74OA said:
I like the idea of separating those responsible for designing the future force out from under those responsible for supporting and employing the current force. Those are two very different and frequently conflicting priorities--particularly when so many senior careers and egos are wedded to current force programs.
Headquarters G-3/5/7 are good examples of staffs with competing priorities to advocate for both the current and future force and a directorate buried in ARCIC doesn't have the horsepower to stand up to the four stars representing the current force and its "right now" needs.
Consolidating the future force guys within their own chain of command is more likely to create a focused effort under bosses who aren't pressured by conflicting priorities. Similarly, matrixing the futures staff in CFTs is a good step to avoid stove piping, and putting them under their own four-star will ensure future issues get an equal hearing when competing for finite resources with those advocating for the current force.
Only time will tell if the execution matches the concept. We'll see.
Worth a try........
I agree with 74 on this.
ARCIC isn't/wasn't really the issue.
It was, as he describes, the fragmentation of elements focused on new capabilities and modernization among major commands that are decidedly focused on near-term readiness.
I would also challenge the assertion that TRADOC is the most influential MACOM -- I would argue it is FORSCOM. The fact ARCIC required a separate reporting channel is itself a testament that something was amiss in its alignment.
TRADOC is a massive hairball, and the elements of its enterprise that generate requirements have become disconnected and irrelevant from procurement -- which is a big problem that AFC is trying to resolve. First by creating CFTs, and then vesting authority for program requirements with CFT leaders answering directly to the chief, instead of whatever 3-star who thinks the next vehicle/helicopter ought to suit his frame of reference.
See former ARCIC CG McMaster derailing GCV by unilaterally declared it
must have a manned turret -- despite that decision already being made, and it being nowhere written except his personal view that a vehicle commander must be able to look out of a turret with binos.
I don't know if AFC will work, but I damn well know that the status quo was failing. The fact that the AFC CG doesn't control the pursestrings (ASA(LT) does) is going to be a problem. But they accepted risk there to move quickly, as the legislation required was probably a bridge too far.
Futures, requirements, R&D, and procurement should all be under one roof -- and none of FORSCOM, AMC, or TRADOC fit that.
HQ creep is a legit concern, but not so much in this case. The actual net growth is about 300 people from what I understand -- the rest is realignment. The 4-star and people will be harvested from ISAF, or maybe USARPAC -- which is a highly dubious 4-star billet in the first place, and a vestige of the "Asia-Pacific Rebalance" that was more a political signal than a functional need.
