If the only thing we can truly know with certainty is our own individual mind's existence, it stands to reason, that in order to move forward with any meaningful life, we must accept as axiomatic, at least the idea that what we perceive via our senses is in someway indicative of a present reality. Is there any grounds outside of pragmatism for accepting this belief as an axiom? There are at least a couple for me. One, I have a deep intuition that the physical universe is real, that what I perceive is based on a physical reality. It seems preposterous to me that a different explanation would be correct even though I know there are other possible explanations with adequate explanatory power I cannot disprove. Two, it is the explanation that provides the most meaning to my experience.
We all agree on accepting the above axiom, but why should I stop there? Do I not have similar grounds for believing in objective morality? I have a deep intuition that there really is right and wrong. It seems preposterous to me that they are simply constructs programmed into me via natural selection without any basis in external realities. Objective morals also provide a more meaningful explanation to my experience. Without them right and wrong describe mere preference, which runs counter to how I experience emotion related to the two.
Is that not grounds enough for rationally believing in objective morality? Is it less rational to believe in objective morality than it is to believe in the reality of the physical universe? If so, why?
We all agree on accepting the above axiom, but why should I stop there? Do I not have similar grounds for believing in objective morality? I have a deep intuition that there really is right and wrong. It seems preposterous to me that they are simply constructs programmed into me via natural selection without any basis in external realities. Objective morals also provide a more meaningful explanation to my experience. Without them right and wrong describe mere preference, which runs counter to how I experience emotion related to the two.
Is that not grounds enough for rationally believing in objective morality? Is it less rational to believe in objective morality than it is to believe in the reality of the physical universe? If so, why?