underground, and so they had to be eliminated by the infantry.
remember A&M president general Rudder, i do.
col Rudder lead at pont du hoc.
col Rudder lead at pont du hoc.
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Ag46 in glider landed behind German lines D-Day! Lived to tell about it ! But pretty close mouthed.
It depends what it is to be compared to. For instance, compared to our 'withdrawal' from Afghanistan, it was a marvel of perfection. The Union forces in the wilderness? Likewise. An actually similar operation in scale/modern warfare? There isn't one.
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