According Admiral Barbey, they took his input with a grain of salt. Saipan was going to take place on 15 June 1944. They bombarded it with 15 battleships and 11 cruisers with 165,000 rounds (2,500 14 and 16 inch rounds) for two solid days from 10,000 yards. And we are not talking about the areal bombardment. It still took 71,000 Marines and soldiers until 7 July to finish it.74OA said:
To this day, with total Allied air and sea supremacy at Normandy, I cannot understand how more German emplacements and fortifications weren't obliterated in advance. Nor can I understand why it took so many hours of desperate fighting before one lone destroyer captain finally took the initiative and pushed in close enough to provide effective fire support at Omaha. As important as the landings were, I'd have thought the Navy would have grounded gunships on the beach to fire point-blank if necessary. Had our European Theater air and naval forces learned nothing about supporting landing forces from the Pacific campaigns?
Yes, but only a fraction of the acreage at Omaha (or elsewhere) had line-of-sight to fire directly at the landing craft. I'm referring to the lack of effective, responsive tactical air and naval gunfire in direct support of the landing force despite air and naval supremacy at the point of attack. Once the problem became evident at Omaha, the enemy with beach overwatch positions should have been inundated with Allied tactical air and naval gunfire. My question is why didn't it happen?Rabid Cougar said:According Admiral Barbey, they took his input with a grain of salt. Saipan was going to take place on 15 June 1944. They bombarded it with 15 battleships and 11 cruisers with 165,000 rounds (2,500 14 and 16 inch rounds) for two solid days from 10,000 yards. And we are not talking about the areal bombardment. It still took 71,000 Marines and soldiers until 7 July to finish it.74OA said:
To this day, with total Allied air and sea supremacy at Normandy, I cannot understand how more German emplacements and fortifications weren't obliterated in advance. Nor can I understand why it took so many hours of desperate fighting before one lone destroyer captain finally took the initiative and pushed in close enough to provide effective fire support at Omaha. As important as the landings were, I'd have thought the Navy would have grounded gunships on the beach to fire point-blank if necessary. Had our European Theater air and naval forces learned nothing about supporting landing forces from the Pacific campaigns?
Saipan is 44 square miles. Not one inch of it was outside the range of the bombardment. Utah Beach was 36 square miles by itself.
740A,Quote:
To this day, with total Allied air and sea supremacy at Normandy, I cannot understand how more German emplacements and fortifications weren't obliterated in advance. Nor can I understand why it took so many hours of desperate fighting before one lone destroyer captain finally took the initiative and pushed in close enough to provide effective fire support at Omaha. As important as the landings were, I'd have thought the Navy would have grounded gunships on the beach to fire point-blank if necessary. Had our European Theater air and naval forces learned nothing about supporting landing forces from the Pacific campaigns?
I was indulging in a bit of hyperbole regarding ship grounding and I'm well aware of the effects, and sometimes lack thereof, from naval gunfire and tactical air in the Pacific Theater. What I am trying to understand is why, once things bogged down on Omaha, there wasn't an immediate and overwhelming response from the Allied navies and air forces to suppress the German overwatch positions firing directly onto the beach. If I recall correctly, it took hours before one lone destroyer captain finally took the initiative to venture in close enough to provide accurate supporting gunfire--so it certainly was possible to do so by the dozens of other destroyers available. Nor can I find much discussion of tactical air's response--not strategic bombers--showing up to work over the cliffs, either. My question simply is why wasn't more done on the day?titan said:740A,Quote:
To this day, with total Allied air and sea supremacy at Normandy, I cannot understand how more German emplacements and fortifications weren't obliterated in advance. Nor can I understand why it took so many hours of desperate fighting before one lone destroyer captain finally took the initiative and pushed in close enough to provide effective fire support at Omaha. As important as the landings were, I'd have thought the Navy would have grounded gunships on the beach to fire point-blank if necessary. Had our European Theater air and naval forces learned nothing about supporting landing forces from the Pacific campaigns?
Rabid Cougar rightly pointed out the Saipan example. Another is Okinawa. And those were heavier battleships on the main, and far more concentrated and skilled at that kind of thing carrier based air power. And yet at the Pacific invasions, it was simply not that easy to knock out fortifications. It is closely related to the myth of how much can be accomplished from the air, that a bombardment can account for most.
On the specific command and control element,withe the destroyer example --- you are onto a different point. This kind of thing would have been better grasped in the Pacific by both sides probably sooner, yes, but there are still limits. But the idea of `grounding gunships' is nuts ----- are you saying let battleships and heavy cruisers run aground and possibly break their backs and be constructive losses in an attempt to provide closer support???
The Japanese Navy did regularly risk cruisers real close-in, and oddly enough, did consider your proposal at both Saipan and Okinawa. At Saipan the old battleship Yamashiro was indeed to be run ashore, and at Okinawa the famous super-battleship Yamato had the same mission.
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What I am trying to understand is why, once things bogged down on Omaha, there wasn't an immediate and overwhelming response from the Allied navies and air forces to suppress the German overwatch positions firing directly onto the beach. If I recall correctly, it took hours before one lone destroyer captain finally took the initiative to venture in close enough to provide accurate supporting gunfire--so it certainly was possible to do so by the dozens of other destroyers available.
That is an even better question. Though certainly Atlantic land-based air did not have the practice at taking out such positions that MacArthur's and Nimitz's forces did. But you implying there wasn't much tactical response at all --- not just simply the bombings failed, right? It will be interesting to see if any D-Day experts have answers now that what you are asking is more clear.Quote:
Nor can I find much discussion of tactical air's response--not strategic bombers--showing up to work over the cliffs, either. My question simply is why wasn't more done on the day?
Yeah, my premise could be way off, but I can't find much discussion on this subject. Regarding tactical air, while it's of course true that Allied air in Europe didn't have much experience supporting sea landings, it did have extensive experience providing close air support and interdiction, so I doubt there is any technical, tactical or doctrinal issues that would have prevented on-call air support at Normandy. Again, I'm posing all this as a question, and would love to have someone knowledgeable educate me......titan said:Quote:
What I am trying to understand is why, once things bogged down on Omaha, there wasn't an immediate and overwhelming response from the Allied navies and air forces to suppress the German overwatch positions firing directly onto the beach. If I recall correctly, it took hours before one lone destroyer captain finally took the initiative to venture in close enough to provide accurate supporting gunfire--so it certainly was possible to do so by the dozens of other destroyers available.
Okay, I see the distinction you are making. I freely aver that is a good question, and its not my expertise. I can't say. I really haven't studied the forensics of the D-Day invasion and events as have Pacific War. (Atlantic special at sea is the Kreigsmarine and Royal Navy clashes, not the landings.) Was the long destroyer also not followed in? Japanese ones would have been champing at the bit, and probably would have done what you said. It got them in trouble sometimes.That is an even better question. Though certainly Atlantic land-based air did not have the practice at taking out such positions that MacArthur's and Nimitz's forces did. But you implying there wasn't much tactical response at all --- not just simply the bombings failed, right? It will be interesting to see if any D-Day experts have answers now that what you are asking is more clear.Quote:
Nor can I find much discussion of tactical air's response--not strategic bombers--showing up to work over the cliffs, either. My question simply is why wasn't more done on the day?
ABATTBQ87 said:
From my studies regarding the bombardment of the Normandy Coast.
1) They relatively short duration by naval gunfire was to destroy as many gun emplacements as possible, as well as shock the defending forces so that when the landings took place the Germans would be numb and unable to fight.
2) The aerial bombardment was to provide foxhole cover on the beaches, but bombers were afraid of hitting inbound landing craft so they waited a few extra seconds to drop their bombs; this resulted in missed coastal targets.
3) The Allies didn't want to show their hand early; the Normandy plan was based on deception and keeping German armor from attacking at the beach-heads. In the mind of the planners, they had to keep the Germans thinking that Patton was crossing at Calais, and early bombings/navy gunfire would have blown that cover rather quickly.
74OA said:
Not talking about air interdiction inland of the Normandy beaches. Not talking about bombers hitting area targets from altitude. Not talking about the general theater prep done in the months leading up to invasion.
Was only questioning the apparent lack of effective on-call direct naval gunfire support and close air support for the beaches themselves on D-Day. Read the link I posted earlier, please.....
Undoubtedly true, but once on the beach, Navy shore parties were there to talk gunfire and tac air onto targets not visible off shore. But the few resources I can find say that it took hours before a destroyer captain took the initiative to push in close enough to provide effective fire support........ABATTBQ87 said:74OA said:
Not talking about air interdiction inland of the Normandy beaches. Not talking about bombers hitting area targets from altitude. Not talking about the general theater prep done in the months leading up to invasion.
Was only questioning the apparent lack of effective on-call direct naval gunfire support and close air support for the beaches themselves on D-Day. Read the link I posted earlier, please.....
Couldn't see the emplacements from the sea; Rommel was genius in the way he positioned gun emplacements as muzzle flash could not be seen from the sea as they fired down the beach,