Obviously the hammering of the Japanese carriers during the battle left Japan in a very exposed position going forward. If we hadn't been able to cripple them (say we only sunk one carrier) would they have been able to hold us back for a longer period of time? By how much did those sinkings speed up the war?

If midway had gone south for us, they were going to take it. That was their end goal. And they would have used that to take out pearl harbor. They knew their only hope was to destroy our fleet - thats why they attached Pearl in the first place.

So yeah.... if they held every pacific base we had (Phillipines, Guam, Midway, Pearl), it would have severely effected the timeline of the war. It was pretty difficult to get planes/ships/troops to the Southwest Pacific without those bases.

Just my uneducated thoughts....

The Doolittle Raid didn't cause much damage to Japanese infrastructure, but it did do great damage to their collective psyche. The Japs felt a need to expand their eastern boundary, and the obvious solution was to take Midway. In so doing, they hoped to draw in the US Navy for a final confrontation that they believed they would win, decisively.

Had the Japs been successful, they undoubtedly would have continued their torrid pace of conquest into the South Pacific. Capturing Guadalcanal would have been all but assured; the result of that would have been disastrous for any US-Australia sea lanes, which is why the Marines fought so hard for that little island. No one can say how long this would have extended the war, but it undoubtedly would have, even though I believe it would not have made any difference in the ultimate outcome.

gigemhilo said:

---

If midway had gone south for us, they were going to take it. That was their end goal. And they would have used that to take out pearl harbor. They knew their only hope was to destroy our fleet - thats why they attached Pearl in the first place.

So yeah.... if they held every pacific base we had (Phillipines, Guam, Midway, Pearl), it would have severely effected the timeline of the war. It was pretty difficult to get planes/ships/troops to the Southwest Pacific without those bases.

Just my uneducated thoughts....

---

The book Shattered Sword contradicts that, their conclusions are even if all our carriers has been lost, Midway would have been taken but they couldn't hold it. They had no way to take out a Pearl from midway.

At best they saw the war might have been delayed, but the outcome wouldn't change.

Basically the US production capability was going to overwhelm the Japs one way or another.

Also another point is the Japs took all these islands as putter defense but theses island needed full resupply from home land. Which the japs couldn't provide.

I'f Midway had fallen "Germany first " would have been scrapped. Pearl Hawaii would have been made a bastion. The entire American fleet would have need shifted to Pacific coast. The Royal Navy would been left to handle the Atlantic by itself. Reason being? The next step after Pearl was The West Coast and the Japanese had the means of reaching it in force.

Quote:

---

The next step after Pearl was The West Coast and the Japanese had the means of reaching it in force.

---

It's a long way from Hawaii to the West Coast. I'm no expert on the Pacific War, but it seems like their supply lines would be stretched too thin. Also - wouldn't we have been able to hammer them with land based fighters, bombers & artillery?

Apache said:

---

Quote:

---

The next step after Pearl was The West Coast and the Japanese had the means of reaching it in force.

---

It's a long way from Hawaii to the West Coast. I'm no expert on the Pacific War, but it seems like their supply lines would be stretched too thin. Also - wouldn't we have been able to hammer them with land based fighters, bombers & artillery?

---

their supply line couldn't keep up with what they already had taken. they never could have held Midway.

They never could have taken Pearl. Another thing in the book I referenced was the Japs never really developed capable landing craft. Actually said they might have been blooded really bad trying to take Midway.

Rabid Cougar said:

---

I'f Midway had fallen "Germany first " would have been scrapped. Pearl Hawaii would have been made a bastion. The entire American fleet would have need shifted to Pacific coast. The Royal Navy would been left to handle the Atlantic by itself. Reason being? The next step after Pearl was The West Coast and the Japanese had the means of reaching it in force.

---

That's hilarious

Not saying that they would have taken Pearl. But if the Americans had been defeated at Midway, the leadership's reaction would have been to make Hawaii a bastion.

They had no way of knowing what Japan's true capability was at the time. They only had an inkling of the Yamatos . If Midway had fallen and the American carriers all sunk there was not going to be anyway of expelling them until the American industrial production kicked in.

SRBS said:

---

Rabid Cougar said:

---

I'f Midway had fallen "Germany first " would have been scrapped. Pearl Hawaii would have been made a bastion. The entire American fleet would have need shifted to Pacific coast. The Royal Navy would been left to handle the Atlantic by itself. Reason being? The next step after Pearl was The West Coast and the Japanese had the means of reaching it in force.

---

That's hilarious

---

Was it so hilarious that the government interned 75,000 plus American citizens of Japanese decent plus another 45,000 Japanese ex-pats on the west coast? It was so hilarious that they started rounding them up within 48 hours of the attack on Pearl Harbor. The perceived threat to Pearl and the West Coast in 1941-1942 would have become a reality had Midway fallen.

Rabid Cougar said:

---

SRBS said:

---

Rabid Cougar said:

---

I'f Midway had fallen "Germany first " would have been scrapped. Pearl Hawaii would have been made a bastion. The entire American fleet would have need shifted to Pacific coast. The Royal Navy would been left to handle the Atlantic by itself. Reason being? The next step after Pearl was The West Coast and the Japanese had the means of reaching it in force.

---

That's hilarious

---

Was it so hilarious that the government interned 75,000 plus American citizens of Japanese decent plus another 45,000 Japanese ex-pats on the west coast? It was so hilarious that they started rounding them up within 48 hours of the attack on Pearl Harbor. The perceived threat to Pearl and the West Coast in 1941-1942 would have become a reality had Midway fallen.

---

The fear was from sabotage than invasion. Why they had all the planes at Pearl all lined up in rows out in the middle of the airbases

we had 36 aircraft carriers,

9 battleship divisions, 21 cruiser divisions, hundreds of main battle ships

hundreds of subs

a fleet of thousands and thousands of support ships and logistics

https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/u/us-pacific-fleet-organization-1may1945.html

a ring of islands around japan with fully built ports, docks, airports, bases, etc.,

3900 b-29's and tens of thousands of other combat aircraft and tens of thousands more support aircraft

total air, sea and land domination

we had practiced seaborne invasions hundreds of times

and we had basically won the war.

and we were incapable/scared holy ****less of invading japan - basically like california without the then armed citizenry.

no. japan was not a threat to the west coast. LOL.

JABQ04 said:

---

We didn't want to invade Japan, but we damn sure were planning it and preparing for. X-Day was to be only three months after the atomic bombs were dropped. If they didn't surrender it was going down.

In hindsight I don't think the Japanese had the ability to invade the US. But in 1941/1942 we didn't know that. We just saw them racking up victories on Guam, Wake, Philippines, Singapore, China etc.... They very much had an aura of invincibility until we won at Coral Sea and then Midway.

---

Nimitz disagrees and was actively arguing against an invasion. Both he and Halsey felt that an invasion was unnecessary and even argued against the use of the atomic bombs and said so in their memoirs after the war. They both felt that we had defeated the Japanese in detail and simply needed to wait it out. Our Submarine force had made it almost impossible for supply ships to bring in materiel it from Chinese mainland to supply the Japanese factories. From late in 43 on they had little ability to resupply their ring of island defenses and suffered huge losses trying to do so.

In New Guinea a Japanese Corps commander literally marched his divisions to death instead of leaving them in place to starve in their defensive potions. Less than 10% of his command made if off the island and very few actually died from combat with US troops.

While the huge naval battles are neat to focus on and inspiring to read about it was the strangulation of the Japanese home island that ultimately ended the war and would have ended it regardless of an invasion or dropping the bomb.

JABQ04 said:

---

We didn't want to invade Japan, but we damn sure were planning it and preparing for. X-Day was to be only three months after the atomic bombs were dropped. If they didn't surrender it was going down.

In hindsight I don't think the Japanese had the ability to invade the US. But in 1941/1942 we didn't know that. We just saw them racking up victories on Guam, Wake, Philippines, Singapore, China etc.... They very much had an aura of invincibility until we won at Coral Sea and then Midway.

---

Oh i totally agree the general public viewed the possibility as real.
And our leadership had to take it seriously even if they felt deep down it was not reality.
I just listed the resources we devoted to illustrate how far japan was from it in 41


Ironically, it would be much easier to do today, though still not easy.

CanyonAg77 said:

---

Quote:

---

Nimitz disagrees and was actively arguing against an invasion. Both he and Halsey felt that an invasion was unnecessary and even argued against the use of the atomic bombs and said so in their memoirs after the war.

---

I don't know, but I doubt they argued for or against the atom bomb. It was the biggest secret of the war, and they were probably as shocked as anyone when it was used. Truman didn't even know about it until after FDR died, so I doubt they informed commanders in the field.

---

Nimitz new about it in early 45, CinCPac was part of putting everything in place to get the Enola Gay and Bockscar in place and ready to drop it. You don't dedicate a that much support and shipping on a secret project without CincPac knowing what was going on.

He is very clear he thought the dropping of the bomb was unnecessary and that if would only take a few more months of the current bombing and the Japanese would have succumbed to internal pressure. Remember we killed larger numbers of people and destroyed more area with the fire bombings than the atomic bombs combined. Read his biography it's all in there, the author also dedicates some time in The Admirals to the subject of defeating Japan and the use of the bomb.

JABQ04 said:

---

Very true. Like you said there were those that didn't feel the invasion was necessary. However, we were still planning on and preparing for the invasion which was slated to start in Nov 1945.
.

Some telling quotes from MacArthur who was chosen to lead the whole show.
https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V1/ch13.htm

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Downfall

I know it's Wikipedia but still gives a good break down of the planned invasion. My grandfather fought the Japanese and in his items I have, there is a pamphlet that was distributed to American troops discussing the points system and will I have enough to go home or will I have to take part in the invasion.






So at least the men were under the assumption that there was going to be an invasion of Japan as the pamphlet was made sometime after May 1945

---

No doubt a plan was in place and troop movements begin pretty early in the planning process for any plan. But the decision to actually invade had not been made and there was still much discussion about how and when to do it through the summer of '45.

Apache said:

---

Quote:

---

The next step after Pearl was The West Coast and the Japanese had the means of reaching it in force.

---

It's a long way from Hawaii to the West Coast. I'm no expert on the Pacific War, but it seems like their supply lines would be stretched too thin. Also - wouldn't we have been able to hammer them with land based fighters, bombers & artillery?

---

Our sub fleet would have been a major disruption in their efforts.

Quote:

---

He is very clear he thought the dropping of the bomb was unnecessary and that if would only take a few more months of the current bombing and the Japanese would have succumbed to internal pressure.

---

https://www.atomicheritage.org/profile/chester-w-nimitz

Looks like you're correct about Nimitz, still think it's unlikely Halsey knew. From the link above, it appears that Nimitz had conflicting views, which is not a surprise.

Quote:

---

Despite his high rank and pivotal role in the Pacific theater, Admiral Nimitz was not informed of the work of the Manhattan Project until February 1945....

According to Ashworth, after reading the letter, Nimitz asked, "Don't those people realize we're fighting a war out here? This is February, and you're talking about the first of August."...

"He said he was not attempting to minimize the 'awful power' of the new weapon, because it undoubtedly 'hastened the end.'...

Nimitz neither openly condemned nor supported the atomic bomb, but it is clear that he had certain misgivings about its use. His biographer E.B. Potter observed that the Admiral did in fact consider the atomic bomb somehow indecent. After his death, Nimitz's wife Catherine also remembered her husband feeling badly about the dropping of the bomb "because he said we had Japan beaten already."

---

Cinco Ranch Aggie said:

---

cbr said:

---

we had 36 aircraft carriers,

9 battleship divisions, 21 cruiser divisions, hundreds of main battle ships

hundreds of subs

a fleet of thousands and thousands of support ships and logistics

https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/u/us-pacific-fleet-organization-1may1945.html

a ring of islands around japan with fully built ports, docks, airports, bases, etc.,

3900 b-29's and tens of thousands of other combat aircraft and tens of thousands more support aircraft

total air, sea and land domination

we had practiced seaborne invasions hundreds of times

and we had basically won the war.

and we were incapable/scared holy ****less of invading japan - basically like california without the then armed citizenry.

no. japan was not a threat to the west coast. LOL.

---

It sure looks like you have just described the US forces circa 1944-1945, not 1942. Not saying the Japs were really a threat to actually invade, conquer, and hold any American territory but your post does not correctly describe our military force in the first half of 1942.

---

Yes, exactly my point - even with our superpower status in 45, invasion of japan was daunting. This illustrates how absurd the idea of japan in 41 or 2 invading the west coast. Just completely out of the question.

quite frankly one of the big things that has always bothered me, even as a child watching midway and studying the war, was just how stupid japan's leadership seems to be.

i never understood midway as a concept.

take an island you can't support and hold, no matter what? ok

lol, 'draw the us carriers out to battle' .... and then get shocked when they are waiting for you?

drag a whole fleet behind your carriers and then tuck and run when they get sunk?


even pearl harbor was a strategic disaster, and nagumo didnt even understand the game.

pearl had to be disabled as a major port, its oil supplies burned, and the carriers had to be sunk, period. the only hope whatsoever for japan was to completely eliminate the us pacific fleet's ability to project power that week.

running away back home with the carriers after day 1, without accomplishing any of those goals, simply ignores the entire strategic hope for the operation, and doomed the entire war from day 1.

there was just no cohesive strategic vision... seems like the whole war was literally 'well, they're embargoing us, we dont have much else to do, so let's see if we can freak them out with a surprise attack and hope they give up'

back to midway, the whole point was to accomplish what pearl failed to do and sink the carriers. by then it was really already too late, the fleet carriers would be coming on line by the end of 42 anyway and the war was over then.

given that, they should have kept the fleet together, under their cap, with supporting destroyers etc., and as soon as they spotted the carriers they should have tried to close the distance during the air battle and take out the carriers with surface ships at any cost.

though i think the us carriers could outrun any of japans' significant surface fleet.

certainly, in hindsight, their surface fleet was near useless anyway.

you should read Shattered Sword.

It gets into the stupidity of their side, from ignoring war games, to horrible planning, to plan ol arrogance that they where just superior. They ignored lessons of previous battles as just bad luck on their side.

Biggest failure was their reliance on very complicated time tables and battle maneuvers that made the operation almost impossible to execute.

cbr said:

---

there was just no cohesive strategic vision... seems like the whole war was literally 'well, they're embargoing us, we dont have much else to do, so let's see if we can freak them out with a surprise attack and hope they give up'

---

Careful, you just described our invasion plan for Iraq.

Quote:

---

back to midway, the whole point was to accomplish what pearl failed to do and sink the carriers. by then it was really already too late, the fleet carriers would be coming on line by the end of 42 anyway and the war was over then.

given that, they should have kept the fleet together, under their cap, with supporting destroyers etc., and as soon as they spotted the carriers they should have tried to close the distance during the air battle and take out the carriers with surface ships at any cost.

---

The Japanese Navy consistently planned very detailed and complex plans that did not sustain the friction of battle very well. This resulted in repeatedly showing up at objectives with only part of the fleet present and part of the story because one part of the fleet wasn't talking to the other.

Yamato in an effort to hide his main force ended up leaving them dispersed so they couldn't support each other and ultimately allowed himself to be destroyed in detail instead of attacking in force.

The fact that we were reading the Japanese Naval code at this point can't be understated as well. We knew a lot more of what Yamato wanted to do than just that the target was Midway.

Old RV Ag said:

---

CT'97 said:

---

cbr said:

---

there was just no cohesive strategic vision... seems like the whole war was literally 'well, they're embargoing us, we dont have much else to do, so let's see if we can freak them out with a surprise attack and hope they give up'

---

Careful, you just described our invasion plan for Iraq.

Quote:

---

back to midway, the whole point was to accomplish what pearl failed to do and sink the carriers. by then it was really already too late, the fleet carriers would be coming on line by the end of 42 anyway and the war was over then.

given that, they should have kept the fleet together, under their cap, with supporting destroyers etc., and as soon as they spotted the carriers they should have tried to close the distance during the air battle and take out the carriers with surface ships at any cost.

---

The Japanese Navy consistently planned very detailed and complex plans that did not sustain the friction of battle very well. This resulted in repeatedly showing up at objectives with only part of the fleet present and part of the story because one part of the fleet wasn't talking to the other.

Yamato in an effort to hide his main force ended up leaving them dispersed so they couldn't support each other and ultimately allowed himself to be destroyed in detail instead of attacking in force.

The fact that we were reading the Japanese Naval code at this point can't be understated as well. We knew a lot more of what Yamato wanted to do than just that the target was Midway.

---

Nice comments. One small note that's a bit nit picking - Yamato was a battleship, Yamamoto was the admiral.

---

And both more or less met the same fate

CT'97 said:

---

cbr said:

---

there was just no cohesive strategic vision... seems like the whole war was literally 'well, they're embargoing us, we dont have much else to do, so let's see if we can freak them out with a surprise attack and hope they give up'

---

Careful, you just described our invasion plan for Iraq.

Quote:

---

back to midway, the whole point was to accomplish what pearl failed to do and sink the carriers. by then it was really already too late, the fleet carriers would be coming on line by the end of 42 anyway and the war was over then.

given that, they should have kept the fleet together, under their cap, with supporting destroyers etc., and as soon as they spotted the carriers they should have tried to close the distance during the air battle and take out the carriers with surface ships at any cost.

---

The Japanese Navy consistently planned very detailed and complex plans that did not sustain the friction of battle very well. This resulted in repeatedly showing up at objectives with only part of the fleet present and part of the story because one part of the fleet wasn't talking to the other.

Yamato in an effort to hide his main force ended up leaving them dispersed so they couldn't support each other and ultimately allowed himself to be destroyed in detail instead of attacking in force.

The fact that we were reading the Japanese Naval code at this point can't be understated as well. We knew a lot more of what Yamato wanted to do than just that the target was Midway.

---

Good discusion - though as to your joke, i've honestly come to wonder if the true goal of the iraq war and other post 9/11 actions wasnt simply to destabilize the mideast, destroy secular arab powers, create a radical islamic enemy and migration crisis, and create an american police state....

But thats a whole nother discussion.

Quote:

---

Nice comments. One small note that's a bit nit picking - Yamato was a battleship, Yamamoto was the admiral.

---

You are correct Sir, I am not sure how I didn't notice that.