Morality has two distinct domains - moral value (the good) and moral obligation (the right.). They are related but not synonymous. An act (like going to the soup kitchen) can be morally good without being morally obligated.

The relationship between God and the good (moral value) is not the same as the relationship between God and the right (moral obligation).

If there were no God, there would be no moral obligations. In a world that fundamentally stops at descriptive laws of nature, there simply could be no prescriptive moral laws. Natural laws describe the way the would is, but moral laws describe the way it should be. Such prescriptive laws are without rational support given naturalism.

Is this just Hume's is-ought problem?

Martin Q. Blank said:

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Is this just Hume's is-ought problem?

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I don't think so. It's not that you can get an ought from an is. You can, really. It that moral ought are inexplicable in a world where the fundamental explanation reduces to descriptive natural laws.

Yes, that's Hume's is-ought problem. I agree that naturalism cannot overcome it.

Martin Q. Blank said:

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Yes, that's Hume's is-ought problem. I agree that naturalism cannot overcome it.

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I do think you can get an ought from an is, as long as the ought is built into the is. ("Jim owes Frank" is a descriptive claim, but the ought is explicable from the nature of the description.) Hume's ought/is is often used against teleology and divine command stuff, too.

It seems to me that even inserting god into the equation doesn't really solve anything. Let's assume the existence of god and the idea that he's clearly set out how he wants humans to behave. The leap from there to saying "people ought to behave this way" still has the implied reasoning behind it that we are obligated to act according to what god wants. And where's the justification for that? Because he created us? So? I never asked to be created in the first place. Because he'll punish us if we don't? Threats are poor justification. Because he'll reward us if we do? That's just a bribe. Because it will make him happy? I see little reason to care if he's happy or not. The "ought" issue remains.

Furthermore every "ought" statement has some implied reasoning behind it even if that reasoning isn't explicitly stated. Why should I treat "Because god said so" as a more legitimate justification than one that prioritizes the collective welfare of mankind?

What if the ought is because it's objectively better?

Even if you could prove that, which I am skeptical you could, why ought I prioritize things which are objectively better?

You didn't ask me to prove it, you asked why there's an ought.

Ought you run oil in your engine?

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And where's the justification for that? Because he created us? So?

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It's not that he created us period. He created us with a purpose. There's a mutual desire between the creature and God to fulfill that purpose. And failing in that purpose is self destructive.

Zobel said:

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You didn't ask me to prove it, you asked why there's an ought.

Ought you run oil in your engine?

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And I'm still not asking you to prove it, I'm asking you why I ought to prioritize what you say is objectively better.

I do like the question of "Ought you run oil in your engine" though. It's a good one to point out the implied justification behind all ought statements. In this case: If you want your car to continue running, you ought to put oil in your engine. If you want your car to break down, you ought not put oil in your engine. Two different oughts as a result of different starting assumptions.

The implied ought there is still "If you want to fulfill the purpose God created you for, you ought..." But what if I don't want to do that? Then I ought not do that, right?

This is free will in a nutshell. If you want to destroy your engine, don't put oil in it. Fast results. If you want to continue to use your engine, you ought to put oil in it.

The tension is between you as an agent and the proposed creator. The agent may rebel but they cannot change the design intent of the creator. Thus the ought is inherited.

So even by inserting the assumption of God's existence and desires for mankind into the equation we are still left with "To achieve more favorable results, you ought..." Where is the so called superiority of the theistic point of view here?

Rocag said:

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The implied ought there is still "If you want to fulfill the purpose God created you for, you ought..." But what if I don't want to do that? Then I ought not do that, right?

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Yes.

You're invoking reason and purpose as starting assumptions, but these are by necessity downstream of a proposed creator. The superiority, if you want to call it that, is that the purpose is already fixed. If you don't want to achieve that purpose, that's free will at play, but you can't create another purpose for yourself - you can't create another ought, because the ought implies both the beginning and the end.

You also began with a dichotomy that is assumed and, I believe, false - separating what God wants from what prioritizes the collective welfare of mankind. This seems something like cylinders advocating for an oil free life as prioritizing collective welfare.

The statement "you can't create another purpose for yourself" is not something we can just take for granted. I obviously can decide on a purpose for myself that differs from what the hypothetical one that God has set for me. Baked into your argument is the assumption that the purpose God sets is more valid than the one the person sets for themselves. And how do you decide that?

And I threw out "collective welfare of mankind" not really because I am arguing that must be the conditions under which we argue oughts from, but because it is a decent enough starting point. It becomes a question of how societies set their priorities. Furthermore, I'm not at all convinced the Christian god cares about the collective welfare of mankind especially for those branches of the religion that assume most of mankind is destined to be tortured for all of eternity.

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I obviously can decide on a purpose for myself that differs from what the hypothetical one that God has set for me.

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Where does this purpose originate? Another god? This is the obvious problem with polytheism.

Must a person be a deity to decide on a purpose for their own existence?

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And how do you decide that?

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Not arguing for or against the paradigm, but if we are talking about a proposed Creator there is a qualitative difference in the location of the hierarchy between Creator and created.

An engine cannot decide for itself to be anything other than an engine. Or a bookshelf. And in the grand scheme of created vs creator the difference between a man and an engine is infinitely less than man and a Creator.

It's axiomatic in the Christian view of mankind that all things that exist have a nature, and that nature has an irrevocable set of identities or properties which define it. One of those is it's telos. The implication here is that while one may repurpose an engine to another duty - perhaps the cylinders can be used as planters - it would then no longer be an engine, properly. Mankind has a nature, and this nature includes an end (telos is the word Aristotle used for this) and this is unchangeable.

So unless you can change your nature (you can't) you can't change your purpose. It's not a choice.

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Furthermore, I'm not at all convinced the Christian god cares about the collective welfare of mankind especially for those branches of the religion that assume most of mankind is destined to be tortured for all of eternity.

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There is no greater damage done to the witness of Christianity than the near-pagan dualism that has become prevalent. The absolute most basic claim of Christianity is that God created mankind with the express purpose of ruling and reigning over creation as god. It's right there in the first chapter.

Rocag said:

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Must a person be a deity to decide on a purpose for their own existence?

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Well deciding and creating are two different things. You'd have to answer the OP as to how a purpose and ought statements can originate from something other than a higher power.

Your argument reduces humanity to mere tools. "You're a screwdriver. That's all you are and ever will be. If you don't turn screws the way I like you're damned." If that's the case what a curse intelligence and free will is. Maybe that screwdriver would work just fine as a pry bar or a chisel even if that's not the created purpose. And how much more complex is a human than that? I don't see a good reason to recognize that a creator's intended purpose must supersede all other possible purposes.

Rocag said:

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Your argument reduces humanity to mere tools. "You're a screwdriver. That's all you are and ever will be. If you don't turn screws the way I like you're damned." If that's the case what a curse intelligence and free will is. Maybe that screwdriver would work just fine as a pry bar or a chisel even if that's not the created purpose. And how much more complex is a human than that?

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This is a really weak rebuttal, and it's quite a bet less thoughtful than your previous posts. I think you can do much better.

It doesn't reduce humanity to tools. God does not need tools. He derives no benefit from the creation of human beings. It recognizes humanity as creations.

You're raising a hypothetical about maybe. Maybe that engine would be fantastic as a planter. But it wouldn't be an engine.

Humans are promised the most sublime destiny as an irrevocable and unchangeable essential characteristic of their nature: to become god.

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I don't see a good reason to recognize that a creator's intended purpose must supersede all other possible purposes.

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I can't take this response seriously. If we allow for a Creator - for argument's sake - the only agent who could presume to change the purpose would be a peer of the Creator.

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I can't take this response seriously. If we allow for a Creator - for argument's sake - the only agent who could presume to change the purpose would be a peer of the Creator.

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I don't see this as a self-evident statement at all. The act of creation may include an intended purpose, no argument there, but that intended purpose is still only from the creator's point of view. And I don't believe you've succeeded in arguing that humanity isn't allowed to have their own thoughts on the matter because they are created beings. You're still left arguing "ought" statements based on projected consequences which is no different than arguments made without the inclusion of a deity.

And all of that is with the assumed premise that not only does god exist but that we can accurately know what he wants. Which certainly isn't clear. Even people who agree that the god of the Bible exists can't agree on what that implies regarding what he wants from mankind. Effectively we're all just making opinion statements when it comes to what people ought and ought not do.

Yes, the intent is from the Creator's point of view. If we accept the structure (again for discussion's sake) of Creator-created I can't see how the subordinate "point of view" matters.

Humanity can have their own thought, but again the question is why? Where does this ability derive from? And having thoughts doesn't remove constraints. My dog may look at birds through the window but he cannot fly.

I'm not offering projected consequences. I'm talking about immutable ends. The ought is a binary consequence. You may deny the ought but you can't change the end.

Rocag said:

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Why should I treat "Because god said so" as a more legitimate justification than one that prioritizes the collective welfare of mankind?

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Suppose that God exists, loves you, is all knowing and all wise. Under what conditions would it make sense for someone to refuse to do what God said?

A moral ought is indefeasible; it can't be defeated by other considerations. When a cop tells me to pull over, that gives me reason to pull over. But it's defeasible reason. It can be defeated by other reasons. But, if a being like God exists, then his command can't possibly be defeated by other considerations.

Further, it is necessarily true that God should be loved. Since it is necessarily true that I ought to love God, then it follows that I ought to obey.

Eh, when you start bringing all the omni's into the mix you open yourself up for even more issues in my opinion. First and foremost the question of can free will even exist in the first place if everything is the creation of an omnipotent and omniscient deity (I strongly believe it cannot). Without free will there is no "ought" in the first place, only the "is". Existence is on rails and headed down one specific path even if the passengers don't know the route or destination.

I would therefore hesitate to engage in a discussion based on those assumptions because I believe at its base it doesn't make sense.

Rocag said:

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Eh, when you start bringing all the omni's into the mix you open yourself up for even more issues in my opinion. First and foremost the question of can free will even exist in the first place if everything is the creation of an omnipotent and omniscient deity (I strongly believe it cannot). Without free will there is no "ought" in the first place, only the "is". Existence is on rails and headed down one specific path even if the passengers don't know the route or destination.

I would therefore hesitate to engage in a discussion based on those assumptions because I believe at its base it doesn't make sense.

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If you want to give some reasons for thinking that the God of classical monotheism can't exist, that's fine. It can be it's own thread. But if the God of classical monotheism does exist, then the existence of moral obligations becomes explicable while, absent such a God, their existence is inexplicable.

We seem to have the "free will" thread on this board about once every month or so. Just stick around a bit, you'll see a new one pop up. And the argument isn't one against god's existence but that a world with an omnipotent and omniscient creator and free will is a logical contradiction. A very powerful and very knowing deity or one that doesn't promise free will wouldn't trigger the contradiction so it is only an argument against a very specific version of theism.

Back to the topic at hand, I think we may have reached a point where we are arguing in circles. I don't accept the presumptions you base your argument on as necessarily true (such as that god should be loved, that the creation is obligated to accept the creator's purpose for them, etc.) and without those base assumptions I don't see how you move the conversation forward. Simply claiming they are self evident isn't enough to convince me they actually are.

And, like I said, as a practical matter with no way to conclusively prove either god's existence or what he wants if he does exist we're all just making our "ought" statements based on assumptions and opinions. I don't see this as a problem for naturalism any more than it is for theism.

Martin Q. Blank said:

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Is this just Hume's is-ought problem?

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Pretty much always yes.

fat girlfriend said:

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If there were no God, there would be no moral obligations.

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Correct. Without God there is no objective standard of morality. Judging anything to be "bad" - rape, murder, theft, kidnapping, infidelity, etc. - would just be matters of opinion.

NoahAg said:

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fat girlfriend said:

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If there were no God, there would be no moral obligations.

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Correct. Without God there is no objective standard of morality. Judging anything to be "bad" - rape, murder, theft, kidnapping, infidelity, etc. - would just be matters of opinion.

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Given that you have zero tangible interaction with God, your decision to believe there is an objective standard is an opinion.

Rocag said:

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It seems to me that even inserting god into the equation doesn't really solve anything. Let's assume the existence of god and the idea that he's clearly set out how he wants humans to behave. The leap from there to saying "people ought to behave this way" still has the implied reasoning behind it that we are obligated to act according to what god wants. And where's the justification for that? Because he created us? So? I never asked to be created in the first place. Because he'll punish us if we don't? Threats are poor justification. Because he'll reward us if we do? That's just a bribe. Because it will make him happy? I see little reason to care if he's happy or not. The "ought" issue remains.

Furthermore every "ought" statement has some implied reasoning behind it even if that reasoning isn't explicitly stated. Why should I treat "Because god said so" as a more legitimate justification than one that prioritizes the collective welfare of mankind?

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That line of thinking, I would contend, is a bit of a strawman. Meaning that it fundamentally misunderstands the notion of hell, and assumes the God of Christianity, or even Aristotle, is just a powerful being within the universe, rather than a being that is the sheer act of to be itself or a being that is goodness itself. Even if we reject Christianity as a near eastern cultural expression adopted by western culture, yardda yadda…. You still are attacking a notion of God that is not the Christian understanding of God.

For example: "God will punish us…". We could talk about justice etc, but I assume you mean send us to Hell. (I could be wrong and apologize if I misunderstood). However in the theological sense, God does not send us to Hell, we choose it. A "god" that would force us to love him is not is not the God of Christianity. As Fulton Sheen would say "the charm of a "yes" is the possibility of a "no". Or as CS Lewis would state "There are only two kinds of people in the end: those who say to God, "Thy will be done," and those to whom God says, in the end, "Thy will be done." All that are in Hell, choose it.".

So when we say, as Christians, that we have an obligation to act in a way that is good, it is because goodness itself, the being that transcends Euthyphro's dilemma, radiates it from its very being, not because of an arbitrary statement of an arbitrary paganistic diety, rather because it's nature itself is goodness.

So when we disorder and unalign ourselves from this objective goodness itself. We deprive ourselves of a goodness that should rightly be there. And since we don't live in a vacuum we inevitably cause suffering and pain to those around us.

I would call that a "should".

Aggrad08 said:

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Martin Q. Blank said:

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Is this just Hume's is-ought problem?

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Pretty much always yes.

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It's really not. It's more akin to Aquinas' distinction between theoretical and practical reason.

It's pretty easy to get "a human ought to love God" from "it is a necessary truth that God is to be loved."