I remember hearing about this, but assumed it happened suddenly, vs. 45 minutes.

https://www.kbtx.com/2022/01/04/marine-officer-faces-discharge-over-training-mishap-that-killed-9/

Quote:

---

It took 45 minutes for the tank to sink and if the distress signal had been seen sooner, it's likely rescuers could have saved the troops, the report stated.

As the water levels continued rising, the troops who had only trained on land remained inside the broken-down tank in seas that were rougher than expected, according to the findings.

They were not told to remove their helmets, weapons and other gear, which prevented them from being able to escape. Their life jackets also may have prevented them from removing their body armor and proved useless in keeping them afloat because of the weight, according to the investigation. At least two of the troops had not completed their swimming certifications.

The emergency lights did not function, and no markings were put on a side hatch, leaving troops scrambling in the dark, using their cellphone lights to find it, according to the findings.


Once they did, they struggled to open it, losing time. As they finally pried open the hatch, another assault vehicle came to rescue the crew and ended up colliding with the distressed vessel, which turned broadside into a wave that swept over it.

The troops were knocked off their feet, and water flooded through the hatch and into the compartment, causing the vehicle to rapidly sink.

---

I don't have direct experience with the AAVs, but I think they wear something similar to what aviators wear. The LPU has CO2 cartridges that inflate when you pull on the beaded handles.

I'll have to read the report, but my understanding from one of the medical officers on the MEU is that assets that could have helped were tied up doing relatively low priority tasks elsewhere.

I was in 3rd tracks from 04-10 and was a crew chief instructor before I left. I haven't read thoroughly through all of the information, but I've read a lot and talked to friends still with the unit. With that caveat, this was beyond FUBAR from the top down. It seems not many, if any at all, of the trackers had done a surf qual or any trac to trac transport training in sea. The grunts had done no in sea AAV training whatsoever. The AAVs should have been deadlined and there was not a good safety patrol in place. I read that the November flag (ship in distress) was waived early on, but was never responded to. These tracs and more importantly these troops should have never been in the water. It starts from the very top, but the AAV plt sgt and plt commander should have shut their platoon of AAVs down.

HollywoodBQ said:

---

I'm hoping a Marine will comment on this tragic accident.
It doesn't make much sense to me as a former Abrams Tanker.

One thing I will comment on is the lifejackets inside a sinking vehicle.

I've flown on a bazillion commercial flights and heard the spiel about don't inflate your life vest until you exit the aircraft. I always kind of let this go in one ear and out the other until I was watching the Air Crash Investigations show that dealt with the Ethiopian Airlines 767 that crashed off of the Comoros Islands in 1996.

Apparently a bunch of the crash survivors drowned because they put their life jackets on and inflated them inside the aircraft while it was sinking. With the buoyancy of the the life jackets, they became pinned against the ceiling of the aircraft and couldn't escape through the exit door.

Do they really require Marines to wear (inflated) life jackets inside an AmTrac?

---

Training is to not inflate your jacket until you are in the water. At least it was a decade ago.

BaitShack said:

---

Quote:

---

They were not told to remove their helmets, weapons and other gear, which prevented them from being able to escape. Their life jackets also may have prevented them from removing their body armor and proved useless in keeping them afloat because of the weight, according to the investigation. At least two of the troops had not completed their swimming certifications.

---

---

To me, that sounds like the life jackets were being worn over the body armor, and may have interfered with the troops ability to remove the body armor Body armor is HEAVY, especially if it's being worn with the SAAPI plates (ballistic ceramic plates that can stop rifle rounds, as opposed to just kevlar, which only stops pistol rounds and frag), and with the body armor (and possibly other gear) on, the Marines may have weighed more than the life vests could float.

I don't know what kind of body armor the Marines use, but the Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) I was issued in Afghanistan 10+ years ago actually had an emergency release that basically made your armor fall off when you pulled it. (This feature was added after one or more soldiers drowned after falling in canals in Iraq.) If you had a life vest on over it, this feature might not work as intended.

I think you are talking about an IOTV. If you ever saw the safety cord pulled a worn flotation device does not inhibit either pulling the cord or the IOTVs ability to fall away (this was all by design). What I could see happening though is a flotation device holding the IOTV panels on by friction or when the IOTV is worn with DAPS or throat/neck protector would probably keep the IOTV panels from dropping when the cord is pulled. That stuff comes down to keeping calm when you hit the water and not panicking. If these Marines (and Sailor(s)) had never been in water before with their gear on, calm isn't going to be happening. Much less add in the dimensions of enclosed space, taking on water, surf, etc. I am also what kind of flotation was worn, and inflatable or the big bulky stuff you remember from old war movies.

What has me a little curious is certification protocols. Right now things seem to be landing heavily at a battalion commanders feet. To me that only happens if he (in this case) created a command climate that was not conducive to safety or signed off on risk assessments that failed to appropriately mitigate risk. Swimmer certification, vehicle maintenance, progressive training, etc comes down to Company Command and Platoon Commanders. Did they do their part?

This article definitely gave me about a million more questions. Whereas previously I just assumed it was a terrible tragedy, now it sounds like an avoidable calamity.

Stat Monitor Repairman said:

---

You had a bunch of guys out there trying to do the best they could under the circumstances.

They probably had a rule that body armor stays on at all times.

They got caught out in heavy seas.

Nobody wanted to be the one to dump their body armor for fear of reprisal.

They thought they would just get towed in and go home at the end of the day.

But they got waked out by another vessel.

Flooded them in a closed compartment.

Somebody may have got stuck in the hatch or been tangled up on something, who knows.

Its dangerous work. Very dangerous work.

---

All very true and I don't blame anyone on that vehicle for what happened. They were set up for failure.

I read that the transmission on the vehicle had a bad leak and instead of deadlining the vehicle they just put more oil in before they launched from the beach. The vehicle went dead when the transmission seized up stopping both the jet propulsion system and the track from working. They were completely dead in the water. Even in 3 foot seas, that is hell on an AAV. The sea was apparently much more intense than that on the day in question. The grunts had no training on trac to trac sea transfer and I doubt the crew had any as well. The crew most likely had only trained towing a disabled trac in the calm jetty next to the ramp in Del Mar. In my opinion, this was an accident that was made catastrophic by a lack of training and NCOs and much higher skirting and down right ignoring the safety rules of AAV operations. That trac should have never been in the water.

Seen a few comments about deadline vehicles and lack of training.

This just seems like the risk assessment of doing this activity with vehicles that were not fully mission capable should have set off red flags all over the place.

With respect to training, what sorts of training to Marines going on AmTracs get when they're going through their MOS specialty training?

I assume the 0311 grunts don't get any.
But the crew of the AmTrac must do some training to get certified, licensed, etc.

As an Army Tanker from the Fort Knox era in the early-mid 1990s, I can say that we got training on how to ford a creek and talked about fording a river.

We learned the hard way that the seals around the driver's hatch in an Abrams Tank are usually broken so the driver is probably going to get wet when you ford a creek.

With a vehicle that swims through the water, I assume the Marines must train that extensively when their going through their MOS training so that everybody who comes out of it is proficient and knows what can go wrong.

My personal example is, I never threw track on my tank because at the Armor School we had some very good instruction from an E-6 who told us what it sounds like when the track is about to come off and how to correct it so that doesn't happen.

I assume there must be similar training on AmTracs regarding, OK, if you don't do A, then B is going to happen.

Stat Monitor Repairman said:

---

You had a bunch of guys out there trying to do the best they could under the circumstances.

They probably had a rule that body armor stays on at all times.

They got caught out in heavy seas.

Nobody wanted to be the one to dump their body armor for fear of reprisal.

They thought they would just get towed in and go home at the end of the day.

But they got waked out by another vessel.

Flooded them in a closed compartment.

Somebody may have got stuck in the hatch or been tangled up on something, who knows.

Its dangerous work. Very dangerous work.

---

This. Water safety has to be first priority. You cannot perform your mission if you are drowned. I recall my one and only time going amphibious in an old M113 APC swimming without any prep to the vehicle. And that was on a small lake with near zero turbulence.

HollywoodBQ said:

---

Seen a few comments about deadline vehicles and lack of training.

This just seems like the risk assessment of doing this activity with vehicles that were not fully mission capable should have set off red flags all over the place.

With respect to training, what sorts of training to Marines going on AmTracs get when they're going through their MOS specialty training?

I assume the 0311 grunts don't get any.
But the crew of the AmTrac must do some training to get certified, licensed, etc.

As an Army Tanker from the Fort Knox era in the early-mid 1990s, I can say that we got training on how to ford a creek and talked about fording a river.

We learned the hard way that the seals around the driver's hatch in an Abrams Tank are usually broken so the driver is probably going to get wet when you ford a creek.

With a vehicle that swims through the water, I assume the Marines must train that extensively when their going through their MOS training so that everybody who comes out of it is proficient and knows what can go wrong.

My personal example is, I never threw track on my tank because at the Armor School we had some very good instruction from an E-6 who told us what it sounds like when the track is about to come off and how to correct it so that doesn't happen.

I assume there must be similar training on AmTracs regarding, OK, if you don't do A, then B is going to happen.

---

There is a very extensive training section of the MOS school dedicated to amphibious activities. It took 1/3 of the school when I went through in 2004. The 3 to 4 man trac crew all is trained on amphibious distress and every billet has specific responsibilities. Also, tracs work in a 4 vehicle section. The November flag should have been noticed by the other vehicles in the water march way before it got catastrophic. Running into a disabled trac while attempting tow or rescue is a pretty bad indicator of lack of training as well.

Also, when we would attach to a grunt unit for training they would come to us and do trac specific training on our ramp. Specifically, we would take them into our jetty, which has no surf, and to trac to trac sea transfer and towing exercises.

HollywoodBQ said:

---

I never threw track on my tank because at the Armor School we had some very good instruction from an E-6 who told us what it sounds like when the track is about to come off and how to correct it so that doesn't happen.

---

Ain't no substitute for this kind of knowledge man. If I've learned one thing over the years, its that.

I was an 1833 many years ago (reserve unit in Galveston). Its been a long time, but I had to pass the swim test during boot camp or they would have changed my MOS - the swim instructors were taunting me that I'd be changed to a cook if I didn't pass (apparently my unit needed one of those too). How the hell were any of of the men in that Amtrac not certified?

"Regner relied on other Marines to tell him that all service members were certified to swim, even though some weren't, said Carver. Regner was told "they're stellar, that they're above average, that they were deployable," he said."

"It took 45 minutes for the tank to sink and if the distress signal had been seen sooner, it's likely rescuers could have saved the troops, the report stated."

"They were not told to remove their helmets, weapons and other gear, which prevented them from being able to escape. Their life jackets also may have prevented them from removing their body armor and proved useless in keeping them afloat because of the weight, according to the investigation.

At least two of the troops had not completed their swimming certifications."



WTF? Why didn't the highest ranking man on the Amtrac order everybody strip off their gear and climb out one of the multiple hatches? They apparently had plenty of time. Very, sad and preventable.

When I 1st heard of this accident in 2020, I assumed the sinking occurred when the AAV was exiting the ship's well deck. 30 years ago we were told that transition was the mostly likely time it would occur. Exiting the ship, water would sometimes come in through the top hatches. Sitting in the dark and cramped passenger area, any water coming in (albeit a trickle) from the doors above you was not a reassuring feeling.

I'm surprised to hear that any Marine was allowed in the water or in the AAV without a current swim qual. Swim qualification use to be done annually. 3rd class training included swimming with gear and was the minimum acceptable rating. I believe 2nd class was the standard minimum for a Marine Rifle Company acting as the boat company. Boat companies did additional swim training, both in the pool and otherwise. Dunk training was also required. Water survival training was done without gear. None of the training included escaping through an AAV front or rear crew hatch in the event the main hatches failed to open.

We (grunts) wore a Mae West style life-vest. I don't remember what the AAV crew wore. We had to wear them when on the well deck, but I don't remember wearing one in the AAV. The life-vest sat on your chest and looped around your neck, and had adjustable belly straps.

As for the Marines not exiting the AAV prior to the collision, the only thing I can conclude is that the AAV commander opted to not give that order due to being in rough seas. No reason comes to mind for the Rifle Squad not shedding their gear. That should have been done immediately after the AAV went dead in the water. That rests on the AAV NCO and Rifle Squad NCOs.

My heart goes out to these Marines and their families. This was obviously a horrific and terrifying experience for those involved.

There has been AAV dunk tank training for at least the past 15 years. No idea if the AAV crew or the grunts had been through it, but I highly doubt it based on everything I've read.

I know this is tangential, but I hate it when you can tell that the journalists are all ignorant of the topic that they're reporting. Verbiage all wrong, highlights of details that aren't supported by general context, etc.

Non-current swim qual sounds terrible... until you realize it's likely time lapsed and doesn't mean the man has forgotten how to swim. For most of my career I was "unqualified" despite being the strongest swimmer in any of my units.

The big thing, though, is that we've known that the AAVs need to be replaced for decades now and the EFV's cancelling by leadership set the stage for maintenance issues to turn lethal on these old buckets. What I want to know is who authorized / commanded the movement from shore to ship with a full crew compartment. That's the man who ignored risk factors and realities for "training objectives."

HollywoodBQ said:

---

I'm hoping a Marine will comment on this tragic accident.
It doesn't make much sense to me as a former Abrams Tanker.

One thing I will comment on is the lifejackets inside a sinking vehicle.

I've flown on a bazillion commercial flights and heard the spiel about don't inflate your life vest until you exit the aircraft. I always kind of let this go in one ear and out the other until I was watching the Air Crash Investigations show that dealt with the Ethiopian Airlines 767 that crashed off of the Comoros Islands in 1996.

Apparently a bunch of the crash survivors drowned because they put their life jackets on and inflated them inside the aircraft while it was sinking. With the buoyancy of the the life jackets, they became pinned against the ceiling of the aircraft and couldn't escape through the exit door.

Do they really require Marines to wear (inflated) life jackets inside an AmTrac?

---

To understand what happened on July 30 off the coast of California it is important to make a distinction between all the failures that contributed to the sinking of the AAV and the failures that resulted in the deaths of eight Marines and a Corpsman. Those are severable issues and lumping them together is allowing senior leadership at the policy making commands, TECOM and CD&I, to escape scrutiny and accountability for the deaths of those Marines and Corpsman. If everything went wrong with the AAV and the chain of command that contributed to sinking of the AAV, everybody aboard that vehicle should have easily escaped and been watching it while treading water for 15 minutes before it sank.

There are many factors that caused the AAV to sink and that has been where the press and the Marine Corps is happy to focus the attention because it turns the eyes of the public and congress toward the chain of command on the west coast in the operating forces. If those Marines and HN3 Gnem had been required to attend **and** successfully complete Underwater Egress Training (UET) in the Submersible Vehicle Egress Trainer (SVET) they would have know that as soon as the water rose to the level of the deckplates in the AAV that they should shed their body armor, helmets, rifles, loosen their bootlaces, and get the LPU-41 ready to inflate directly over their blouse (instead of over the body armor) they would be alive today.

According to the investigation approximately 20-25 minutes passed from the time that the water level reached the deck-plates and the time that the waterlogged AAV was bumped by another one attempting a rescue and and sank rapidly. There was plenty of time in which they could have carefully and methodically removed their gear and gotten ready to exit the vehicle through the top hatches and even with the broken egress lighting and the latch that was stuck they would have still had time to spare before it sank.

The driver of the AAV was the last person conscious and the last to escape the vehicle. He could not get out of the driver's hatch and went back through the passenger compartment. According to the investigation, he activated the LPUs on several Marines that were still flailing in the back trying to get out the hatch. Only one of the dead made it to the surface where they performed CPR for an hour before calling his death. Seven of the dead were found floating between 20' and 30' below the surface because the sinking AAV was already so deep when the LPUs were activated that it did not have enough buoyancy to overcome the pressure and bring them to the surface with their gear. One of the dead was recovered still in the AAV on the ocean floor.

The Marine Corps knew that it had a giant gap in the training requirement policy for UET because of an investigation of an August 2017 Osprey mishap in which it was discovered that the 21 passengers riding in the back of the Osprey had been designated as "infrequent fliers" and therefore exempted from the requirement to complete UET. TECOM ****ed around for over three years and did not fix the broken directive (MCO 3502.3B) to close the gap. Over a year after the Osprey mishap investigation identified the problem, a minor update was made to the 3502.3B and it was republished as the 3502.3C with the terms "frequent flier" and "infrequent flier" replaced by risk Category A and B but the order still left open a loophole for Marines that failed to successfully complete UET to be assigned to fly overwater or embark as passengers in AAVs in waterborne operations.

It was exactly the same page and paragraph of the MCO 3503.3C that was identified by the investigating officer of the AAV mishap on page 59 in recommendation 9 as needing to be deleted and replaced:

"This should be changed to read, "All MEU personnel
assigned to risk categories will successfully complete the full MAET
or SVET prior to amphibious/waterborne operations regardless of prior
UET training." "

Eleven months after that report of investigation was released, the Corps still has not corrected/updated or canceled the MCO 3502.3C and it remains in effect. The problem didn't get fixed four years ago when it was first identified because the Marine Corps didn't want to spend the necessary funding to provide enough resources to provide UET to every Marine that is supposed to get it. Penny pinching on safety training and safety devices is the same reason that the Corps removed supplemental emergency breathing devices (SEBD) a.k.a. oxygen bottles from AmTracs in 2015 (and yet they still found to means to keep them on helicopters).

Not only did nobody get fired or reprimanded over the AAV investigation at TECOM or CD&I, they were never questioned or interviewed. The 100 page report of investigation and over 1700 pages of enclosures are posted on the FOIA Reading Room web page. It all focuses on execution of policy in the west coast operating forces and not on the training policy and resourcing decision that are made in Quantico.

https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Agencies/USMC-FOIA/FRR/

I recommend watching the videos linked in this article and reading the highlighted passages from the investigation to get an appreciation of the training that was not provided to these Marines.

https://taskandpurpose.com/opinion/marine-corps-aav-accident-preventable-opinion/

This episode of All Marines Radio is a really good examination of the findings of fact in the AAV mishap investigation by a panel of retired senior infantry officers who have a ton of experience in AAV operations with the MEU.

https://allmarineradio.com/2021/04/08/the-mensa-brothers-we-review-the-findings-of-facts-from-the-investigation-into-the-sinking-of-an-aav-that-killed-eight-marines-and-one-sailor/

That is incredibly disheartening. I have been in the water in a disabled AAV a few different times, once in some pretty hellacious seas, and I know the terror I felt even with the proper training. I have spent a few nights unable to sleep thinking about the last hour of those young men's lives.

Thank You Sir!

I always value your commentary on the USMC.
I'll check out the links.

Like FightinFarmer USMC, I've had a couple of unsettled thoughts thinking back to my time in the Abrams. Sort of retroactive claustrophobia and the thought of drowning in the drivers station. Note that I never felt any claustrophobia or fear when I was serving in the 1990s.

I am once again glad that, by the time I reported for the BFV leader course, the M2/M3 family was no longer considered swimmable, even with the swim tent thing. (M2A2/M3A2 and later versions were too heavy, due added armor.)

FightnFarmerUSMC said:

---

That is incredibly disheartening. I have been in the water in a disabled AAV a few different times, once in some pretty hellacious seas, and I know the terror I felt even with the proper training. I have spent a few nights unable to sleep thinking about the last hour of those young men's lives.

---

It's so disheartening, and frustrating. I read most of the official report during a gap between classes. Ended up skipping the later class. I was not in a learning mood.

As I suspected from the beginning, it was systemic failure on so many levels. It usually is in cases like this. Just like at Hawthorne with the mortar incident that killed seven. Or the EOD accident at Camp Pendleton that claimed four. I was there for that one. One of the first on scene actually. We originally thought there was only two casualties. We never knew there were two others next to the explosion center till much later. There was nothing left of them.

All of these, just stupid mistake mounted on top of stupid mistake. Chain of deliberate decisions to save time, cost, training budgets, etc.

Again, just frustrating as hell to me. Like, punch a wall frustrating.

Ulysses90 said:

---

HollywoodBQ said:

---

I'm hoping a Marine will comment on this tragic accident.
It doesn't make much sense to me as a former Abrams Tanker.

One thing I will comment on is the lifejackets inside a sinking vehicle.

I've flown on a bazillion commercial flights and heard the spiel about don't inflate your life vest until you exit the aircraft. I always kind of let this go in one ear and out the other until I was watching the Air Crash Investigations show that dealt with the Ethiopian Airlines 767 that crashed off of the Comoros Islands in 1996.

Apparently a bunch of the crash survivors drowned because they put their life jackets on and inflated them inside the aircraft while it was sinking. With the buoyancy of the the life jackets, they became pinned against the ceiling of the aircraft and couldn't escape through the exit door.

Do they really require Marines to wear (inflated) life jackets inside an AmTrac?

---

To understand what happened on July 30 off the coast of California it is important to make a distinction between all the failures that contributed to the sinking of the AAV and the failures that resulted in the deaths of eight Marines and a Corpsman. Those are severable issues and lumping them together is allowing senior leadership at the policy making commands, TECOM and CD&I, to escape scrutiny and accountability for the deaths of those Marines and Corpsman. If everything went wrong with the AAV and the chain of command that contributed to sinking of the AAV, everybody aboard that vehicle should have easily escaped and been watching it while treading water for 15 minutes before it sank.

There are many factors that caused the AAV to sink and that has been where the press and the Marine Corps is happy to focus the attention because it turns the eyes of the public and congress toward the chain of command on the west coast in the operating forces. If those Marines and HN3 Gnem had been required to attend **and** successfully complete Underwater Egress Training (UET) in the Submersible Vehicle Egress Trainer (SVET) they would have know that as soon as the water rose to the level of the deckplates in the AAV that they should shed their body armor, helmets, rifles, loosen their bootlaces, and get the LPU-41 ready to inflate directly over their blouse (instead of over the body armor) they would be alive today.

According to the investigation approximately 20-25 minutes passed from the time that the water level reached the deck-plates and the time that the waterlogged AAV was bumped by another one attempting a rescue and and sank rapidly. There was plenty of time in which they could have carefully and methodically removed their gear and gotten ready to exit the vehicle through the top hatches and even with the broken egress lighting and the latch that was stuck they would have still had time to spare before it sank.

The driver of the AAV was the last person conscious and the last to escape the vehicle. He could not get out of the driver's hatch and went back through the passenger compartment. According to the investigation, he activated the LPUs on several Marines that were still flailing in the back trying to get out the hatch. Only one of the dead made it to the surface where they performed CPR for an hour before calling his death. Seven of the dead were found floating between 20' and 30' below the surface because the sinking AAV was already so deep when the LPUs were activated that it did not have enough buoyancy to overcome the pressure and bring them to the surface with their gear. One of the dead was recovered still in the AAV on the ocean floor.

The Marine Corps knew that it had a giant gap in the training requirement policy for UET because of an investigation of an August 2017 Osprey mishap in which it was discovered that the 21 passengers riding in the back of the Osprey had been designated as "infrequent fliers" and therefore exempted from the requirement to complete UET. TECOM ****ed around for over three years and did not fix the broken directive (MCO 3502.3B) to close the gap. Over a year after the Osprey mishap investigation identified the problem, a minor update was made to the 3502.3B and it was republished as the 3502.3C with the terms "frequent flier" and "infrequent flier" replaced by risk Category A and B but the order still left open a loophole for Marines that failed to successfully complete UET to be assigned to fly overwater or embark as passengers in AAVs in waterborne operations.

It was exactly the same page and paragraph of the MCO 3503.3C that was identified by the investigating officer of the AAV mishap on page 59 in recommendation 9 as needing to be deleted and replaced:

"This should be changed to read, "All MEU personnel
assigned to risk categories will successfully complete the full MAET
or SVET prior to amphibious/waterborne operations regardless of prior
UET training." "

Eleven months after that report of investigation was released, the Corps still has not corrected/updated or canceled the MCO 3502.3C and it remains in effect. The problem didn't get fixed four years ago when it was first identified because the Marine Corps didn't want to spend the necessary funding to provide enough resources to provide UET to every Marine that is supposed to get it. Penny pinching on safety training and safety devices is the same reason that the Corps removed supplemental emergency breathing devices (SEBD) a.k.a. oxygen bottles from AmTracs in 2015 (and yet they still found to means to keep them on helicopters).

Not only did nobody get fired or reprimanded over the AAV investigation at TECOM or CD&I, they were never questioned or interviewed. The 100 page report of investigation and over 1700 pages of enclosures are posted on the FOIA Reading Room web page. It all focuses on execution of policy in the west coast operating forces and not on the training policy and resourcing decision that are made in Quantico.

https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Agencies/USMC-FOIA/FRR/

I recommend watching the videos linked in this article and reading the highlighted passages from the investigation to get an appreciation of the training that was not provided to these Marines.

https://taskandpurpose.com/opinion/marine-corps-aav-accident-preventable-opinion/

This episode of All Marines Radio is a really good examination of the findings of fact in the AAV mishap investigation by a panel of retired senior infantry officers who have a ton of experience in AAV operations with the MEU.

https://allmarineradio.com/2021/04/08/the-mensa-brothers-we-review-the-findings-of-facts-from-the-investigation-into-the-sinking-of-an-aav-that-killed-eight-marines-and-one-sailor/

---

This was my ARG. I was on the other LPD, not the one the AAVs were attached to and returning to. The MEU CO (O-6) and the AAV Company CO (O-5) were both relieved of command.

This was an emotional week for the entire ARG.

I get that firing the co is the expected / standard move, but I'd like to see OpsO's go down more. Lots of yes-men in those roles who have put others in stupid unnecessary & risky positions because the CO wanted training and they were too chicken**** to question whether the training was worth it.

Eta: often it's his office that frauds training into the books to show the unit as being qualified which misleads the co in the first place.

Reference material for those of us who don't speak Marine, I found this PDF that explains a lot of the jargon.
I assume it's a little dated since it still shows M1A1s but it helps with the acronyms.
https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Amphibious%20Ready%20Group%20And%20Marine%20Expeditionary%20Unit%20Overview.pdf