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Yea I really don't see that this is the case in any practical sense at all.
The only way I've ever seen people argue for natural rights without an external moral arbiter is to more or less co-opt the concept of natural rights by affirming them while denying the premise. But to say that natural rights are good, and natural, and are inviolable begs the question "why?". And even an appeal to reason is metaphysical. At some point it has to be an external standard, or it fails to be immutable, and therefore it is an inherently different concept of rights altogether.
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These things have certainly had their effects, but I don't take a doom and gloom view. The world is actually quite a bit better than it has been in the past for the typical person. And I see quite a few excesses and terrible things rooted in religion.
Who said doom and gloom? I said this is where the bad comes from. It is also where some of the good comes from. We don't have to reject the good things of America to point out the bad. And arguing that "yeah religion has problems, too" is sort of ancillary to the topic at hand. People doing bad things for bad reasons in one sphere isn't really challenged by people doing bad things for bad reasons in another.
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I don't think personhood is logically restricted to humanity I think it's a broader and more powerful concept. I think Neanderthals were probably people and if alive today would need rights extended to them even though they aren't human beings. And if we follow our evolution back I think trying to discern differences in our DNA or ability to procreate with our ancestor is not as meaningful an indicator as the traits we view as personhood. And I do think we should be broad, which is why I err pretty early on abortion, but I don't extend it past the limits of reason as I see them, which is to say a few cells.
I wasn't arguing striclty for human nature as solely identified with DNA. Philosophically the Greeks said men were "logos" while animals were "alogos". By this definition a Neanderthal may well have been a Man, even if it wasn't a homo sapien, if that follows? Regardless, there is a categorical error to assign a property of the universal into the realm of the particular. We don't say that a goldfish is a fish and therefore each goldfish has gills. We say that all fish have gills, and goldfish are fish, and therefore has gills (clunky, but maybe illustrates the correct motion from broad to specific). Steve doesn't have the right to life because he is Steve. Even before he was Steve he had it. He has it because Steve is a human being. It's not a personal thing, its a categorical thing.
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Let's look at the reality of how these rights are manifest. You have a right to free speech, it's among the most beloved and valued (high on a hierarchy if you were to provide one). But you can't lie under oath, you can't divulge classified information, you can't cause a panic, you can't bribe a judge, jury or cop, you can't slander or libel, you can't hire a hitman ect. This inalienable right is in fact limited in many instances where it was weighed and found wanting.
Meh, social contract theory is all based on voluntary cession of rights and is based on a reciprocal obligation, and that obligation is justified in and through the concept of natural law. If you're going to struggle all the way up to what is moral, just, and good in how humans deal with each other in the context of rights, you can't begin by denying the source of those rights. No God, no natural law. No natural law, no natural rights. No natural rights, no social contract. You can replace God with "reason" if you like, but it is still an external criterion to appeal to.