Got into a discussion with another individual about who was the best cavalry commander of the American Civil War. His man was Benjamin Grierson; no one else came close. States that his raid was strategically important in that it allowed Grant to take Vicksburg. Grierson doesn't even make my top 5.
I am curious as to what the esteemed historians on this site have to say...
Who is your Top 5 and reason for your opinion if you care?
1. Forrest- Raid on Mobile & Ohio, Streight's Raid, Brice's Crossroads, Horse Marines, enough said 2. Hampton- Trevilian Station, Beefsteak Raid, never screwed up majorily 3. Stuart- Twice around McClellan, always reliable reconn guy (Gettysburg he used the discretion Lee gave him but did not work out for the Rebs). 4. Mosby- Did so much with so little, captured horses and generals (Lincoln only missed the horses) and was a pain in the butt in the shadow of the Capitol until the end of the war. 5. Buford- token Federal for Thoroughfare Gap and Gettysburg.
I certainly see Grierson, but he was a one hit wonder, but then what a hit!
It's really difficult to compare them, especially the 3 top Confederates, since they operated in very different operational environments and had largely different missions.
When it comes to the traditional cavalry missions of screening and recon, Stuart was hard to beat, as least when he wasn't off in a fit of butthurt grandstanding. I will take issue with the contention that he was operating within Lee's instructions prior to Gettysburg, since one of Lee's orders was not to lose contact with the main body. A task which Stuart failed at, spectacularly.
As a deep raider, Forrest was the best, hands down. However, for all his tactical success, he was largely a sideshow at the strategic level.
I'm not sure I would even count Mosby as a cavalry commander so much as a mounted guerilla. And, like Forrest, tactically successful, strategically, largely irrelevant.
Since the Federal army forced their way into the area between Lee and Stuart, I'm not sure how that means Stuart failed dramatically. He wasn't going to crash through the AoP by himself.
As to Forrest and his strategic value, I think he was on Sherman's mind as much if not more than Johnston as he moved on Atlanta. And Forrest had no more than a brigade to division+ sized unit in the summer of 64. Both Mosby and Forrest tied up forces much larger than themselves due to the fear they instilled in the Union high command. Strategically significant? Maybe not but pretty impressive.
Strategically no cavalry commander was truly decisive in the war, Grierson comes the closest and all he did was distract* Pemberton and cause him to lose his cavalry for the Vicksburg Campaign, neither of which were crucial in the ultimate fall of Vicksburg. Stuart's first ride around McClellan, Van Dorn's Holly Springs Raid coupled with Forrest's West TN Raid and Wilson's Raid might be the only other strategically significant cavalry actions of the war.
*Pemberton wasn't unaware that Grant was moving south of the town on the west bank and all he sent was Bowen's Division to oppose the landing on the east bank. I owe Pemberton's insufficent action more to his being tied to the city as opposed to distracted by Grierson.
Forrest was strategically valuable at times and then disappeared at others. He just did his own thing. He was mediocre at best when tied to the main army. Forrest was talented and definitely a top 5 cavalry commander in the war, but I find claims of his genius rather overblown. Stuart was consistently a better cavalry commander overall.
Forrest certainly operated better independently, much like Stonewall but I'd say he was better than mediocre when attached to a larger force. As Smeghead mentioned the missions varied and different guys performed certain missions better. Working with an army, Stuart probably is your guy but for guerilla operations Mosby is tops and for deep raids Forrest is the guy. But much as the role of a starting pitcher is different from a long reliever, which is different from a closer only one will be the Cy Young award winner.
As a cavalry commander what did he do? Kill Stuart in a pointless raid and left the AoP without any cav in the Wilderness and Spotsylvania? Started fights with Meade? He has the reputation of a cavalryman but actually commanded infantry more.
Wade Hampton almost Crazy Horsed him at Trevellian Station before the LBH. He's not in my top 10 but for flash and dash he is top 5, maybe #1. His best moment during the Civil War was definitley on the east cavalry field at Gettysburg so props for that.
He wasn't brigaded to a general for nothing. He was as an adjective in action..... rash, daring, fearless, and reckless. His men loved him because he was always in front of them. He was basically responsible for killing Stuart (Yellow Tavern) and was stopping Lee's retreat at Appomattox.
Objectively, he was the poster child of a daring, flamboyant civil war cavalry officer.
Forrest was strategically valuable at times and then disappeared at others. He just did his own thing. He was mediocre at best when tied to the main army. Forrest was talented and definitely a top 5 cavalry commander in the war, but I find claims of his genius rather overblown. Stuart was consistently a better cavalry commander overall.
An argument could be made that Stuart was quite effective, but no commander from the war ever expressed a desire to have JEB on their side vs. NBF, to my knowledge. The latter focused on surprise and interior lines for control.
The key to Forrest's skill as a tactician was his innate ability to read a fight. He understood how best to balance mounted and dismounted action, defense and attack, commitment and pursuit. Whatever his issues of self-control behind the lines or in personal combat, Forrest never let emotion overcome him in conducting a battle.
His defining approach involved maintaining pressure, harassing enemy forces before an engagement, engaging them at all points during a fight and giving them no time to rally. "Whenever you see anything blue, shoot at it and do all you can to keep up the scare," was his injunction during one skirmish. The best illustration of his tactics came on June 10, 1864, at Brice's Crossroads, Miss.
Union Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman had dispatched Brig. Gen. Samuel Sturgis and 8,100 men to finish Forrest once and for all. Forrest had less than half as many troops, but he made excellent use of the wooded, broken terrain. He utilized his men's ability to shift from foot to horse and back again; he slowed and confused the Union advance by repeated counterattacks; he brought up his reinforcements on the enemy flanks and dispatched his Escort Company to strike at their rear.
At the climax of the fight he led a column against Sturgis' centerdirectly supported, for one of the few times in the Civil War, by an unlimbered artillery battalion advancing alongside in the manner of Napolon. Canister shot at 60 yards, revolvers against bayonets and the presence of Forrest himselflooking, recalled one observer, like "a very god of war"sent the Union troops reeling. Forrest's men pursued the fleeing Yankees for two days across 50 miles, inflicting 2,200 casualties and capturing more than 200 loaded supply wagons.
As well as the valor of the lion, Forrest possessed the cunning of the serpent. Bluff and deception played major roles in his tactics. Releasing prisoners with disinformation, deploying along trails and secondary roads, simulating larger forces by using small detachments in now-you-see-them-now-you-don't fashion, marching the same troops repeatedly across the same spaceall standard ploys, but consistently effective in intimidating outposts and small garrisons.
Forrest usually bolstered demands for an enemy's surrender with a warning that were an assault required, responsibility for the consequences rested with the defenders. This was a spin-off of the rules of war developed in early modern Europe, under which refusing surrender when facing almost certain defeat meant quarter should not be expected. The idea was to save useless bloodshed by negotiating the inevitable. The effect was often persuasive to enemies composed of mediocre troops, men usually posted somewhere in the back of beyond and not inspired to fight to the death. On one occasion a surrendered Union colonel, seeing the actual numbers of his opponents, demanded his arms back and a fair fight. Forrest replied that all was fair in love and war.
Supportive comparative incidents are very difficult to find.
One was a trained west pointer, and another a quite promoted junior enlisted. That the latter had such a substantial impact on significant strategies/battles in the war vs. the former essentially...proves the comparative value of the latter. He also had an outsized impact post-war, of course.
Forrest was used/deployed/employed separately much more often. His ability to use the environment around him to his advantage was a distinct advantage that...was without peer.
I dunno, and my opinion doesn't matter one iota, but if you had to ask some 'out of context' American commander like Patton who he would want as a cavalry commander under him, I think the answer would be clear.
1. Forrest- Raid on Mobile & Ohio, Streight's Raid, Brice's Crossroads, Horse Marines, enough said 2. Hampton- Trevilian Station, Beefsteak Raid, never screwed up majorily 3. Stuart- Twice around McClellan, always reliable reconn guy (Gettysburg he used the discretion Lee gave him but did not work out for the Rebs). 4. Mosby- Did so much with so little, captured horses and generals (Lincoln only missed the horses) and was a pain in the butt in the shadow of the Capitol until the end of the war. 5. Buford- token Federal for Thoroughfare Gap and Gettysburg.
I certainly see Grierson, but he was a one hit wonder, but then what a hit!
Re:Mosby - see William Mosby Eastland -San Jacinto battle =Mier Expedition- drew black bean executed.
I am partial to Buford. His one big thing was to get the Federals in the right places as the Gettysburg fight began. And he understood Cavalry was about recon and economy of force missions, not the Napoleonic saber/lancer charges of 50 years prior. No Buford and the Civil War ends differently. Too bad he did not live long enough to see it.
Sam Elliott does not play wusses in movies, either...........
NBF is a decent pick but all his stuff was in the backwaters of the war and not seriously strategically important.
Stuart was a gadfly and failed Lee when most needed.
The raids by Wilson and Grierson were jaunts on the sidelines.
1. Forrest- Raid on Mobile & Ohio, Streight's Raid, Brice's Crossroads, Horse Marines, enough said 2. Hampton- Trevilian Station, Beefsteak Raid, never screwed up majorily 3. Stuart- Twice around McClellan, always reliable reconn guy (Gettysburg he used the discretion Lee gave him but did not work out for the Rebs). 4. Mosby- Did so much with so little, captured horses and generals (Lincoln only missed the horses) and was a pain in the butt in the shadow of the Capitol until the end of the war. 5. Buford- token Federal for Thoroughfare Gap and Gettysburg.
I certainly see Grierson, but he was a one hit wonder, but then what a hit!
Philip Sheridan > Stuart. Stuart was a loose cannon that helped Lee lose Gettysburg.
It's really difficult to compare them, especially the 3 top Confederates, since they operated in very different operational environments and had largely different missions.
When it comes to the traditional cavalry missions of screening and recon, Stuart was hard to beat, as least when he wasn't off in a fit of butthurt grandstanding. I will take issue with the contention that he was operating within Lee's instructions prior to Gettysburg, since one of Lee's orders was not to lose contact with the main body. A task which Stuart failed at, spectacularly.
As a deep raider, Forrest was the best, hands down. However, for all his tactical success, he was largely a sideshow at the strategic level.
I'm not sure I would even count Mosby as a cavalry commander so much as a mounted guerilla. And, like Forrest, tactically successful, strategically, largely irrelevant.
It would have been interesting to see what Forrest might have proved capable of had his ability been recognized a couple of years earlier, which earlier increased utilization was hampered by natural-to-the-time subjugation of recognition of "natural ability" to formally-instructed military science. Eventually he climbed the ladder all the way in Confederate service in the "West", demonstrating himself equal to each succeeding challenge until the Confederacy's bottom fell out. He gave indication of an ability to apprehend strategic thought and responsible others, after the bird had flown, lamented that he had not been given the opportunity to act upon a bigger stage. I believe Jefferson Davis was among these.
