YZ250 said:
I don't understand the point of the criticism. He should have stuck to the plan that called for a defensive retreat for the purpose of delaying the fall? He, Wainright and Sutherland hated that plan. Don't forget that MacArthur was also in charge of the Philippine Army and had Filipino troops in addition to only 22,000 American troops. MacArthur tried to oppose the invasion but later implemented the retreat to Bataan. They successfully delayed the inevitable which is according to plan. I don't think we have a single general who wouldn't at least try to oppose the Japanese landings. So he did deviate from the plan but ended with the same result.
Whenever the fall of the Philippines is talked about nobody ever talks about the Navy. They got out of there and did almost nothing to oppose the landings even though they had 29 submarines in the Asiatic fleet. They didn't even try to supply the Army. You said that MacArthur should have known that supplies would not come. Why should he think this when he was repeatedly told that they were coming? Quezon was told the same thing. Eisenhower himself was one who was actually trying to get supplies there. To me that is the real failure if you are going to criticize the fall of the Philippines: the Navy doing nothing to oppose the Japanese and not even trying to bring in supplies.
Back to the plans. MacArthur didn't come up with the war plans himself as it was a joint plan with the Navy that had been in development for years. MacArthur hadn't been Chief of Staff since 1935. Almost 7 years. He had retired from the Army in 1937 and wasn't recalled to duty until July of 1941. During that time the plans had been revised.
My point is when talking of MacArthur in WWII they always focus on the fall of the Philippines and not on the New Guinea campaign or the liberation of the Philippines. I don't believe he lost a battle once he went on the offensive.
These are good points, but I'm not real sure you can blame the Navy (other than the supplies and reinforcements never came. But the plan hinged on the Pacific Fleet still being viable).
The Pacific Fleet was destroyed at Pearl Harbor.
The Asiatic fleet (forgive me, I am just going on memory) had 1 Heavy cruiser (USS Houston), 2 Light Cruisers (USS Marblehead (a WWI era cruiser) and USS Boise (Modern-attached). 13 WWI destroyers, 29 subs (1/4 old S-boats and all with defective torpedoes), ~6 old China River Gunboats, a destroyer tender, a sub tender, a couple of fleet oilers and minesweepers, a couple of squadrons of PBYs, etc.,etc. In other words, not much and most of it old, worn, not modernized and spread out trying to execute more tasks than it had assets for. And pretty bad/slow/late overall intelligence, so they were often late to an event and therefore could not effect it. And ZERO air power.
Any one of the Japanese task forces roaming the area and supporting landings was strong enough to destroy the Asiatic fleet by themselves, even if the Navy had been able to mass all it's ships together. In fact, that's essentially what happened when the combined US, British, Dutch and Australian fleet (ABDA) tried to intercept an invasion task force in the Java Sea. They lost most of their ships, then and when they subsequently tried to escape to Australia. The Asiatic Fleet tried multiple times to oppose the Japanese landings with little to no success. They just didn't have the muscle to make a difference.
Again, just a cursory over view, but the Navy lost almost everything trying hard to execute a war plan that was obsolete the moment the first Japanese bomb fell at Pearl Harbor.
12thFan/Websider Since 2003