On a more serious note: I saw somewhere a couple years back that one thing that contributed to the Japanese achieving surprise at Pearl Harbor was that US intelligence either underestimated the IJN's capability for underway refueling, or missed it entirely.
Without underway refueling, the Kido Butai can't get to Hawaii from Japan, and still get back to safe harbor. The carriers, especially the two newest, Shokaku and Zuikaku, could probably do it, but no way the escorting destroyers could.
I haven't been able to find anything definitive on the topic in academic literature as to what USN intel knew on the topic, and to whom they might have passed that info. I did find that the IJN was probably ahead of USN capabilities at the time, and the IJN did actually possess more of the necessary fast oilers than the USN did.
So the general American tendency to underestimate/denigrate Japanese capability and proficiency might well have played a role in any estimate of the IJN's capability in that area.
I doubt I'll be able to find anything definitive without getting into USN intel files in the National Archives. But I di think if the intel had straight said "the IJN lacks the capability for underway refueling" that might have been brought up by the attempts to clear the names of Admiral Kimmel and General Short. Unless it was classified and they didn't have access.