No court has said that. In fact, they've all said quite the opposite, and they aren't going to change their minds now.WHOOP!'91 said:So where do people like me get the idea they are not liable for speech on their platform as long as they are not editorializing? Picking who can and who cannot be heard is editorializing.HTownAg98 said:No, they are not. There is no such thing as you are alleging in Section 230.WHOOP!'91 said:At a minimum, they are violating their Sec 230 protections and making a huge in-kind donation to Dem pols. With the garbage they let stand from China, Iran and Del Pols, they have no foundation to censor Trump and other Rep pols.HTownAg98 said:Then you must not have understood the holding in this case. Marsh involved company towns, because in this situation, the company town was acting as, and performing the exclusive functions of, wait for it...government. The sentence immediately after the one you posted says as much.Rick Burns said:
"Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it." MARSH v. STATE OF ALABAMA. 326 U.S. 501 (1946)
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/571/marsh-v-alabama
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/326/501Quote:
Thus, the owners of privately held bridges, ferries, turnpikes and railroads may not operate them as freely as a farmer does his farm. Since these facilities are built and operated primarily to benefit the public and since their operation is essentially a public function, it is subject to state regulation. And, though the issue is not directly analogous to the one before us we do want to point out by way of illustration that such regulation may not result in an operation of these facilities, even by privately owned companies, which unconstitutionally interferes with and discriminates against interstate commerce...
In our view the circumstance that the property rights to the premises where the deprivation of liberty, here involved, took place, were held by others than the public, is not sufficient to justify the State's permitting a corporation to govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties and the enforcement of such restraint by the application of a State statute. Insofar as the State has attempted to impose criminal punishment on appellant for undertaking to distribute religious literature in a company town, its action cannot stand. The case is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Facebook, Twitter, and Google are not state actors; they are not performing exclusive government functions. These are not legitimate lawsuits; they are tweets with a filing fee.