Rustys-Beef-o-Reeno said:

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Small would have had the same outcome
I think we moved the runner over with 1 out both innings.
We just didn't put the ball in the air after that.

The strategy was fine, players need to get a hit.

The A's in the 12 laid 2 perfect bunts in a row.
Is what it is.

Bottom 12 down 2 with tuve at the plate and he almost tied it. Problem was Tucker and Bregman and Diaz not being clutch behind Alvarez and tuve.

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The 11th inning when we had 7-8-9 was the inning to bunt. Instead we get 2 K's sandwiched around a groundout and went down with a whimper when only needed 1 to win. If Carantini bunts Pena over then you have Pena at 3rd with 1 out and your best contact hitter (Gamel) at the plate. Espada screwed the pooch big time in that inning and should be called out for it. It's one thing to not ask Yordan or Tucker to bunt, but to not expect your 7-8-9 scrubs to do it is malpractice.

superaggie73 said:

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Rustys-Beef-o-Reeno said:

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Small would have had the same outcome
I think we moved the runner over with 1 out both innings.
We just didn't put the ball in the air after that.

The strategy was fine, players need to get a hit.

The A's in the 12 laid 2 perfect bunts in a row.
Is what it is.

Bottom 12 down 2 with tuve at the plate and he almost tied it. Problem was Tucker and Bregman and Diaz not being clutch behind Alvarez and tuve.

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The 11th inning when we had 7-8-9 was the inning to bunt. Instead we get 2 K's sandwiched around a groundout and went down with a whimper when only needed 1 to win. If Carantini bunts Pena over then you have Pena at 3rd with 1 out and your best contact hitter (Gamel) at the plate. Espada screwed the pooch big time in that inning and should be called out for it. It's one thing to not ask Yordan or Tucker to bunt, but to not expect your 7-8-9 scrubs to do it is malpractice.

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That's a huge if on the Caratini bunt. The scenario where Caratini bunts and Pena is thrown out at 3rd is also a distinct possible scenario there.

dcaggie04 said:

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superaggie73 said:

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Rustys-Beef-o-Reeno said:

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Small would have had the same outcome
I think we moved the runner over with 1 out both innings.
We just didn't put the ball in the air after that.

The strategy was fine, players need to get a hit.

The A's in the 12 laid 2 perfect bunts in a row.
Is what it is.

Bottom 12 down 2 with tuve at the plate and he almost tied it. Problem was Tucker and Bregman and Diaz not being clutch behind Alvarez and tuve.

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The 11th inning when we had 7-8-9 was the inning to bunt. Instead we get 2 K's sandwiched around a groundout and went down with a whimper when only needed 1 to win. If Carantini bunts Pena over then you have Pena at 3rd with 1 out and your best contact hitter (Gamel) at the plate. Espada screwed the pooch big time in that inning and should be called out for it. It's one thing to not ask Yordan or Tucker to bunt, but to not expect your 7-8-9 scrubs to do it is malpractice.

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That's a huge if on the Caratini bunt. The scenario where Caratini bunts and Pena is thrown out at 3rd is also a distinct possible scenario there.

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How many times are we gonna lose games by not bunting and continue to make this excuse. Carantini swinging away doesn't help either. Let's say he doesn't strike out and actually makes contact…he's a dead pull hitter and doesn't advance the runner then either. Unless he gets a hit which is a 25% chance at best based on his numbers. I'll take a better than 25% chance that he gets a bunt down. There is zero excuse for not bunting Carantini.

or find a favorable count and hit and run. If you see Pena take off, take a giant hack and give him some protection so he takes the bag.

it's just so frustrating that when the rules change in extra innings, our strategy stays the same as it does for a 9-inning game.

"Sometimes you lose track of your PFP's and we got blindsided by them last night." - Astros GM Dana Brown on the defensive struggles against 3 straight bunts from the A's. @SeanUnfiltered @SportsTalk790

— Brian LaLima (@BLima790) September 11, 2024

"Fielding is timing. He's been a little out of sync. We all know he's a special SS. Jeremy Pena is a really good shortstop so let's not lose sight of that." - Astros GM Dana Brown with us on @SportsTalk790 talking Pena's defensive errors. @SeanUnfiltered

— Brian LaLima (@BLima790) September 11, 2024

For anybody who cares to keep track,

Astros M# to win the division is 14.

The M# for NYY/Bal/Cle to get the 1 or 2 seed against Hou is 13.

Inversely, the Astros M# to overtake Cleveland or NYY is 24.

Mathguy64 said:

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I just think this whole strategy thinking an institutional decision. Somewhere the nerds have data that says don't bunt and it just feels like the data is off. Like it doesn't plan for the outcome of "you can trade outs for a single run because all you need is a single run"

The Tucker AB in B11 was infuriating. You have to get 1 run or it's over. 2 runs wins but without 1 you lose. You have to maximize the opportunity of 1 run. Altuve is on 3B with 1 out and the 3B is near him holding him close. The SS is almost on 2B shifted over for tucker to pull the ball but he's not in the infield grass. The hole there is massive. Just push the ball to that side of the field and Altuve scores. And likely Tucker can stroll to 1B since there isn't a damn fielder on the left side to field the ball.

Of course he didn't ever try that.

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Exactly.

Through most of the regular season it might not matter as much. But when you're in a tight playoff race or post-season series where every run and game really, really matters the ability to adapt is huge. Especially in a situation late in the game or extra innings where you don't need that crooked number, you just have to push one run across.

I even think in the 8th & 9th a little more situational adaptation would have won the game and would push a run across.

In the 8th:
- Bregman leads off and lines out to C. OK, he's one of your top hitters so you want him swinging away as the leadoff because there's a reasonable likelihood of him poking a shot into the Crawford Boxes or hitting a double.
- Diaz doubles to the LC gap
- Pena comes up with one on and one out but K's swinging. In this situation you need him to try to put the ball in play to the right side. If he shoots a base hit the other way Diaz almost certainly scores.
- Caratini with the backwards K to end the inning. I get that hitting MLB pitching is the hardest thing to do in sports and you can't take each AB in a vacuum but you really don't want to go down looking here.

So no runs and a runner stranded in scoring position after a double.

In the 9th:
- Gamel grounds out, 4-3
- Heyward grounds out, 6-3
- Altuve with the 2 out single
- Yordan with the 2 out single (which he smoked)
- Tucker K's looking

At least neither one of Gamel or Heyward K'd but you've got to get a guy on base to set the table for Altuve & Yordan. And maybe even pinch hit for Tucker given his rust since coming back, especially with RISP.

Prosperdick said:

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This is where I really miss AJ as I feel like he was much better at situational managing

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AJ? The same guy that yanked ZG and didn't insert Cole and cost us a ring?

I always thought he was a little too analytical and situational managing was his weakness.

Ag_07 said:

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Prosperdick said:

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This is where I really miss AJ as I feel like he was much better at situational managing

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AJ? The same guy that yanked ZG and didn't insert Cole and cost us a ring?

I always thought he was a little too analytical and situational managing was his weakness.

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Yeah I'd say besides people like Francona, it's hard to find a fanbase that is all 100% a fan of their manager throughout the tenure. And even he had some haters later on

I thought Dusty from 2020-2022 was really good… then hit a brick wall of stubbornness in 2023.

Hinch from 2015-2018 was great but in 2019 we got very analytical and pulled pitchers too early

Mathguy64 said:

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I just think this whole strategy thinking an institutional decision. Somewhere the nerds have data that says don't bunt and it just feels like the data is off. Like it doesn't plan for the outcome of "you can trade outs for a single run because all you need is a single run"

The Tucker AB in B11 was infuriating. You have to get 1 run or it's over. 2 runs wins but without 1 you lose. You have to maximize the opportunity of 1 run. Altuve is on 3B with 1 out and the 3B is near him holding him close. The SS is almost on 2B shifted over for tucker to pull the ball but he's not in the infield grass. The hole there is massive. Just push the ball to that side of the field and Altuve scores. And likely Tucker can stroll to 1B since there isn't a damn fielder on the left side to field the ball.

Of course he didn't ever try that.

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We argue this every single time.

Sac bunts aren't 100% successful either. I think the last I saw is sac bunts are around 70% successful.

I see this: Like it doesn't plan for the outcome of "you can trade outs for a single run because all you need is a single run"

The problem I have with that statement is you're not trading outs for a single run. You're initially trading an out for a base. At the same time you're also trading an out for a run expectancy over 1 to a run expectancy under 1.

I know your argument is the expectancies should be different if you're focused on getting that run, and only that run in. But, in reality, is it going to change that much? How many guys do you actually trust to change their approach at the plate and have success in a pressure situation? Most already aren't having success in pressure situations with their typical approach that has been successful for them to that point.

It's easy to say bunt, get the guy to 3rd, and have the next guy go with an approach to drive him in. In reality, it's not that easy when there is another guy on the other side who has something to say about preventing that.

txags92 said:

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That whole "early in the season when the games don't matter as much" line drives me crazy. They DO matter, just as much as the game we played last night. I know the sense of urgency isn't there in April like it is now, and you don't want the players burned out too early because the season is a grind. But the games count exactly the same and you should play to win all of them. Which means not using the same crappy strategy in Manfredball for September that didn't work in April either.

And I understand the whole "he's a good hitter who can win the game with one swing" idea, but having a bunch of guys who didn't get it done all game long swinging away in extra innings instead of working to move the runner over is just stupid. Nobody except maybe Yordan has earned the right to be "too good to bunt" this season. Getting that guy to third forces the infield to play in, and opens up more opportunities for the rest of the hitters in the line up to drop one in behind them.

This is just another situation where our hitting efforts don't match up with the game situation. When you are in the bottom of extra innings in a tie game, all that matters is getting that one run in. You don't need a home run when you already have a runner at 2nd. Just get that guy home and you win. All of this falls on the hitting coach IMO. We are absolutely terrible at hitting behind runners, moving guys over, getting the ball in the air to sacrifice, etc. All we seem to be good at is trying to pull the ball into the cheap seats, even when the pitches are in the opposite batters box.

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You're misinterpreting what I meant. Yes, all games matter statistically but there's a margin for error early in the season that's not there at this point. Conversely, if we weren't lousy in April, May, and most of June there would be more margin than currently exists

You should always play to win but now there's less opportunity to make up for games dropped.

Otherwise, I agree with your post.

The A's are our kryptonite

W said:

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when the visiting team does not score in the top of the 10th

the home team's strategy has to change in the bottom half

waiting for the 3-run homer...when you only need 1 run to win...doesn't make sense

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Be honest when you answer this - how many guys in the Astros offense, outside of Altuve, Yordan, Bregman, and Tucker do you trust to successfully change their approach at the plate in order to drive only 1 run in during the highest pressure situation of the game against guys who generally have really good accuracy and nasty stuff?

Are you saying you trust Pena, Diaz, Dubon, Chas, or Jake to purposefully go oppo with a guy on 3rd and 1 out when the pitcher knows that's what they want to do, and all of those guys are susceptible to the low slider off the plate and away? All of them are already fighting against swinging at that pitch during their normal approach.

Beat40 said:

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Mathguy64 said:

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I just think this whole strategy thinking an institutional decision. Somewhere the nerds have data that says don't bunt and it just feels like the data is off. Like it doesn't plan for the outcome of "you can trade outs for a single run because all you need is a single run"

The Tucker AB in B11 was infuriating. You have to get 1 run or it's over. 2 runs wins but without 1 you lose. You have to maximize the opportunity of 1 run. Altuve is on 3B with 1 out and the 3B is near him holding him close. The SS is almost on 2B shifted over for tucker to pull the ball but he's not in the infield grass. The hole there is massive. Just push the ball to that side of the field and Altuve scores. And likely Tucker can stroll to 1B since there isn't a damn fielder on the left side to field the ball.

Of course he didn't ever try that.

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We argue this every single time.

Sac bunts aren't 100% successful either. I think the last I saw is sac bunts are around 70% successful.

I see this: Like it doesn't plan for the outcome of "you can trade outs for a single run because all you need is a single run"

The problem I have with that statement is you're not trading outs for a single run. You're initially trading an out for a base. At the same time you're also trading an out for a run expectancy over 1 to a run expectancy under 1.

I know your argument is the expectancies should be different if you're focused on getting that run, and only that run in. But, in reality, is it going to change that much? How many guys do you actually trust to change their approach at the plate and have success in a pressure situation? Most already aren't having success in pressure situations with their typical approach that has been successful for them to that point.

It's easy to say bunt, get the guy to 3rd, and have the next guy go with an approach to drive him in. In reality, it's not that easy when there is another guy on the other side who has something to say about preventing that.

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OK, if sac bunts are 70% successful then what is that compared to? The BA of the hitter at the plate? Because if so, that 70% is way more than double the best BA on the team.

And you sac bunt a guy to 3rd in Manfred Ball then you have 2 outs to get 90' and even then it doesn't have to be a base hit. It can be a ground ball to the right side. It can be a sac fly. Or depending on the runner at 3rd and the batter at the plate you can even do a safety squeeze with less than 2 outs.

When the situation calls for just putting the ball in play that's an approach I'd expect big leaguers to be able to adjust to. In fact, that's one of the big claims from the people who denigrate BA- they say that a lot of the hitters today would have a whole lot higher BAs if they just focused on contact & base hits vs. hitting for power.

TarponChaser said:

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Beat40 said:

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Mathguy64 said:

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I just think this whole strategy thinking an institutional decision. Somewhere the nerds have data that says don't bunt and it just feels like the data is off. Like it doesn't plan for the outcome of "you can trade outs for a single run because all you need is a single run"

The Tucker AB in B11 was infuriating. You have to get 1 run or it's over. 2 runs wins but without 1 you lose. You have to maximize the opportunity of 1 run. Altuve is on 3B with 1 out and the 3B is near him holding him close. The SS is almost on 2B shifted over for tucker to pull the ball but he's not in the infield grass. The hole there is massive. Just push the ball to that side of the field and Altuve scores. And likely Tucker can stroll to 1B since there isn't a damn fielder on the left side to field the ball.

Of course he didn't ever try that.

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We argue this every single time.

Sac bunts aren't 100% successful either. I think the last I saw is sac bunts are around 70% successful.

I see this: Like it doesn't plan for the outcome of "you can trade outs for a single run because all you need is a single run"

The problem I have with that statement is you're not trading outs for a single run. You're initially trading an out for a base. At the same time you're also trading an out for a run expectancy over 1 to a run expectancy under 1.

I know your argument is the expectancies should be different if you're focused on getting that run, and only that run in. But, in reality, is it going to change that much? How many guys do you actually trust to change their approach at the plate and have success in a pressure situation? Most already aren't having success in pressure situations with their typical approach that has been successful for them to that point.

It's easy to say bunt, get the guy to 3rd, and have the next guy go with an approach to drive him in. In reality, it's not that easy when there is another guy on the other side who has something to say about preventing that.

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OK, if sac bunts are 70% successful then what is that compared to? The BA of the hitter at the plate? Because if so, that 70% is way more than double the best BA on the team.

And you sac bunt a guy to 3rd in Manfred Ball then you have 2 outs to get 90' and even then it doesn't have to be a base hit. It can be a ground ball to the right side. It can be a sac fly. Or depending on the runner at 3rd and the batter at the plate you can even do a safety squeeze with less than 2 outs.

When the situation calls for just putting the ball in play that's an approach I'd expect big leaguers to be able to adjust to. In fact, that's one of the big claims from the people who denigrate BA- they say that a lot of the hitters today would have a whole lot higher BAs if they just focused on contact & base hits vs. hitting for power.

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Why is that your expectation? We have guys who find it difficult to lay off the slider low and away when they are in their normal approach. Your expectation for them is to look to go oppo, find something outside to drive, and successfully get the runner in from 3rd without swinging at the slider low away 3 times in a row in the most pressure filled situation of the game?

I didn't say anything about finding a pitch to drive. With the runner on third you just have to put the ball in play in most cases.

I'd also argue those guys have trouble laying off those pitches because they're always looking to drive the ball vs. just make contact. And in most situations I'm good with that approach because you're looking to put up a lot of runs and bury your opponent. But when you only need one run, especially late in the game, you have to shift your approach a bit.

For at least 10-15 years now we've been told that BA doesn't matter it's OPS so players trade making contact for seeking to do damage and strikeouts are up massively across the league in that time. Players are almost always swinging for the fences when they could sacrifice some power for a higher BA.

Mathguy64 said:

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My only comment to add to this is that what we currently are doing in Manfredball isn't working. One run and extra inning wins/losses are measures of luck. You should be roughly .500 regardless of how good a team you have. The bigger your deviation from .500 is, the luckier or unluckier you are.

We are consistently the unluckiest team in these games. So we are either just unlucky every year or our strategy is off.

I just wonder if we can try something else strategically. It's not like it's going to hurt.

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It just seems like we pound the ball into the ground in manfred ball. Like no matter the pitch it's a grounder to short or something.

It's almost as if the approach changes with our guys in that scenario