Calling all you ACW buffs! I've got a question for you.

The wife and I had the opportunity to visit Antietam and Harpers Ferry on two sunny days this past weekend. It's a gorgeous part of the country, well worth the visit if you are in the area. I was struck by the terrain at Antietam, the gentle hills and ridges just high enough to conceal and protect. I was also struck by how wide the front of battle was from the Cornfield to Burnside Bridge. Grossly outnumbered by McClellan and still regrouping, I really couldn't see how Lee could hope to gain his northern victory here.

My question: Many hypotheticals ponder what would have happened had the CSA won at Sharpsburg. But why did Lee commit himself at Antietam in the first place?

I know that the Union commanders received word of Lee's whereabouts and situation when they recovered Special Order 191, and therefore moved to meet him while his forces were still split. Is the answer simply that he did not expect to meet Union resistance so soon, and so was forced to fight? Could he not withdraw to a more beneficial site after realizing the force opposing him? Did he even consider withdrawal? Or could he not hope to do so with his forces still spread out without undue chance that one or more of his three columns being cut off before crossing the Potomac? Obviously he believed he could win, else he wouldn't have committed forces to the field, right? What was his plan for victory? The Confederates seemed to be on the defensive for the majority of the battle.

I'm genuinely curious what you guys think. I'm not much a Civil War nut, but I am reading Battlecry of Freedom at the moment (but not that far along). In any case, I do not envy those Texans in the Cornfield or the Union troops who had to storm the bridge with the Georgian snipers trained on them from the bluff above!

The biggest problem is that there was only one ford over the Potomac behind him, and he was worried he could not safely retreat in the face of the Union army: he was helped after the battle by McClellan's reluctance to press him.

I'm not an expert, but I did just finish listening to the 10 or so episodes on regarding the battle on the civil war podcast (which I would recommend). Part of Lees army had just been defeated in the battle of something ridge or mountain and his lines of communication and supply were threatened. He had no business trying to fight at sharpsburg except for the fact that McClellan was the opposing general. McLennan had proven to be so incompetent on the peninsula and elsewhere that Lee felt he had and advantage even though his force was way out numbered and exhausted.
That was the opinion of the podcast hosts.

Is that the podcast the Civil War (1861-1865): A History Podcast?

I barely have made it through the intos up to Ft sumter. The male host is so pro north and anti south it disgusts me.

oldarmy76 said:

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Part of Lees army had just been defeated in the battle of something ridge or mountain and his lines of communication and supply were threatened. He had no business trying to fight at sharpsburg except for the fact that McClellan was the opposing general.

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South Mountain is what you're thinking of. It's theee engagements fought to hit Lee's army while it is separated coming through the Blue Ridge into Maryland.

Lee concentrates his army at Sharpsburg afterward so he doesn't get picked apart by the numerically superior Union forces.

Dr. Watson said:

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Lee had no choice. He blundered badly during the Maryland Campaign. He assumed Harper's Ferry would just surrender without a fight. It didn't. He assumed his army would be fine invading Maryland. They weren't. He assumed Maryland would support the South, but he invaded the wrong part of the state for that. He split his inferior force into many disparate parts to try and supply his forces and clean up the area around Harper's Ferry, and he was facing an AoP that was motivated to stop him. The pressure placed on Jackson around South Mountain (and Jackson blundered badly during this campaign as well) forced Lee to reassemble and try to make it back to the Potomac. With the passes around South Mountain cut off, he only had one open ford across the Potomac and he couldn't take it with the entire Army of the Potomac nearby in good order. So he had to urgently call for AP Hill and wait for McClellan to act.

Three people saved Lee at Antietam: McClellan, Burnside, and AP Hill. McClellan's plan of attack made it impossible for the Union to quickly and decisively win. A piecemeal assault against good defensive terrain with good interior lines meant that Lee could shuttle his reinforcements along the line as they came under attack. Burnside refused to listen to his subordinates who told him everything from, "there's a ford half a mile down the creek," to "the creek is only knee deep." Had he pressed his advantages, Lee's right would have been rolled up almost immediately. As it happened, they almost still lost their right flank and the one road to the ford. But AP Hill showed up just in the nick of time.

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Well said!

He didn't have a choice.

I will add another "well said" to that post.

My family spent an entire day exploring the Antietam battlefield back in 1987, and of course, visited Burnside's bridge. Have lot's of memories of that day (and of many other civil war battlefields we visited when I was stationed at Andrews AFB, Maryland - near DC).

Somehow, the strongest memory of what we learned that day is what you just posted:

Quote:

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Burnside refused to listen to his subordinates who told him everything from, "there's a ford half a mile down the creek," to "the creek is only knee deep." Had he pressed his advantages, Lee's right would have been rolled up almost immediately.

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Our son was only six at the time and didn't quite understand a lot of what we were seeing and learning about - but when we were staring at Burnside's Bridge and learning the story of Burnside's blunder he understood completely. He is 36 now and was not a fan of visiting Civil War battle fields - but he remembers that story to this day.

And to this day, I have always wondered why Lincoln kept Burnside in high level AoP positions after that fiasco.

Thank you all for your input! It makes much more sense to me knowing that Lee was forced to fight there, rather than choosing it.

A fascinating campaign. The discovery of "the lost order" made McClellan much more aggressive initially than his norm. Lee was thus in a tight squeeze.
A Landscape turned Red by Steven Sears is a must read. My favorite on it and I've got a bunch.
Antietam a Soldiers Battle by John Michael Priest gives a minute by minute ground eye view of that horrific day

It is. I started at bull run and moved forward. I find it very interesting and don't see any latent anti south sentiment. The pod casters are out of Virginia I believe. If anything, they do too much detail. Antitum was 10 episodes or so which is sometimes hard to keep up with the details of troup movement over 10-weeks.

Ah, I started at the beginning. The lead in is very anti-south in its explanation of causes of war, but even moreso in the adoration of Lincoln and disparaging of Southern leaders. Good to know it improves. I'll keep going

A document has come down to me through my grandmother's family in Maryland, though I have no idea how it found its way to her. It is a handwritten version of Lee's proclamation "To the People of Maryland."

At the upper right corner it reads,

Quote:

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Head Qurs: Army No Va.
Near Fredericktown 8th Sept. 1862

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The signature at the end on the right side of the final page is R.E. Lee, General Comd.

However, the signature is in the same handwriting as the rest of the letter, and the rest of the letter was presumably written by Charles Marshall. On the left side of the final page it reads,

Quote:

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Official
Charles Marshall
Maj. & A.D.C.

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These three lines are crossed out with a line across each part.



I also have a letter on official stationery, Head-Quarters, 8th Army Corps, dated 20 September 1862 and addressed "To the Ladies of Frederick, Md." The letter authorizes said ladies to set up a hospital for the care of "confederate" (his quotation marks) wounded and sick prisoners of war.

By command of Major General Wool, signed by T J Cram, Colonel, A.D.C.


There are also a number of cartes de visite, including a photo of my two first cousins, four times removed, who served with a Confederate Maryland infantry unit.

As I've mentioned before, my ggg grandfather and my uncle, his son, were with the 27 th Georgia and met the federal s as they came across the cornfield in the morning. They eventually retreated toBloody Lane where they defended that position.

At some point they retreated across Antietam Creek as the day stretched on. My uncle George Carter was wounded but survived. I have a pic of him I'll post tomorrow.

Lee's position at Antietam from a tactical perspective was very good for the most part ( excluding escapability in defeat and some blind spots at the Sunken Road). His performance was terrific as he used his interior lines to quickly shuttle his troops at just the right moments to avoid disaster. Contrast that position to the next year at Gettysburg where The Federals had the interior lines and Lee's men could not support each other quickly to see a bad tactical situation.