Lee's Best Battle According to Lee's Old War Horse

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FTACo88-FDT24dad
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AG
Lee's Best Battle According to Lee's Old War Horse


https://emergingcivilwar.com/2024/06/03/lees-best-battle-according-to-lees-old-war-horse/

Quote:

In 1893, Washington Post correspondent Leslie J. Perry had an opportunity to do something that modern historians would kill to have: a sitdown interview with a Civil War soldier. In particular, this interview was with one of the Confederacy's top soldiers, James Longstreet. The conversation varied on many war-related topics. Perry could not hold back from asking some of the same questions we banter around roundtables and symposium tables and online forums, including: "Which do you consider Gen. Lee's best battle?"

The comments are worth reading.
Rabid Cougar
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AG
I'd say 2nd Manassas and Chancellorsville. I also would say the entire Overland Campaign… Yes Grant maneuvered him out of his works but he was never defeated .
BQ78
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AG
I'd say Second Manassas. At Chancellorsville, he had more casualties by percentage of his army than Hooker. Everyone remembers Jackson's flank attack but forgets the bloodiest morning the next day, with Lee banging his head against an entrenched AoP.
Sapper Redux
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Rabid Cougar said:

I'd say 2nd Manassas and Chancellorsville. I also would say the entire Overland Campaign… Yes Grant maneuvered him out of his works but he was never defeated .
Lee lost the Overland Campaign badly. He lost a larger percentage of his army than Grant and was forced back into his last line of defense while never able to alter Grant's strategy. The only thing that prevent him from losing in 64 was blundering by the Army of the James around Petersburg. Strategically and tactically Lee's best victory was 2nd Manassas. It gave him perhaps his one legitimate shot at winning the war.
BQ78
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AG
Lost it badly?!?! Other than letting Grant steal a march on him at the James River and getting sick at the North Anna (after arranging a perfect trap) what did he do wrong? What should he have done differently? He put a hurting on Grant and was wearing northern morale out in 1864 in Virginia.
Sapper Redux
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He was obsessed with defending Richmond to the point that he functionally destroyed his army. He played right into Grant's hands. He lost around 55% of his soldiers as casualties and then lost thousands more to desertion. I can't say he would have won if he broke from the defense of Richmond, but he would have had his army as a dangerous fighting force for longer and could have coordinated with Johnston.
Jabin
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Apologize for the derail, but Sapper's comment triggered one of my constant curiosities. His comment:
Quote:

and then lost thousands more to desertion.
I've always wondered how common or uncommon desertion was. I'm surprised it wasn't sky high given the appalling conditions that the individual soldiers faced. Does any credible data exist on the issue?

And once men did desert, what did they do? Could they go home or would the be arrested and/or be pariahs? If they could not go home, where did they go? Out west? Somewhere where they were not known and could disappear, such as a big city? What were their stories to the people they encountered after they deserted?

Was the official and unofficial treatment of deserters different in the South vs. the North?
BQ78
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AG
One of the old classic books that still holds up today is Ella Lonn's "Desertion During the Civil War". Both sides had horrendous problems with it.
Jabin
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BQ78 said:

One of the old classic books that still holds up today is Ella Lonn's "Desertion During the Civil War". Both sides had horrendous problems with it.
Thanks very much. I've found it online for free and will read it.
Jabin
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Reading it now. It describes conditions much worse than I knew. For example, many of the troops were issued muskets that did not work. The Armies put little attention into logistics and morale, so the soldiers were typically starving to death, with no replacement clothing, no shoes, and no blankets. t page 10, the author describes "numbers" of soldiers simply abandoning the battlefield because their muskets didn't work. That could throw a crimp in a battle plan!

I wonder how much of a general's success or failure was determined by logistics? Has anyone actually studied that? In other words, was a general's defeat due to his poor leadership or the fact that the Quartermasters failed him?
Sapper Redux
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It was a huge part of Burnside's failure as the commander of the Army of the Potomac. Granted he was a terrible tactical commander, too, but his army was falling apart throughout his command. Part of the reason there's such a huge gap between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville is because Hooker spent the entire time rebuilding the AoP and establishing a firm logistical backbone. He failed in his one battle, but the AoP that Meade took over was in very good shape for Gettysburg.
Jabin
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Thanks. That's very interesting.
Windy City Ag
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Quote:

I've always wondered how common or uncommon desertion was. I'm surprised it wasn't sky high given the appalling conditions that the individual soldiers faced. Does any credible data exist on the issue?

And once men did desert, what did they do? Could they go home or would the be arrested and/or be pariahs? If they could not go home, where did they go? Out west? Somewhere where they were not known and could disappear, such as a big city? What were their stories to the people they encountered after they deserted?
I have stumbled more and more on books focusing on the latter parts of the Civil War when the Southern Economy broke down and inflation was so rampant that most soldiers families were suffering terribly and basically starving.

CSA deserters is usually pegged at around 100K compared to an army that is estimated to be anywhere from 700K to 1 Million. So either 1-10 or 1-7 depending on your source.

The desertion was not a steady state. It went into overdrive as the CSA started to crack up in the last years of the war. Jeff Davis's decision to start flexing federal power for conscription of crops at the expense of non-combatants made a whole lot of the states furious, especially North Carolina who was somewhat ambivalent about the Southern cause from the beginning. Also, Union armies rampaging through Southern States caused men to fear for their families. The Federal Government twisted the knife by accepting the surrender of CSA soldiers through desertion and pardoning them and restoring citizenship immediately.

Record keeping was so bad back then that it was easy for men to escape without punishment. The destruction of the CSA War Department Building by the CSA government as they set fire to Richmond also destroyed much of the paper trail.

Historian Mark Weitz did a lot of work on this. There is a book called "Damning the Slaughter: Desertion Rates in the Confederate Army" that delved into the topic as well.



Jabin
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Thanks, good info.

Lonn's book also describes how many of the deserters would band together into lawless groups of men that would then raid, rape, and pillage. When the men still serving would hear of that, I would think that would motivate many of them to also desert in order to go home to protect their families.

The reality of the war really makes the later attempts to glorify it, such as the "Lost Cause" myth in the South, somewhat dubious.
Windy City Ag
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AG
Quote:

The reality of the war really makes the later attempts to glorify it, such as the "Lost Cause" myth in the South, somewhat dubious.


Yes . . .I remember being depressed reading about the last days of Edmund Ruffin. He was one of the most rabid CSA supporters and fired one of the first shots at Ft. Sumter.

By the end of the war, he had lost eight of his eleven children and his wife. He ended up blowing his own head off in a bedroom in his surviving son's home while wrapped in the Confederate flag.

The war was an unrealistic folly fomented by overly proud and unrealistic men like him at the expense of so many innocent people.


aalan94
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Quote:

He was obsessed with defending Richmond to the point that he functionally destroyed his army. He played right into Grant's hands.
I don't believe Lee had been given free hand by Davis to expose Richmond. We can't pretend this is some sanitized version of risk. Everything is in context, and Lee had immense logistics struggles and political considerations. That he did so much with so little is extrordinary. Seriously, the whole effort would have collapsed in late 1863 or shortly thereafter if he had not been there.
Smeghead4761
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Back to Sapper and BQ's debate:

First of all, it needs to be noted that the Overland Campaign was a campaign, as opposed to a battle. A campaign is a series of battles and movements designed to achieve a strategic objective.

The way I see it, Lee had two strategic objectives:
1. Preserve his army
2. Cause Lincoln to lose the 1864 election. A McClellan presidency was about the only way the South was going to get out of the war as an independent country.

Lee was partially able to achieve the first goal. He was able to preserve his army as an effective fighting force, but it was no longer a useful force, because he was pretty much trapped in Petersburg.

Probably the only way Lee could have achieved the second goal would have been to defeat Grant the way he had defeated the Army of the Potomac in previous years - smack them around hard enough that the army goes back into camp to regroup and try to figure out a new plan. Grant did make some mistakes during the campaign - North Anna and Cold Harbor - but Lee was unable to take advantage of them.

Grant wasn't able to achieve his main strategic objective - the destruction of Lee's army - but he did hurt it badly, and was able to pen Lee up in Petersburg, while Sherman secured the election for Lincoln by capturing Atlanta.

As far as the contention that Lee was "obsessed" with defending Richmond, he didn't really have a choice, for both political and logistical reasons. On the political side, the fall of Richmond would have almost certainly handed the 1864 election to Lincoln, as well as being a major blow to the internal political cohesion of the CSA.

On the logistical side, all of the rail lines, and thus Lee's supplies, ran through Richmond. Guerillas can exist without major supply lines, but a field army can't, unless they want to strip the countryside around them. Lee had no desire to leave Virginia looking like Germany after the 30 Years War. Without Richmond, Lee's only option would have been to retreat westward along the rail line (as he tried to do after Five Forks), where he would have been ultimately trapped anyway.

Lee probably did the best he could with the hand he was dealt. He had one brief opening to possibly stem the tide - at North Anna - but he wasn't able to take advantage.

OTOH, if Grant hadn't been saddled with the political necessity of leaving Butler in command of the Army of the James, and had been able to put, say, Sheridan or maybe Hancock in charge there, the whole thing might have been over in the spring.
tallgrant
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Agree with smeghead's points above.

The other fascinating what-if is right after the Wilderness, if Sheridan's cavalry had stayed with the army instead of chasing JEB Stuart to Yellow Tavern. That might have been enough to allow for a Union breakthrough during Spotsylvania, particularly during Upton's attack.
LMCane
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Rabid Cougar said:

I'd say 2nd Manassas and Chancellorsville. I also would say the entire Overland Campaign… Yes Grant maneuvered him out of his works but he was never defeated .
the Union came a few minutes from defeating Lee in detail at Spotsylvania during the Overland Campaign

at the "Muleshoe" Lee withdrew 18 artillery pieces to move his forces south,

a few hours before Emory Upton launched yet another Union attack which broke the Confederate line.

it was only John Gordon who was able to rally his troops to plug the breach in the Rebel line.

LMCane
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also if it was not for Benjamin Butler's hesitation in front of Petersburg, Lee would have been flanked and Richmond taken in June 1864 rather than a year later.

On June 9, Major General Benjamin Butler dispatched about 4,500 cavalry and infantry against the 2,500 Confederate defenders of Petersburg. While Butler's infantry demonstrated against the outer line of entrenchments east of Petersburg, Kautz's cavalry division attempted to enter the city from the south via the Jerusalem Plank Road but was repulsed by Home Guards.

Afterwards, Butler withdrew. This was called the battle of old men and young boys by local residents.

Army of the Potomac
On June 14 through June 17, the Army of the Potomac crossed the James River and began moving towards Petersburg to support and renew Butler's assaults. Marching from Cold Harbor, Meade's Army of the Potomac crossed the James River on transports and a 2,200-foot-long pontoon bridge at Windmill Point.

Butler's leading elements (XVIII Corps and Kautz's cavalry) crossed the Appomattox River at Windmill Point and attacked the Petersburg defenses on June 15. The 5,400 defenders of Petersburg under command of General P.G.T. Beauregard were driven from their first line of entrenchments back to Harrison Creek. After dark the XVIII Corps was relieved by the II Corps.

On June 16, the II Corps captured another section of the Confederate line; on the 17th, the IX Corps gained more ground. Beauregard stripped the Howlett Line (Bermuda Hundred) to defend the city, and Lee rushed reinforcements to Petersburg from the Army of Northern Virginia.


The Siege of Petersburg
The II, XI, and V Corps from right to left attacked on June 18 but was repulsed with heavy casualties. By now the Confederate works were heavily manned and the greatest opportunity to capture Petersburg without a siege was lost.
Rabid Cougar
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AG
LMCane said:

also if it was not for Benjamin Butler's hesitation in front of Petersburg, Lee would have been flanked and Richmond taken in June 1864 rather than a year later.

On June 9, Major General Benjamin Butler dispatched about 4,500 cavalry and infantry against the 2,500 Confederate defenders of Petersburg. While Butler's infantry demonstrated against the outer line of entrenchments east of Petersburg, Kautz's cavalry division attempted to enter the city from the south via the Jerusalem Plank Road but was repulsed by Home Guards.

Afterwards, Butler withdrew. This was called the battle of old men and young boys by local residents.

Army of the Potomac
On June 14 through June 17, the Army of the Potomac crossed the James River and began moving towards Petersburg to support and renew Butler's assaults. Marching from Cold Harbor, Meade's Army of the Potomac crossed the James River on transports and a 2,200-foot-long pontoon bridge at Windmill Point.

Butler's leading elements (XVIII Corps and Kautz's cavalry) crossed the Appomattox River at Windmill Point and attacked the Petersburg defenses on June 15. The 5,400 defenders of Petersburg under command of General P.G.T. Beauregard were driven from their first line of entrenchments back to Harrison Creek. After dark the XVIII Corps was relieved by the II Corps.

On June 16, the II Corps captured another section of the Confederate line; on the 17th, the IX Corps gained more ground. Beauregard stripped the Howlett Line (Bermuda Hundred) to defend the city, and Lee rushed reinforcements to Petersburg from the Army of Northern Virginia.


The Siege of Petersburg
The II, XI, and V Corps from right to left attacked on June 18 but was repulsed with heavy casualties. By now the Confederate works were heavily manned and the greatest opportunity to capture Petersburg without a siege was lost.
It was Baldy Smith who faltered. His Corps captured everything from Battery 3 to 13 of the eastern flank of the Dimmock line on the 15th and did not pursue the retreating Confederates into town that night...
LMCane
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Jabin said:

Apologize for the derail, but Sapper's comment triggered one of my constant curiosities. His comment:
Quote:

and then lost thousands more to desertion.
I've always wondered how common or uncommon desertion was. I'm surprised it wasn't sky high given the appalling conditions that the individual soldiers faced. Does any credible data exist on the issue?

And once men did desert, what did they do? Could they go home or would the be arrested and/or be pariahs? If they could not go home, where did they go? Out west? Somewhere where they were not known and could disappear, such as a big city? What were their stories to the people they encountered after they deserted?

Was the official and unofficial treatment of deserters different in the South vs. the North?
there was sky high desertion of Rebel soldiers in the Army of Northern Virginia in the last several months of the siege at Petersburg

primary source materials state up to 400 Rebs a day were crossing the lines and surrendering or running away back to their homes in the south

this forced Lee to write to Richmond that his army was melting away.
tens of thousands of rebel soldiers deserted into the mountains of virginia and tennessee and Carolina
LMCane
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Jabin said:

Reading it now. It describes conditions much worse than I knew. For example, many of the troops were issued muskets that did not work. The Armies put little attention into logistics and morale, so the soldiers were typically starving to death, with no replacement clothing, no shoes, and no blankets. t page 10, the author describes "numbers" of soldiers simply abandoning the battlefield because their muskets didn't work. That could throw a crimp in a battle plan!

I wonder how much of a general's success or failure was determined by logistics? Has anyone actually studied that? In other words, was a general's defeat due to his poor leadership or the fact that the Quartermasters failed him?
Sheridan, Sherman and Grant all had experience with logistics and Quartermaster duties
LMCane
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everyone is forgetting (as most Americans don't know) that Lee launched not two but THREE invasions of the North.

everyone knows about Antietam in 1862 and Gettysburg in 1863..

but few know about the invasion of Pennsylvania and Maryland in 1864 by the Second Corps/Jubal Early's Army of the Valley. which was delayed at the battle of Monocacy by the future author of "Ben Hur" but arrived to the forts surrounding Washington DC in June.

many Confederates including John Gordon believed they could have taken Washington if Early had not hesitated outside Silver Spring. a few hours delay allowed two divisions of the VI Corps under General Horatio Wright to arrive by ship from City Point.
tallgrant
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Monocacy Battlefield is a nice visit. Also neat because that's where the marker for the lost Special Order 191 is.
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