quote:

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The meaning of life and the afterlife

Consider this intuition:

1) If this earthly life is all there is, our lives are insufficiently meaningful.

I think this is an intuition a lot of ordinary people have. But now let's turn this fact—the fact that people have the intuition in (1)—into a puzzle. It doesn't seem at all easy to find an argument for (1). After all, it seems like our earthly lives are meaningful on their own: they provide opportunities for the practice of the intellectual and moral virtues, and such practice seems to be "sufficiently" meaningful. (Sufficiently for what? I guess sufficiently for us to say that our lives "have real meaning". This is vague.) Maybe there is some easy-to-fall-for unsound argument (compare the case of the common intuition that there is a problem between omniscience and free will; there, it is easy to attribute that intuition to the existence of a modally fallacious argument together with the mistaken idea that backwards causation is impossible, which mistaken idea may rest on some fallacious arguments as well), but I don't actually know of one. Rather, the intuition about (1) seems quite direct.
Maybe there is a non-cognitive explanation, tied to the selective advantages of our believing (1). As a general methodological principle, however, I want to avoid such non-cognitive evolutionary explanations of beliefs absent particular evidence, because that path leads to scepticism, besides being strewn with unevidenced just-so tales.

Let me suggest one cognitive explanation: People intuit (1) because they have a more basic perception that:

2) The main meaning of our earthly lives comes from or is largely shaped by the meaning that these lives have in the light of our lives after death.

Now, there is an argument from (2) to one interpretation of (1). If (2) holds, the main kind of meaning that our lives have is in fact dependent on an afterlife. Thus, there is a true counterfactual that says that:

3) If there were no afterlife, then our lives would be insufficiently meaningful, where "insufficiently" is measured relative to the kind of meaning that they in fact have.

And then people report the counterfactual fact in (3) as (1).
Now let me add one further twist. After all, there are people who don't believe in an afterlife but who still find (1) very plausible—and their belief in (1) then makes them feel terrible. (Cf. Mickey in the middle portion of Woody Allen's Hannah and Her Sisters.) They cannot justify (1) by means of (3). Nonetheless, (1) appears well-entrenched.

Here I want to use a really clever idea that Dan Johnson gives in a recent issue of Faith and Philosophy to examine our justification for the possibility premise in the ontological argument. Johnson thinks that the premise that possibly God exists is a premise that we derive from the claim that God exists, and the latter claim is one we have prior knowledge of by means of the sensus divinitatis. An atheist may then lose the justified belief that God exists, while keeping the derived belief that possibly God exists, with this derived being still justified by its past justification. The S5 ontological argument can then be used to leverage this derived belief into a full-blown belief that God exists. This is circular—and yet perfectly justified, as long as the atheist did not have good reason to cease believing in God. Johnson makes a similar move with regard to the cosmological argument, but I am less willing to go there with him.

Anyway, applying Johnson's idea to the case at hand is a cinch. We have a prior intuition that (2). From this, we derive (3) and then (1), right sense of "sufficiently". Even if we lose a belief in an afterlife, we can hold on to (1), which is a kind of shadow of the deep intuition that (2). We can even give an argument from (1) to (2), which is in a sense circular, but not viciously so:

4) Given the fact that a finite life of intellectual and moral virtue could be meaningful, (1) only has a reasonable interpretation on which it is true if (3) and (2) are true.

5) The intuition in (1) does have a reasonable interpretation on which it is true.

6) Therefore, (2) is true.

I think we do, in fact, have a very resilient (but perhaps not indestructible) pull towards (5).

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http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/

[This message has been edited by letters at random (edited 8/4/2009 6:21p).]

Why is our intuition a logical basis for the existence of an afterlife?

Why should our lives be "sufficiently meaningful"?

What does "sufficiently meaningful" even mean?

On sensus divinitatis: even if everyone believes something, why does that make it true?

[This message has been edited by calef (edited 8/4/2009 7:32p).]

This:

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This is circular—and yet perfectly justified, as long as the atheist did not have good reason to cease believing in God.

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Then this:

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I want to avoid such non-cognitive evolutionary explanations of beliefs absent particular evidence, because that path leads to scepticism, besides being strewn with unevidenced just-so tales.

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I want to nominate the dumbest arguer of all time. "Lets forget science, and have a circle jerk. An atheist wont be able to keep up."

I should have known better than to post this here. You have no idea what you are talking about, and I lack the inclination to teach you. (Since you obviously do not know what non-cognitivism means in this context, I really suggest you be less of an arrogant ass in your reply).

Alexander Pruss, by the way, had a PhD in math when we was like 19. He taught at Georgetown after finishing his PhD in Philosophy.

Show some humility, man.

[This message has been edited by letters at random (edited 8/4/2009 7:49p).]

Smart people can still be susceptible to the delusion.

Irony, huh?

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You have no idea what you are talking about, and I lack the inclination to teach you.

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I really suggest you be less of an arrogant ass in your reply

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Irony?

ShootBoyDang, you cannot prove it is a delusion, so your ridicule makes you look like a 14 year old twerp.

bobo:

your criticism of my post is, to an extent, fair. However, I really think my comments must be taken as a reaction against shootdangboy dismissing the thoughts of Pruss as being "dumb" and "a circle jerk."


That being said, I ought not have added the line that I "lacked the inclination to teach him."

So, your criticism is accepted.



(But, to be honest, I have no inclination to engage him in a discussion of the technical points of the post I copied and pasted. It would be fruitless; and I don't think it is arrogant to think that I should know the jargon of technical philosophy better than someone who is not studying it).


But..again...I did act like an ass with that comment. I apologize.







[This message has been edited by letters at random (edited 8/4/2009 8:09p).]

Irony?

Yes, irony.

[This message has been edited by The Lone Stranger (edited 8/4/2009 8:04p).]

Since everyone on these boards seems to be so fond of name-dropping logical fallacies, arguing from authority would like a word with you, letters.

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arguing from authority would like a word with you, letters.

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Really? What exactly did I argue from authority? I used the fact that Pruss had a PhD in math at a young age to be evidence that he wasn't dumb. I hardly think that could be considered arguing from authority.

The fact he got a phd in math at a young age doesn't at all rate his argumentative or philosophical skills as "smart".

If you want to think that having two PhDs from prestigious universities and being a professor at Georgetown fails to provide evidence that someone isn't dumb, then so be it. But is still isn't arguing from authority to conclude that such facts do constitute said evidence.

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The fact he got a phd in math at a young age doesn't at all rate his argumentative or philosophical skills as "smart".

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Here's some brutal honesty:
I've read a number of ShootBoyDang's posts. Of the active anti-theist posters, only muster ag knows less about philosophy and makes poorer arguments on this board than he does. So, as a result, I really don't think Pruss's credentials have to be mentioned to establish any credibility. The person passing judgement truly wouldn't know one way or the other.

Ah ad hominen, so oft used one thinks thee cheapened!


My point is that his credentials have absolutely nothing to do with the content of his argument. I don't give two sticks about his degrees or where he teaches, if he's in a field where ideas and argument are two of the most important things, I sure as hell better better not be left wanting after hardly a page of prose.

The dude begs questions like Kim John Il in the Vatican.

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My point is that his credentials have absolutely nothing to do with the content of his argument. I don't give two sticks about his degrees or where he teaches, if he's in a field where ideas and argument are two of the most important things, I sure as hell better better not be left wanting after hardly a page of prose.

The dude begs questions like Kim John Il in the Vatican.

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Awesome. We can discuss that then. But ShootBoyDang mischaracterized his argument and called it dumb. I'm all for philosophical discussion and disagreement. I don't give a crap what anyone's credentials are either. But I also don't have much patience for a mental midget like SBD to make dumb statements while patting himself on the back for his own intelligence in a grand act of self-delusion.

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My point is that his credentials have absolutely nothing to do with the content of his argument.

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Well, congratulations. You have hammered home a point that nobody here disagrees with.

Of course, what you dsaid was that I made an argument from authority. Of course, I did no such thing. I offered as evidence the intellectual achievements of the man in rebuttal to the claim that he was dumb.

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only muster ag knows less about philosophy and makes poorer arguments on this board than he does.

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I like living in Nix's head.

We should probably try and make the comments here a little more charitable.

First, Dr Puss is not dumb or simplistic. LAR mentioned his PhD's. Go read his CV as well, you can find it online. You don't get books published by Cambridge University Press without being smart and getting published in peer reviewed venues such as he has. So the dumb comments from before was ironically a dumb one to make.

Second, any argument takes place within a frame of certain assumptions being true. Those other questions are fair game, but it is uncharitable to call the man out simply because he is making an argument within a certain content. Lord knows the circles he would drive around each one of us given the chance to address those questions as well.

To be fair, the same goes with a respectable and knowledge atheist philosophers. I've read JL Mackie, Michael Martin, and others, but I won't pretend that they stupid, intellectually deficient, or what have you, when I read arguments that they make within a certain content with various assumptions that I disagree with and find unreasonable. That said, they both could probably also run circles around most theists here if they so wished (well, maybe not Mackie, given that he died a while back, but you get the point).

A point of contention that most skeptics here do not have seems to get them to admit, is that theism cannot even be seen as an intellectually respectable position. Sorry to break the sudden news, but the philosophical tides have turned, and it is well past time to face the music. Supposing they would be willing to get the chip off their shoulders and if they would actually take the time to read some good theist philosophers would do many of the skeptical posters here a lot of good. If you still don't agree, then sure, whatever and go disagree. But just stop playing pretend with the empty rhetorical nonsense with the "lol science & dumb and assuming theist" type of posts.

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...arguing from authority would like a word with you, letters.

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Umm, no. The "argument from authority" is committed when it is asserted that, because Bob Smith has a PhD in whateverology his statements should be uncritically accepted as truth. It is not an argument from authority to suggest that because Bob Smith has that PhD that his statements should be approached with respect, whether or not one ends up agreeing with them. This is especially true if Bob Smith has his PhD in the particular field under discussion.

http://skepticwiki.org/index.php/Argument_from_Authority
Note that, as a courtesy to the "freethinkers" on board, I linked to skepticwiki.

Nixter, I respectfully disagree. Boy is less credible than muster, by a bit. No small achievement, that.

quote:

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The fact he got a phd in math at a young age doesn't at all rate his argumentative or philosophical skills as "smart".

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I would suggest that PhD's in Mathematics and Philosophy mean that he is well-educated in Mathematics and Philosophy. Perhaps you meant to say that "well-educated != smart". I suspect, though, that the primary reason you're taking this tack is because he is using his education to argue in favor of theism.

An illustration may be in order. I work in EMS, as an EMT-B. That places me on the lower end of the EMS pecking order. One of the Paramedics on my shift(they're on the upper end of that pecking order) is an atheist. He and I have our disagreements, though always cordially and respectfully (some of you on this board could learn from that). I count him as a friend, a good friend, though I think him grievously wrong-headed in many respects. But when he opines about things related to Emergency Medicine, I shut my mouth and listen. He is better-educated than I, and has much more experience. He is in fact the best medic I know, and I know quite a few. I have checked and discovered him to be wrong on only a few occasions, but those errors in no way make me less attentive when asking his advice, and when I feel that I must disagree with him, I do so respectfully. What I do NOT do is dismiss his medical opinions because I find his religious (non)belief lacking in substance.

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Smart people can still be susceptible to the delusion.

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[This message has been edited by Longstreet (edited 8/4/2009 11:01p).]

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Curriculum Vitae
Alexander R. Pruss

May, 2009

Department of Philosophy
Baylor University

Personal
Born January 5, 1973. Canadian citizen and permanent U.S. resident. Married. Two children.
Education
Ph.D., Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, August, 2001
Dissertation title: Possible Worlds: What They Are Good For and What They Are, advised by Nicholas Rescher
Ph.D., Mathematics, University of British Columbia, Spring, 1996
Dissertation title: Symmetrization, Green’s Functions, Harmonic Measures and Difference Equations, advised by John J. F. Fournier
B.Sc. (hon.), Mathematics and Physics, University of Western Ontario, Spring, 1991
Positions held
2007-present: Associate Professor (tenured), Department of Philosophy, Baylor University
2006-2007: Associate Professor (tenured), Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University
2001-2006: Assistant Professor (tenure-track), Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University
2003-2007: Faculty in Residence to the Culture and Performance Living and Learning Community
Areas of specialization
Metaphysics, Philosophy of Religion, Applied Ethics
Areas of competence
Philosophy of Science, Ancient Philosophy, Aquinas, Leibniz, Kierkegaard
Fellowships, grants and awards
While on faculty at Georgetown University
Junior Faculty Fellowship (Fall 2005)
National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Stipend (2002)
Georgetown Summer Academic Grant (2002, 2003 and 2006)
Living and Learning Community Advisor of the Year Award from Georgetown University Residence Life (2006 and 2007; the Culture and Performance community that I advised itself received a Community of the Year Award in 2006)
During graduate study
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Graduate Fellowship (1997–2000)
Fellowship to attend week-long workshop on the historical Jesus, Westmont College, Santa Barbara, California (2000; nominated by Society of Christian Philosophers)
Andrew W. Mellon Fellowship (1996–1997)
The Izaak Walton Killam Memorial Predoctoral Fellowship (1995–1996)
First Prize in Judaic Seminar’s Purim Essay Contest (1994)
W. Reymont Foundation Scholarship (1991–1992)
Mackenzie King Open Scholarship (1991; one awarded in all of Canada; declined)
The “1967” National Sciences and Engineering Research Council Graduate Scholarship (1991–1995)
Publications in Philosophy
Books
Alexander R. Pruss, The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment, Cambridge University Press, 2006
Richard M. Gale and Alexander R. Pruss (eds.), The Existence of God, with 30,000 word introduction, International Research Library of Philosophy, Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing, 2003
One Body, under contract from University of Notre Dame Press. Manuscript sent to publisher.
Peer-reviewed articles
“Probability and the open future view”, Faith and Philosophy, accepted
“Another step in divine command dialectics”, Faith and Philosophy, accepted
“The ontological argument and the motivational centers of lives”, Religious Studies, accepted
“A Gödelian ontological argument improved”, Religious Studies, accepted
“The essential divine perfection objection to the free will defense”, Religious Studies 44 (2008) 433–444
“Toner on judgment and eternalism”, Faith and Philosophy 25 (2008)
“How not to reconcile the creation of human beings with evolution”, Philosophia Christi 9 (2007) 145–163
“Prophecy without middle knowledge”, Faith and Philosophy 24 (2007)
“Conjunctions, disjunctions and Lewisian semantics for counterfactuals”, Synthese 156 (2007) 33–52
“Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit: Arguments new and old for the Principle of Sufficient Reason”, in: J. Campbell, M. O’Rourke and H. Silverstein (eds.), Causation and Explanation, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007
“A restricted Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Cosmological Argument”, Religious Studies 40 (2004) 165–179
“David Lewis’s counterfactual arrow of time”, Noûs 37 (2003) 606–637
“A new free will defense”, Religious Studies 39 (2003) 211–233
“Post’s critiques of omniscience and of talk of ‘all true propositions’”, Philo 6 (2003) 49–58 (special issue in honor of Richard M. Gale)
“Not out of lust but in accordance with truth: Theological and philosophical reflections on sexuality and reality”, Logos 6 (2003) 51–80
with Richard M. Gale, “A response to Almeida and Judisch”, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 53 (2003) 65–72
“Christian faith and belief”, Faith and Philosophy 19 (2002) 291–303
“Śaṃkara’s principle and two ontomystical arguments”, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 49 (2001) 111–120
“The cardinality objection to David Lewis’s modal realism”, Philosophical Studies 104 (2001) 167–176
“Christian sexual ethics and teleological organicity”, The Thomist 64 (2000) 71–100
with Richard M. Gale, “A new cosmological argument”, Religious Studies 35 (1999) 461–476; reprinted in Richard M. Gale and Alexander R. Pruss (eds.), The Existence of God
“Professor Lucas’ second epistemic way”, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 45 (1999) 189–194
“Lying and speaking your interlocutor’s language”, The Thomist 63 (1999) 439–453
“Leibniz’s approach to individuation and Strawson’s criticisms”, Studia Leibnitiana 30 (1998) 116–123
“The Hume-Edwards Principle and the Cosmological Argument”, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 43 (1998) 149–165; reprinted in Richard M. Gale and Alexander R. Pruss (eds.), The Existence of God
Invited contributions
“Some recent progress on the cosmological argument”, forthcoming in: K. Timpe (ed.), Arguing about Religion, Routledge
“Altruism, normalcy and God”, forthcoming in: S. Coakley and M. Nowak (eds.), Evolution, Games, and God, Boston MA: Harvard University Press
“Brower and Rea’s constitution account of the Trinity”, forthcoming in: T. McCall and M. Rea (eds.)
“Leibnizian cosmological arguments”, forthcoming in: W. L. Craig and J. P. Moreland (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, Oxford: Blackwell
“Programs, bugs, DNA and a design argument”, forthcoming in: Y. Nagasawa and E. Wielenberg (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Religion, Palgrave MacMillan
“The Eucharist: Real presence and real absence”, forthcoming in: Thomas Flint and Michael Rae (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology, Oxford: Oxford University Press
“Complicity, fetal tissue, and vaccines”, National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 6 (2006) 461–470
“Ultimate explanations”, Contemporary Pragmatism 2 (2005) 35–48
with Richard M. Gale, “Cosmological and teleological arguments”, in: William J. Wainwright (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005
“The actual and the possible”, in: Richard M. Gale (ed.), Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics, Oxford: Blackwell, 2002, pp. 317–333
Other non-refereed publications
“Artificial intelligence and personal identity”, forthcoming in: Faith and Philosophy
“On two problems of divine simplicity”, in Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Volume 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2008), 150-167
“Fine and coarse tuning, normalizability and probabilistic reasoning”, Philosophia Christi 7 (2005) 405–424
“Cooperation with past evil and use of cell-lines derived from aborted fetuses”, Linacre Quarterly 71 (2004) 335–350; to be reprinted in: Helen Watt (ed.), Cooperation, Complicity and Conscience: Problems in Healthcare, Science, Law and Public Policy, London: Linacre Center
with Richard M. Gale, “A Response to Oppy and to Davey and Clifton”, Religious Studies 38 (2002) 89–99
“I was once a fetus: That is why abortion is wrong”, Life and Learning 12 (2002) 169–182
Book reviews
Review of Arguing about Gods by Graham Oppy, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007
Review of Why there is Something rather than Nothing by Bede Rundle, Philosophia Christi
Review of Thomas Aquinas’s Trinitarian Theology: A Study in Trinitarian Method by Timothy L. Smith, Speculum, 2005
Review of Nature and Understanding: The Metaphysics and Method of Science by Nicholas Rescher, Review of Metaphysics, 2002
Review of Other Times: Philosophical Perspectives on Past, Present and Future by David Cockburn, Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 39 (2000) 199–202
with Richard M. Gale, Review of Atheism & Theism by J.J.C. Smart and J. Haldane, Faith and Philosophy 16 (1999) 106–113
Conference papers and other academic presentations
“Care and Union”, presentation for workshop on the work of Nicholas Wolterstorff, Baylor University, April, 2009
(with Todd Buras) “Motivating the Possibility Premise”, Metaphysics and Philosophy of Religion Workshop, University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio, TX, March, 2009
“One Body: Reflections on Christian Sexual Ethics”, University of St. Thomas, Houston, November, 2008
“Artificial Intelligence and Personal Identity”, Science and Human Nature: Russian and Western Perspectives Conference, Baylor University, November, 2008
“Cooperating with evildoers”, Keynote Address for the Society of Christian Philosophers Eastern Division and Albert the Great Lecture of the Department of Philosophy, Niagara University, Niagara NY, April, 2008
“A New Way to Reconcile Creation with Evolutionary Biology”, Baylor Philosophy of Religion Conference, San Antonio, TX, February, 2008
“Identity and the Copying of Minds”, UTSA Philosophy Symposium, University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio, TX, February, 2008
“Altruism and Normalcy”, symposium on the evolution of cooperation, Harvard University, May, 2007
“Love and obedience”, Society of Christian Philosophers Eastern Division, Columbia SC, April, 2007
“From intention to accomplishment”, Baylor University, January 2007 and Workshop on Double Effect, Georgetown University, April, 2007
“Double effect in recent philosophy” (working title), American Maritain Association, satellite meeting at the Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Washington, December, 2006
“A defense of the B-theory against the intranslatability and emotional attitude arguments”, Philosophy of Time Society satellite meeting at the Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Washington, December, 2006
“Materialism and Pelagianism”, Society of Christian Philosophers, satellite meeting at the American Academy of Religion Annual Meeting, Washington, November, 2006
“Defending the cosmological argument”, National Faculty Leadership Conference, Alexandria, VA, June, 2006
“Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit: Arguments new and old for the Principle of Sufficient Reason”, invited symposium presentation at the Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Chicago, April, 2006
“Time, tense and language: A defense of the B-theory”, University of Delaware, April, 2006
“How not to reconcile evolution and creation”, University of Notre Dame, March, 2006
“Conjunctions, disjunctions and Lewisian semantics for counterfactuals”, Logic and Linguistics Group, Georgetown University, February, 2006
“Why isn’t altruism abnormal? Contemporary cosmological and teleological arguments for the existence of God, and the evolution of altruism”, Harvard Divinity School, December, 2005
“The Jesuit Ratio Studiorum of 1599”, Joy in the Truth conference, University of Notre Dame, September, 2005
“Western Theism and Evolution”, short paper presented to start discussion at the Philosophers in Jesuit Education satellite meeting at the Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Chicago, Boston, January, 2005
“The cosmos as a work of art”, presented at the Epiphanies of Beauty conference, University of Notre Dame, November, 2004
“Cooperation with past evil and use of cell-lines derived from aborted fetuses”, presented at the Center for Clinical Bioethics, Georgetown University Hospital, spring 2004
“On three problems of divine simplicity”, presented at the Society of Christian Philosophers satellite session at the American Catholic Philosophical Association annual meeting, October, 2003
“Love, deontology, and double effect”, presented at the Formation and Renewal conference, University of Notre Dame, October, 2003
“Eight tempting big-picture errors in ethics”, presented at the Life and Learning conference, Georgetown University, May, 2003
“Fine and coarse tuning, renormalizability and probabilistic reasoning”, workshop on fine-tuning, University of Notre Dame, April, 2003
Invited commentator, conference in honor of Richard M. Gale, University of Pittsburgh, April 5, 2003
“Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit: Arguments new and old for the Principle of Sufficient Reason”, presented at the satellite session on analytic philosophy at the American Catholic Philosophical Association annual meeting, Cincinnati, November, 2002, and in variant form at the Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference, University of Idaho and Washington State University, May 2-4, 2003
“Maternal love and abortion”, presented at the “From Death to Life: Agendas for Reform” conference at Notre Dame University, September 28, 2002
“I was once a fetus”, presented at the Life and Learning conference, Ann Arbor, May 31, 2002
“A new free will defense”, presented at the Central Division Meeting of the Society of Christian Philosophers, March 8, 2002
“The counterfactual arrow of time”, presented at the Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, February 1, 2002
“Faith, paradox, reason and the argumentum Spiritus Sancti in Climacus and Kierkegaard”, presented at the meeting of the Søren Kierkegaard Society at the Central APA Conference, 2001
“The meaning of sexual love”, presented at the interdisciplinary “Conversations with the Other” graduate student conference, Duquesne University, March 24, 2001
Other presentations outside the regular classroom
“God, evil and art”, talk to Baylor Philosophy Club, September 2008
“Love and sex: Philosophical reflections”, Christians and Culture Lecture, St. Paul Center, Pittsburgh, PA, December 2006
On faculty and curriculum committee for “Ethics, Mind and Nature in the Analytic and Thomistic Traditions” week-long summer graduate seminar, Witherspoon Institute, Princeton, NJ, August, 2006
Guest lecture on Principle of Sufficient Reason, graduate philosophy of religion course, Rutgers University, December, 2005
Presentation on free will to Philosophy and Faith lecture series, Georgetown University, Fall, 2004
“Ethics mis-understood”, presented to DFE foreign service fraternity, September, 2004
apologetics workshop for American University pro-life student group, April, 2004
“Eight tempting big-picture errors in ethics”, presented at the Cardinal O’Connor Conference, Georgetown University, January, 2004
presentation on relativism and ethics at high school, Port Angeles, WA, May 2003
“Religion and the Limits of Science”, presentation at high school, Port Angeles, WA, May, 2003
apologetics workshop for Georgetown University Right to Life student group, April, 2002
with Robert Clifton, Kevin Davey and Richard M. Gale, debate on “A new cosmological argument” (Gale and Pruss, 1999), in front of Philosophy Honor Society, University of Pittsburgh, March, 2001
Publications in Mathematics and Related Fields
Peer-reviewed articles
“A strictly stationary, N-tuplewise independent counterexample to the central limit theorem”, Stochastic Processes and Their Applications, accepted
“A general Hsu-Robbins-Erdős type estimate of tail probabilities of sums of independent identically distributed random variables”, Periodica Mathematica Hungarica 46 (2003) 181–201
“Discrete harmonic measure, Green’s functions and symmetrization: A unified probabilistic approach”, Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska (Sectio A) 55 (2001) 139–174
with Stephen J. Montgomery-Smith, “A comparison inequality for sums of independent random variables”, Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications 254 (2001) 35–42
with Dominik Szynal, “On the central limit theorem for negatively correlated random variables with negatively correlated squares”, Stochastic Processes and Their Applications 87 (2000) 299–309
“Symmetrization inequalities for difference equations on graphs”, Advances in Applied Mathematics 22 (1999) 338–370
“A remark on the Moser-Aubin inequality for radially symmetric functions on the sphere”, Canadian Mathematical Bulletin 42 (1999) 478–485
“Radial rearrangement, harmonic measures and extensions of Beurling's shove theorem”, Arkiv för Matematik 37 (1999) 183–210
“A bounded N-tuplewise independent and identically distributed counterexample to the CLT”, Probability Theory and Related Fields 111 (1998) 323–332
“Discrete convolution-rearrangement inequalities and the Faber-Krahn inequality on regular trees”, Duke Mathematical Journal 91 (1998) 463–514
“A maximal inequality for sums of exchangeable random variables”, Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society 126 (1998) 1811–1819
“Steiner symmetry, horizontal convexity and some Dirichlet problems”, Indiana University Mathematics Journal 46 (1997) 863–895
“A two-sided estimate in the Hsu-Robbins-Erdős law of large numbers”, Stochastic Processes and their Applications 70 (1997) 173–180
“Comparisons between tail probabilities of sums of independent symmetric random variables”, Annales de l’Institut Henri Poincaré – Probabilités & Statistiques 33 (1997) 651–671
“One-dimensional random walks, decreasing rearrangements and discrete Steiner symmetrization”, Annales de l’Institut Henri Poincaré – Probabilités & Statistiques 33 (1997) 83–112
“On Spataru’s extension of the Hsu-Robbins-Erdös law of large numbers”, Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications 199 (1996) 558–576
“Remarks on summability of series formed from deviation probabilities of sums of independent identically distributed random variables”, Ukraïns´kii Matematichnii Zhurnal 48 (1996) 569–572; reprinted in: Ukrainian Mathematical Journal 48 (1996) 631–635
“Three counterexamples for a question concerning Green’s functions and circular symmetrization”, Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society 124 (1996) 1755–1761
“Randomly sampled Riemann sums and complete convergence in the law of large numbers for a case without identical distribution”, Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society 124 (1996) 919–929
with Alec Matheson, “Properties of extremal functions for some nonlinear functionals on Dirichlet spaces”, Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 348 (1996) 2901–2930
“Nonexistence of maxima for perturbations of some inequalities with critical growth”, Canadian Mathematical Bulletin 39 (1996) 227–237
“A remark on non-existence of an algebra norm for the algebra of continuous functions on a topological space admitting an unbounded continuous function”, Studia Mathematica 116 (1995) 295–297
Non-refereed and popular publications
“Symmetrization, Green's Functions, harmonic measures and difference equations”, Dissertation Summaries in Mathematics 1 (1996) 67–74
with Zvi Margaliot and Patrick D. Surry, “Finding Optimal Steiner Trees”, Journal of Undergraduate Mathematics and Its Applications 12 (3), Fall 1991, 265–278
“A star goes down the cosmic drain or what happens when a star falls down a black hole”, Astronomy London (Ontario), 23 (3), March 1991, 13–15
“Shanks’ transform and series improvement”, Mathematical Mayhem 2 (4), June 1990
“Spherical trigonometry”, Mathematical Mayhem 1 (4), June 1989
“Artificial Intelligence in politics”, Youth Science News 8 (3), May–June 1988, 19–20
“Artificial Intelligence in politics”, Physics in Canada 45 (2), March 1989, 66–67
Presentations in pure and applied mathematics
“Some new results on tail probabilities of sums of independent identically distributed random variables”, seminar, Institute of Mathematics, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin, Poland, May, 1999
“Symmetrization, Green’s functions, harmonic measures and difference equations”, doctoral thesis defense, University of British Columbia, April 1, 1996
“Inequalities for tail probabilities of sums of independent random variables”, Probability Seminar, Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, February 5, 1996
“Radial rearrangement, Beurling's shove theorem and the Chang-Marshall inequality”, invited Complex Analysis Seminar, Mathematics Department, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden, October 3, 1995
“Discrete symmetrization, harmonic measure and the Faber-Krahn inequality on trees”, informal seminar, Mathematics Department, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden, October 2, 1995
“From the Pólya-Szegö symmetrization inequality for Dirichlet integrals to comparison theorems for p.d.e.'s on manifolds”, 8th International Symposium on Classical Analysis, Kazimierz Dolny, Poland, September 18-24, 1995
“Extremals of nonlinear functionals on the unit ball of Dirichlet space, symmetrization theory and drunkards in dangerous blind alleys”, invited seminar, Institute of Mathematics, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin, Poland, September 7, 1995
“Rates of convergence in the law of large numbers and randomly sampled Riemann sums”, invited seminar, Institute of Mathematics, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin, Poland, September 7, 1995
“Nonexistence of maxima for perturbations of some inequalities with critical growth”, Fourth International Conference on Function Spaces, Zielona Góra, Poland, August 28–September 1, 1995
“Extremals for some non-linear functionals on unit balls of Dirichlet spaces”, International Conference on Approximation Theory and Function Series, Budapest, Hungary, August 21-25, 1995
“Extremals of nonlinear functionals on the ball of the Dirichlet space, some conjectures concerning least harmonic majorants, and symmetrization”, invited Complex Analysis Seminar, Department of Mathematics, University of Washington, Seattle, January 10, 1995
with Alec Matheson, “Extremal functions for some nonlinear functionals on the Dirichlet space”, Analysis Seminar, Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, July 26, 1994
with Alec Matheson, “Some questions on a nonlinear functional on the Dirichlet space”, Conference on the Interaction Between Functional Analysis, Harmonic Analysis, and Probability, Columbia, Missouri, May 30–June 3, 1994
“Convergence of randomly sampled Riemann sums to the Lebesgue integral”, Function Spaces Conference, Edwardsville, Illinois, May 23–28, 1994
“Randomly sampled Riemann sums and complete convergence”, Probability Seminar, Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, May 4, 1994
with Zvi Margaliot and Patrick D. Surry, “Network optimization”, Mathematical Contest in Modeling Minisymposium, Second International Conference on Industrial and Applied Mathematics, Washington, D.C., July 12, 1991
with Patrick J. Mann, “Relativistic smoothed particle hydrodynamics,” Applied Mathematics Lecture Series, Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Western Ontario, January 1991
Philosophy dissertation
Title
Possible Worlds: What They Are and What They Are Good For
Committee
Nicholas Rescher (chair), University Professor of Philosophy
John Earman (second reader), Professor of History and Philosophy of Science
Robert Brandom, Distinguished Service Professor of Philosophy
Kenneth Manders, Associate Professor of Philosophy
Teaching experience
Cosmological and ontological arguments (graduate)
Modality and causality (graduate)
Metaphysics proseminar (graduate)
Plato
Augustine and Aquinas on the Trinity
Introduction to Philosophy
Philosophy of Love and Sex
Leibniz and Spinoza
Introduction to Ethics
History of Ancient Philosophy
Philosophy of Religion (undergraduate and graduate)
Third Semester Calculus
Second Semester Calculus
Professional experience and service
Faculty in Residence connected to the Culture and Performance Living and Learning Community (2003–07)
On selection panel for 2003 and 2004 National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Stipend Programs
Refereed book manuscripts for Cambridge University Press and Blackwell
Refereed papers for British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Dialectica, Erkenntnis, Faith and Philosophy, Noûs, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Religious Studies, University of Pittsburgh Philosophy Graduate Student Conference, Canadian Mathematical Journal, Computational Statistics and Data Analysis, Discrete Mathematics, Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, and Mathematische Zeitschriften
Wrote about a dozen reviews for Mathematical Reviews
Guest researcher at the Institute of Mathematics, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin, Poland (one week in 1999, and two weeks in 1995)
Research in the interaction of stars and black holes, supervised by Professor Patrick J. Mann, Departments of Astronomy and Applied Mathematics, University of Western Ontario (Summer, 1989 and 1990)
Research in solid state quantum physics, supervised by Professors M. G. Cottam and M. R. Singh, Department of Physics, University of Western Ontario (Summer, 1988)
Languages
English (dominant and fluent), Polish (fluent), French (reading; passed language requirement exams in philosophy and mathematics), Russian (reading), Classical Hebrew (reading with dictionary), Greek (Koinê, and Classical, mainly Aristotle; reading with dictionary), Classical Syriac/Aramaic (rudimentary reading with dictionary and reference works), Ugaritic (rudimentary reading with dictionary and reference works)

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This post really has no point other than to be amazed at his cv. It is freaking incredible. He is a scientist who has worked in 8 languages and has a PhD in philosophy.





[This message has been edited by letters at random (edited 8/4/2009 11:20p).]

Yeah, so.....?

When a smart person says: let's forget about evidence because that leads to dis belief, we will only focus on a circular argument to show god exists.

Attacking this statement makes me not credible and an ass? It also illustrates that I don't know much about philosophy?

quote:

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...Pruss's credentials have to be mentioned to establish any credibility. The person passing judgement truly wouldn't know one way or the other.

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Nor does he care one way or the other in this situation.

What is the different in drinking coolaid and just not thinking about evidence? It seems they are on the same line with one being a bit more extreme. When a smart person says something, it seems like everyone on this thread is too scared to question it. So instead of thinking about what is being said from a different point of view, you attack me because I must not be worthy of attacking. I'm just a little wittle pawn attacking a big ole king.

[This message has been edited by ShootBoyDang (edited 8/5/2009 6:23a).]

And nobody answered my questions! :-(

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Why is our intuition a logical basis for the existence of an afterlife?

Why should our lives be "sufficiently meaningful"?

What does "sufficiently meaningful" even mean?

On sensus divinitatis: even if everyone believes something, why does that make it true?

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1. First, nobody said it was. Secondly, if you don't give some justification to some intuition, then there can never be any basis for belief and/or knowledge. (For example, our belief in the law of non-contradiction is really based on nothing more than an intuition.)

2. Nobody said they should.

3. Read the post again. He provides one possible answer. Otherwise, he shares your concern about the vagueness of the intuition in question.

4. Again, nobody says it does.


Your questions indicate that you didn't follow his thought process.

[This message has been edited by letters at random (edited 8/5/2009 9:28a).]

This may be a derail, but this has always been my thought about the afterlife.


Who I am as a person is a combination of a few things, but, most important among those things is my brain.

It is very well understood that different parts of our brain make up different parts of who we are, how we function, etc. Our personalities and who we are as a individuals is directly related to our brains (as a combination of genetic and external influences).

For instance, if someone gets their arms and legs cut off, they're still the same person. But if someone suffers a serious head injury, their personality changes significantly.

Even slight changes in brain function can have serious effects on personality; including addiction, depression, psychosis, speech, cognitive abilities, knowing the difference between reality and fiction, appetite, sexual function, the list goes on and on.

So, if our brain decomposes when we die, how exactly does our personality leave our bodies to go somewhere else? I mean hell, the brain is the most complicated organ on the planet, and it takes an entire brain to make up who we are as individuals.

How can "who we are" possibly be transported elsewhere, if our brain is clearly rotting in the ground?

In other words, an "afterlife" is absolutely impossible. Anyone who thinks differently is kidding themselves.

quote:

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In other words, an "afterlife" is absolutely impossible. Anyone who thinks differently is kidding themselves.

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mmmmmO.K.

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mmmmmO.K.

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Did you read the rest of it? Care to refute any of my actual points?

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“Extremals for some non-linear functionals on unit balls of Dirichlet spaces”

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Who wouldn't be a big fan of this paper?

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it takes an entire brain to make up who we are as individuals.

How can "who we are" possibly be transported elsewhere, if our brain is clearly rotting in the ground?

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So if someone lets say 500 years in the future arranges matter in a way to exactly reconstruct your brain that had decomposed would you come back to life?

What if they even used the exact matterial that had once composed your brain? Would YOU come back to life?

Cyprian,

Two points about your post, because it gets to the heart of something that has been bothering me about this board.

1st, It's really hard for a philosophical debate to get off the ground here because it seems that of the handful of posters that actually know some philosophy (there are at least two philosophy Ph.D. students on here), all of you come from the same Plantinga theist school.

As an expert in something, I am keenly aware of how easy it can be to shut down debate with non-experts by simply saying something along the lines of "well you are so ignorant about the basic premise of the discussion that your opinion doesn't even merit a response". Granted, you are usually more succinct than that, but you get the idea. It's sort of inevitable that a R&P board on a A&M related site would attract that crowd, but it would be really interesting for a non-expert like myself, to see two philosophy experts with differing views go head to head.

2nd, how mainstream is the Plantinga line of argument? I've looked up his CV (and I do enjoy a good CV comparing contest LAR.... ) and he is certainly respectable. However, from my limited knowledge of philosophy, and my more broad knowledge of academia, I would suspect that atheist philosophers are the vast majority.

amercer:

Those are all good points; there is nothing in your post I really disagree with. It can be frustrating reading a post written by someone who, while he is whole-heartedly convinced of the stupidity or delusional handicap of any who dare disagrees with him, nonetheless knows almost nothing about mainstream and important topics in philosophy. I sometimes allow it to bring out the poorer parts of my nature.

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I would suspect that atheist philosophers are the vast majority.

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"Vast" is an overstatement, and more and more theist philosophers plead their case every year. Theism is almost universally accepted as professionally respectable, and is becoming more and more common. (There was a time when it was almost not even considered respectable; about 40 years ago). That being said, you are probably right that most professional philosophers are atheists.

Lets forget science, and have a circle jerk
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sounds like modern psychology.

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1. First, nobody said it was.

2. Nobody said they should.

3. Read the post again.

4. Again, nobody says it does.

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Pattern detected.