I'm taking a strategy course through the Naval War College right now on Strategy and War, part of my Joint Professional Military Education requirement. My latest paper was on the topic of strategy in the American Revolution, specifically if the American success was more attributable to our strategy or the failings of British strategy.
A couple of notes, the class is structured and all of our points in the paper have to be relevant to the readings, not outside stuff. The essay structure is also a bit constrained. Anyway, here's what I wrote. Would be good fodder for discussion:
American success in the Revolutionary War was due on the operational and strategic level primarily to the failings of the British during the war. England failed in three key and interrelated ways which showed their fatal misunderstanding of the nature of the American war. They squandered the crucial moral element, overestimated and failed to properly leverage loyalist support, and failed to adapt their strategy to changing circumstances as the war went on. Further failings of global strategy in regards to Britain's continental enemies compounded these failings on the battlefield in North America.
The failure to win the moral side of the war
Fisher claims the British army behaved with moderation (Fisher, 546), but this is only partly true. While the policy of the commanders at the top of the British Army, particularly the Howes and Lord Cornwallis, was moderate, the actions of some of their subordinates like Tarleton and Ferguson, and auxiliaries (the Hessians) were far from it. Given a choice between moderation and fire-and-sword, the British by default chose both simultaneously. The moderation, evidenced by Cornwallis' slow pursuit of Washington in 1776, was often tactically counterproductive while availing the British nothing in the moral sense, whereas the plundering of the Hessians was likewise counterproductive (their baggage became a drag on their forces) but compounded the error, causing catastrophic moral damage to the British cause through patriot propaganda. That such an effect, which was reasonably predictable, was not considered and factored into an overall plan points to the chronic incoherence of British strategy.
Sam Adams' maxim to "Put your enemy in the wrong and keep him so" (Allison, 19) was easily adhered to because the British gave him so much propaganda red meat. But even had they been more restrained, the British were doomed in the propaganda war because they barely attempted to wage it. They captured Philadelphia looking for the American congress. It may have availed them just as much to capture the city's many printing presses.
Failing to leverage loyalist support
The question of maintaining the moral high ground, "winning hearts and minds" is particularly crucial given the prime place in British strategy afforded to the exploitation of the supposed vast loyalist sentiment in the United States. Loyalist support, initially promising, was wasted away through three factors. The first was a lack of a coherent plan to utilize loyalists. Supporters of the crown also lacked a strong governing structure to allow them to self-organize as the rebels did, which was partly a failing internal to the loyalists themselves, but also an outgrowth of the first failing. The third factor was the British inability to protect loyalists who pledged themselves to the cause. This includes protection from patriot reprisals (Allison, 51), as well as from their own self-defeating, plundering treatment of all Americans, loyalist, neutral and patriot alike. As British and Hessian troops moved into New Jersey, they plundered the very loyalists who flocked to greet them as liberators (Hackett, 124). Additionally, "Tarleton's Quarter" in South Carolina and Clinton's Proclamations of 1780 created an environment which hardened rebel sympathies and pushed neutrals and potential loyalists away from Britain, thus helping to dissipate enthusiasm for the crown cause (Carpenter 20-22).
Failure to adapt strategy to changed circumstances
During the war, both sides' initial strategic assumptions failed the test in the field, but American commanders, particularly George Washington and Nathaniel Green moved towards a more viable strategic alternative (Pavkovic). In this case, the American success highlights, by contrast, the British failure in the same. Americans evolved a new way of war (Hackett, 367) that was barely matched even in the attempt by their opponents. British strategy was vacillating from the beginning, and never evolved. Henry Clinton, throughout his command, never showed a "clear appreciation of his task or any rational suggestions for advancing it" (Fisher, 545). The effort mounted in 1776 is characterized as a "gamble" hardly an inspiring term for a deliberative strategic vision (Fisher, 549). After early failings, the British in 1779 recognized that they could not bring Washington to a decisive battle, but the strategic conclusion derived from this was hardly a bold shift. British forces simply chose to hold Washington and wait for the chimerical loyalist uprising they had been dreaming of for the past four years (Fisher, 550).
Counter Argument: American Strategy Triumphant
An alternative view would be to credit George Washington and other continental leaders with a strategic acumen that surpassed the British failings. Washington too faced strategic incoherence at the beginning of the war, but evolved into a greater understanding of the nature of the war, of irregular warfare and the use of militia in conjunction with regulars, of the value of intelligence, and of keeping an army in being to frustrate British plan through a "war of posts." Similarly, Gen. Nathaniel Green and Southern partisans such as Francis Marion developed a style of warfare by partisan attrition that wore down Gen. Cornwallis, pushing him into a trap that Washington and his French allies were able to spring (Weigley, 26). It is unquestionable that the Americans understood their mission better than the British understood theirs. The fact that their options were inherently limited through Washington's "military poverty" (Weigley, 3), gave them the sharp focus of a cornered animal, and they developed strategy according to the simple, stark options that were open to them.
Counter Argument Refutation
While it is somewhat true that the two strategies, American and British are opposite sides of the same coin, the American success counterweighing against British failings was inherently reactive. Washington did develop an effective strategy, one that evolved in a way that the British one never did. But throughout the war, he was forced to surrender the strategic initiative and was only able to seize the tactical initiative. He could do no more with the resources available at hand. Washington's goals were to keep his army alive and wait for the enemy to make a mistake. His strategy was, in fact, predicated on British strategy, making the latter the true center of gravity upon which the entire war pivoted. At Trenton, Saratoga, and Yorktown, as in the war overall, the Americans succeeded only insofar as they capitalized on British failures.
Conclusion: Britain overstretched
These factors on the ground were compounded by broader strategic factors. England simply bit off more than it could chew. While impressive in its logistics, the effort was simply inadequate. This is no Scottish rebellion, walled off from foreign interference and with short supply lines. Many of the strategic failings cited above stemmed from the logistical failings of the British war in North America. Inability to mobilize and protect loyalists was hampered by the sheer scale of the geography. Operations in the field were limited by long supply lines stretching back to England, which in turn were exposed to privateers and foreign raiders. As the war became global which, given lingering resentment of England by continental powers was inevitable the British were forced to divert troops from America to Caribbean posts (Fisher, 554), and ships even further afield. In the end, the defeat at Yorktown was made possible because of the French ability to achieve temporary naval supremacy at a crucial moment. England was re-fighting the Seven Years War, but with its most important ally in that conflict transformed into its chief opponent in the sequel. British strategy simply did not rise to the occasion, and to do so, if it were even possible, would have required a vision and boldness that was utterly lacking at all levels in British leadership.
Britain also lost the war because the conflict was ultimately a political, not a military one. Having failed to reconcile the colonies before the struggle escalated at Lexington and Concord, Britain failed again and again on the political front through the following year, resulting in a Declaration of Independence that transformed the war's aims and enabled foreign intervention. The British failure to appreciate the power of the political dynamics is not separate from their strategic battlefield failures because it was inherent in their failure to understand the nature of the war. It was a war for hearts and minds, which required clever strategy and a very fine distinction of appropriate levels of force to be used, as well as policies to maximize loyalist participation and drain patriot support. Britain in the 1770s and 1780s needed a strategy as precise as a scalpel, but had only at its disposal a toolkit full of hammers. It's very possible that winning the war required a strategic bridge too far. The most modern theorists today still struggle with insurgencies and winning hearts and minds, and they have the benefit of centuries of hindsight, as well as modern technology on their side. Britain in the late 18th Century, facing a new kind of popular war on the North American continent, and a global war outside it, was even less up to the task.
A couple of notes, the class is structured and all of our points in the paper have to be relevant to the readings, not outside stuff. The essay structure is also a bit constrained. Anyway, here's what I wrote. Would be good fodder for discussion:
American success in the Revolutionary War was due on the operational and strategic level primarily to the failings of the British during the war. England failed in three key and interrelated ways which showed their fatal misunderstanding of the nature of the American war. They squandered the crucial moral element, overestimated and failed to properly leverage loyalist support, and failed to adapt their strategy to changing circumstances as the war went on. Further failings of global strategy in regards to Britain's continental enemies compounded these failings on the battlefield in North America.
The failure to win the moral side of the war
Fisher claims the British army behaved with moderation (Fisher, 546), but this is only partly true. While the policy of the commanders at the top of the British Army, particularly the Howes and Lord Cornwallis, was moderate, the actions of some of their subordinates like Tarleton and Ferguson, and auxiliaries (the Hessians) were far from it. Given a choice between moderation and fire-and-sword, the British by default chose both simultaneously. The moderation, evidenced by Cornwallis' slow pursuit of Washington in 1776, was often tactically counterproductive while availing the British nothing in the moral sense, whereas the plundering of the Hessians was likewise counterproductive (their baggage became a drag on their forces) but compounded the error, causing catastrophic moral damage to the British cause through patriot propaganda. That such an effect, which was reasonably predictable, was not considered and factored into an overall plan points to the chronic incoherence of British strategy.
Sam Adams' maxim to "Put your enemy in the wrong and keep him so" (Allison, 19) was easily adhered to because the British gave him so much propaganda red meat. But even had they been more restrained, the British were doomed in the propaganda war because they barely attempted to wage it. They captured Philadelphia looking for the American congress. It may have availed them just as much to capture the city's many printing presses.
Failing to leverage loyalist support
The question of maintaining the moral high ground, "winning hearts and minds" is particularly crucial given the prime place in British strategy afforded to the exploitation of the supposed vast loyalist sentiment in the United States. Loyalist support, initially promising, was wasted away through three factors. The first was a lack of a coherent plan to utilize loyalists. Supporters of the crown also lacked a strong governing structure to allow them to self-organize as the rebels did, which was partly a failing internal to the loyalists themselves, but also an outgrowth of the first failing. The third factor was the British inability to protect loyalists who pledged themselves to the cause. This includes protection from patriot reprisals (Allison, 51), as well as from their own self-defeating, plundering treatment of all Americans, loyalist, neutral and patriot alike. As British and Hessian troops moved into New Jersey, they plundered the very loyalists who flocked to greet them as liberators (Hackett, 124). Additionally, "Tarleton's Quarter" in South Carolina and Clinton's Proclamations of 1780 created an environment which hardened rebel sympathies and pushed neutrals and potential loyalists away from Britain, thus helping to dissipate enthusiasm for the crown cause (Carpenter 20-22).
Failure to adapt strategy to changed circumstances
During the war, both sides' initial strategic assumptions failed the test in the field, but American commanders, particularly George Washington and Nathaniel Green moved towards a more viable strategic alternative (Pavkovic). In this case, the American success highlights, by contrast, the British failure in the same. Americans evolved a new way of war (Hackett, 367) that was barely matched even in the attempt by their opponents. British strategy was vacillating from the beginning, and never evolved. Henry Clinton, throughout his command, never showed a "clear appreciation of his task or any rational suggestions for advancing it" (Fisher, 545). The effort mounted in 1776 is characterized as a "gamble" hardly an inspiring term for a deliberative strategic vision (Fisher, 549). After early failings, the British in 1779 recognized that they could not bring Washington to a decisive battle, but the strategic conclusion derived from this was hardly a bold shift. British forces simply chose to hold Washington and wait for the chimerical loyalist uprising they had been dreaming of for the past four years (Fisher, 550).
Counter Argument: American Strategy Triumphant
An alternative view would be to credit George Washington and other continental leaders with a strategic acumen that surpassed the British failings. Washington too faced strategic incoherence at the beginning of the war, but evolved into a greater understanding of the nature of the war, of irregular warfare and the use of militia in conjunction with regulars, of the value of intelligence, and of keeping an army in being to frustrate British plan through a "war of posts." Similarly, Gen. Nathaniel Green and Southern partisans such as Francis Marion developed a style of warfare by partisan attrition that wore down Gen. Cornwallis, pushing him into a trap that Washington and his French allies were able to spring (Weigley, 26). It is unquestionable that the Americans understood their mission better than the British understood theirs. The fact that their options were inherently limited through Washington's "military poverty" (Weigley, 3), gave them the sharp focus of a cornered animal, and they developed strategy according to the simple, stark options that were open to them.
Counter Argument Refutation
While it is somewhat true that the two strategies, American and British are opposite sides of the same coin, the American success counterweighing against British failings was inherently reactive. Washington did develop an effective strategy, one that evolved in a way that the British one never did. But throughout the war, he was forced to surrender the strategic initiative and was only able to seize the tactical initiative. He could do no more with the resources available at hand. Washington's goals were to keep his army alive and wait for the enemy to make a mistake. His strategy was, in fact, predicated on British strategy, making the latter the true center of gravity upon which the entire war pivoted. At Trenton, Saratoga, and Yorktown, as in the war overall, the Americans succeeded only insofar as they capitalized on British failures.
Conclusion: Britain overstretched
These factors on the ground were compounded by broader strategic factors. England simply bit off more than it could chew. While impressive in its logistics, the effort was simply inadequate. This is no Scottish rebellion, walled off from foreign interference and with short supply lines. Many of the strategic failings cited above stemmed from the logistical failings of the British war in North America. Inability to mobilize and protect loyalists was hampered by the sheer scale of the geography. Operations in the field were limited by long supply lines stretching back to England, which in turn were exposed to privateers and foreign raiders. As the war became global which, given lingering resentment of England by continental powers was inevitable the British were forced to divert troops from America to Caribbean posts (Fisher, 554), and ships even further afield. In the end, the defeat at Yorktown was made possible because of the French ability to achieve temporary naval supremacy at a crucial moment. England was re-fighting the Seven Years War, but with its most important ally in that conflict transformed into its chief opponent in the sequel. British strategy simply did not rise to the occasion, and to do so, if it were even possible, would have required a vision and boldness that was utterly lacking at all levels in British leadership.
Britain also lost the war because the conflict was ultimately a political, not a military one. Having failed to reconcile the colonies before the struggle escalated at Lexington and Concord, Britain failed again and again on the political front through the following year, resulting in a Declaration of Independence that transformed the war's aims and enabled foreign intervention. The British failure to appreciate the power of the political dynamics is not separate from their strategic battlefield failures because it was inherent in their failure to understand the nature of the war. It was a war for hearts and minds, which required clever strategy and a very fine distinction of appropriate levels of force to be used, as well as policies to maximize loyalist participation and drain patriot support. Britain in the 1770s and 1780s needed a strategy as precise as a scalpel, but had only at its disposal a toolkit full of hammers. It's very possible that winning the war required a strategic bridge too far. The most modern theorists today still struggle with insurgencies and winning hearts and minds, and they have the benefit of centuries of hindsight, as well as modern technology on their side. Britain in the late 18th Century, facing a new kind of popular war on the North American continent, and a global war outside it, was even less up to the task.
